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HISTORICITY IN KARL JASPERS' THINKING:
ITS PRACTICAL STRUCTURE PRESENT IN
A CORRELATION BETWEEN HIS
THINKING AND HISTORIC
CONSCIOUSNESS

by



ABRAHAM SOZO KASHIYAMA

A THESIS

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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA
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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled "Historicity in Karl Jaspers' Thinking: Its Practical Structure Present in a Correlation between His Thinking and Historic Consciousness" submitted by Abraham Sozo Kashiya in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

Jaspers' approach to history may be traced as stretching beyond his philosophy of history as well as his conception of historicity as a doctrine. The historic consciousness lived by him throughout his whole thinking is communicative in structure, and as such it is present in every stage of his thinking. It grows to acquire clarity and thus actualizes its life in an intrinsic correlation with the simultaneous growth of his thinking both cognitional and speculative.

I. Bound up with his strong sense of communicativity, Jaspers' historic consciousness originates as breaking through the realms of cognitive history and of contemplative concentration on empirical knowledge of history. It involves an awareness of his own self, which he upholds as an actuality, authentic only in the existential present. As such, it begins to take shape since his early youth, that is, it develops along with his understanding of such as nature, tradition, knowledge and communion with those close to him. It is a major factor which makes his psychopathological researches and world view psychology so dynamic as to distinguish these from mere cognition.

II. In his overall approach to the past philosophies, Jaspers substantiates his historic consciousness by applying a conception of Existenz. Then, the existential present is confirmed as the origin of the human, historic possibilities.

III. Culminating in the zenith of such a creativity whole, Jaspers discloses the Existenz state as the wholeness side of the subject-object cleavage. In lifting up the authentic state of

creativity as such a whole, he identifies a-historicity with nihilism and rationalism.

IV. Reaching the widest breadth of this existential creativity, Jaspers sets up mystic experience and ascribes this to demonic man who experiences infinitude on the one hand and takes on himself as such his temporal being on the other. This unity of eternity and temporality is held to remain actual only when demonic man never inclines to either side but keeps becoming in time by shaping the world. This cognitional clarification leads Jaspers to a dependable certainty of the eternal now revealed by the past philosophies. Out of this eternal now, Jaspers steps into his philosophizing, philosophizing to follow the past task in his own present situation.

V. At the stage of his philosophizing, Jaspers brings forth a systematic conception of historicity for the purpose of upholding the same historic consciousness. The existential possibilities in time are understood as in tension with Existenz' fundamental relationship with the Transcendence. Thus, historicity is presented as an act of salvatory communication for faith. As contrasted to revelation, this faith-rooted communication limits itself to immanent transcending and intends to be significant by choosing to be an appeal for unending communication for faith.

VI. Jaspers' historicity develops along with his urge for transforming Christianity; in this context, it may be considered as a significant appeal to the Christian faith, especially when both the faiths eventually have to struggle for the truth of eschatology. Bultmann, Tillich and Barth are discussed in an attempt to see Jaspers' contribution and to point out a question arising thereat.

Table of Contents

Part I	Methodology	1
Chapter I	Introduction	1
	1.1 Purpose of this Thesis	1
	1.2 Critiques of Jaspers' Philosophy	2
	1.2.a Jaspers and "Existentialism"	3
	1.2.b Treatments of Jaspers' Approach to History	9
	1.3 Construction of this Thesis	14
Chapter II	The Locus of Jaspers' Historic Consciousness	17
	2.1 Criterion for Determining the Scope	18
	2.2 Range of Jaspers' Approach to History	22
	2.3 Jaspers' Psychology of World Views	30
	2.4 Jaspers' Psychopathological Studies	34
	2.5 The Unity of All Three Stages	40
Part II	Jaspers' Historic Consciousness in his Cognitive Thinking	44
Chapter III	Jaspers' Youth and Methodologies	44
	3.1 Jaspers' Youth and Historic Consciousness	44
	3.1.a Nature	45
	3.1.b Parents	46
	3.1.c The Meaning of Jaspers' Experiences of Nature and Parents	49

3.1.d	Jaspers' School Life	51
3.1.e	The Meaning of Jaspers' Interest in History	54
3.1.f	Jaspers' University Life	57
3.2	The Historic in Jaspers' Communion Relationships	61
3.2.a	Ernst Mayer	62
3.2.b	Gertrud Mayer	66
3.2.c	Max Weber	69
3.2.d	Jaspers' Historic Consciousness in these Relationships	81
3.3	The Historic in Jaspers' Methodologies	85
3.3.a	His Psychopathological Studies	87
3.3.b	His Psychology of World Views	98
Chapter IV	Jaspers' Unification of the Subject-object Cleavage	119
4.1	Toward the Existenz Sphere	119
4.2	Essentials of Existenz	124
4.2.a	The Value Creation	124
4.2.b	Existenz' Historicity	128
4.2.c	The Overcoming of Value	
	Annihilations	133
4.3	Recapitulation	145
Part III	The Creativity Whole	147
Chapter V	The A-historicity	149
5.1	Nihilism	149

5.1.a	Three Flows of Nihilism	149
5.1.b	The Nihilistic Fixation	151
5.2	The Hold on the Finite:	
	Rationalism	154
5.2.a	Authoritarianism	163
5.2.b	Liberalism	164
5.2.c	Value-Absolutism	166
Chapter VI	The Historic Present as a Matter of	
	Salvation	168
6.1	The Hold on the Infinitude	168
6.1.a	Spirit as Infinite and Free	168
6.1.b	Spirit as Irrational and	
	Faith-guided	171
6.1.c	The Antinomic and the Mystic	177
6.2	Spirit between oppositions:	
	Demonic Man	181
6.2.a	The Unending Fluidification	182
6.2.b	Between the Shaping and the	
	Fluidification	183
6.2.c	The Doctrine	184
6.2.d	The Fragmentariness	185
6.2.e	The Indirect Communication	189
6.2.f	The Historic Significance	192
6.2.g	Toward the Being of the Self	195
6.2.h	The Conflict of the Infinite	199
6.3	The Creative Origin: the Mystic	202
6.3.a	Toward the Authentic Sphere of	
	the Mystic	203

	6.3.b	The Polarity of the Mystic	206
Part IV		Existenz' Historicity and Eschatology	210
Chapter VII		Jaspers' Conception of Historicity	214
	7.1	Historicity as Existenz' Phenomenon	214
	7.1.a	Historicity in Relation to a Sense of History	215
	7.1.b	The Awareness of Historicity in Dasein..	218
	7.1.c	Freedom as Historic Consciousness	225
	7.1.d	Historicity as the Life of Eternity	229
	7.2	Historicity Contrasted with the Objective Formulas	237
	7.2.a	Historicity Distinct from Irrationality and Individuality	237
	7.2.b	Historicity Contrasted with any Closed Whole	240
	7.2.c	Historicity and Speculative World History	243
	7.3	The Actualization of Historicity	244
	7.3.a	Fidelity	245
	7.3.b	Expanding the World as Existenz' Phenomenon	252
	7.4	Jaspers' Thinking as Communication of Historicity	254
Chapter VIII		Jaspers' Historicity and the Biblical Eschatology	263
	8.1	From Historicity toward Eschatology	264
	8.1.a	Philosophy as Immanent Actualization	264

8.1.b	Jaspers on Jesus Christ	271
8.1.c	Jaspers' Adoption of Eschatology	276
8.2	The Actuality of the Biblical Eschatology	283
8.2.a	Bultmann	284
8.2.b	Tillich	288
8.3	Conclusion	299
Notes		306
Bibliography		329
Vita		347

PART I
METHODOLOGY
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose of this Thesis

This thesis concerns itself with the practical structure in which Jaspers concentrates man's relation to history on a conception of historicity. Our emphasis will be put upon how Jaspers relates this conception to a task of communication for faith which elevates man's historic possibilities toward eternity. Because of the complexity of Jaspers' thinking, we shall set out by a comprehensive methodological discussion.

First, Jaspers' thinking has been dealt with from various perspectives, and since this thesis orients itself with an existential attunement to Jaspers' thinking, we shall begin by determining this aspect of our approach.

It seems to be desirable that a philosophy be treated in accordance with the author's intention, especially when this is repeatedly pronounced by the author himself. In this sense, two structurally different ways seem to present themselves with regard to Jaspers' thinking. The first is to isolate his doctrines and to deal with them formally without reference to his inward movement, which Jaspers himself holds to be essential to his thinking. The second is to attune to this inward movement by interpreting the philosophical expressions or doctrines, as Jaspers regards these as media for fulfilling his existentially sought inward movement.

To authors who are used to the former type, the latter may look 'unintelligible', while to those who are used to include the

former so long as such a procedure is meaningful for the whole, the former type may look like a violation of the originality of Jaspers. Jaspers himself explicitly points out the importance of the second method, and this is why he consistently distinguishes between "philosophy" and "philosophizing". The former is static while the latter is dynamic to the extent of being identical with becoming of the thinker.

By "philosophy", Jaspers means the objective shape of an inward movement. By "philosophizing" however, he refers to an unendingly transcending by maintaining the unity of the shaping and the correspondent inward movement. Jaspers insists that his thinking as a whole proceeds as "philosophizing" in the above sense of the word. We feel that authors on Jaspers seldom treat his thinking within such a living context. Therefore, we shall stress the practical, culminating movement of his thought in order to present his approach to history as inner growth accompanying his thinking.

Furthermore, with regard to our treatment of his conception of historicity, we are going to discuss it as essential to the fulfilment of his inward movement. In this sense, our approach may be characterized as centred upon Jaspers' praxis of communication which stands out along with his inward movement. This means that the methodological principle of this thesis is dialogue attuning our interpretation to that inward communication urged so intensively by Jaspers. We shall also briefly consider our position with regard to Jaspers' critics.

1.2 Critiques of Jaspers' Philosophy

When "communication" is to rule, to treat Jaspers' philo-

sophy in its own living context means to treat it by his own standard, viz., to assume the communicative dynamism. Jaspers pronounces this:

"It is of the very essence of philosophers not to be capable of being broken up into topics, of being exhausted in subjects (or problems), but to be a whole; a whole which, however, gains utterance only in topics.... I should not defend my writings; all the less so since I have no system to protect. What, self-assertively, I am defending is neither a work nor a confession nor a thesis, but the power of philosophical faith which I serve, but which I did not produce."¹

Here Jaspers insisted that any aspect of his philosophy, so long as it is an expression of the inward movement, is intended to serve philosophical faith at large, which is to shine, so to speak, through unending communication. From the beginning, Jaspers draws attention to the importance of this source of his philosophizing. Yet, it is precisely this point that has been repeatedly neglected by most of his critics. In order to set up our communicative approach more clearly, it seems necessary to review in brief how far his critics go with regard to the communicative stretch of his philosophy.

This may be done in two steps. The first is concerned with the whole of his philosophy, and the second with its particular aspects, which relate to his thought on history.

1.2.a Jaspers and "Existentialism"

Jaspers' philosophy has in general been expounded as a kind of "existentialism". This term has been applied to Jaspers by some simply for convenience sake. Others more or less have used it to classify his philosophy within a general school of thought.

Jaspers, however, distinguishes between "Existenz-elucidation", which he exemplified by his three volume Philosophy, and so-called "Existentialismus", which he calls "a possible debasement of"
2
"Existenz-elucidation." By using the word "debasement", Jaspers indicates something decisive for determining the relation between his critics and his own thinking. The point is that, if the word "Existentialismus" means fixing concrete man to a set of such as doctrines or tenets, it misuses the doctrines produced by the existential thinkers. This is so because such doctrines should be regarded as expressions of "actualization" in which the man is never exhausted by the doctrines produced but remains to keep authenticating himself. In other words, the word "Existentialismus" means subordinating man, namely authentic freedom, to any rational, uniform knowledge produced in the process of inward movement.

It is customary to link together, to say the least, such thinkers as Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Jaspers, Heidegger and Sartre, under the title "existentialism". In the same manner, Jaspers' philosophy is reduced to the insights of his predecessors. To this, Jaspers responds by upholding the sphere of "perennial philosophy" — or of eternal philosophy — in which each philosopher participates on the level where the participant never claims either mastership or discipleship.

That is, Jaspers' position is that existential truth, reached by existential elucidation, proves its worth only when the other partner in communication becomes himself Existenz. It is never exhausted by any cognitional procedures. Here is one example in which Jaspers makes this point clear to one of his critics,

Eduard Baumgarten, the author of the essay "The Radical Evil in Karl Jaspers' Philosophy".

"Baumgarten charges me with the intent of making Kant, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche into a single truth. What a strange intent! As if philosophical truth came into being by stirring together historically immeasurably impressive, insurmountable figures as into a stew! Each such figure is infinite for us, knowledge of them never complete, their interpretation never to be concluded. It would never enter my head to do anything of this kind. But it does make sense to me to show, on pregnantly demonstrated essential thoughts - which have not been taken out of their context - how thoughts (not personalities) harmonize with one another. Or, to express it in other words: to illumine the work of the great figures without thereby wanting to comprehend it; but to carry out this illumination methodically, in a distinct and in each case definite way, and not by the preparation of mixtures." 3

A brief consideration of the variety of approaches to Jaspers must be made in this connection. I shall try to consider some representative cases by classifying them into stages.

First, there are authors attempting to define "existentialism" by using sociological categories. For instance, Walter Kaufmann once called it "revolt against traditional philosophy".⁴ Ernst Breisach calls it "the revolt of the single one" and then sets up a set of themes by generalizing what he thinks is common to the existential thinkers.⁵ Paul Tillich as well applies the "revolt" to identify the existential thinkers, but as we shall see later, he does so by viewing a history of tension between "essentialism and existentialism".⁶

Secondly, there are attempts to define "existentialism" by patterning a mode of thought out of the existential thinkers.

For instance, H.J. Blackham focuses on unending reflections of these thinkers as well as on the consequent nature of such reflections distinguished from cognition-bound thinking.⁷ James Collins and F.H. Heinemann represent the case of concentration on the concept of "existence", in order to identify such a mode of thought.⁸ John Wild dwells most on the methodological aspect and looks into a "phenomenological urge"⁹ as common to their thinking.

Thirdly, while the authors mentioned above are not always concerned with the distinction between "Existenzphilosophie" and "existentialism", there are those who draw a line between the two. Thus, in this case Jaspers is located in the flow of philosophical developments. In other words, Jaspers' philosophy becomes now a matter of the history of "problems", in accordance with Windelband's idea of history of philosophy. For instance, Heinz Heimsoeth, the co-author of Windelband's History of Philosophy, classifies Jaspers' philosophy under the title of "Man and History", and classifies him as belonging to the development of "philosophical anthropology" in Max Scheler's sense of the word.¹⁰

Fourthly, mostly from the Catholic point of view, Jaspers' philosophy is treated as a metaphysics. For instance, M.F. Sciacca characterizes Jaspers' philosophy as "leap into emptiness" by comparing it with traditional ontology, which aims at knowledge of the ultimate.¹¹ Max Mueller, from a similar point of view, regards Heidegger and Jaspers as the emergence of "existentialist metaphysics"¹² and contrasts this with "classic metaphysics".

To move on toward much broader approaches, firstly Paul Tillich traces far back to the beginning of Western philosophy to

define "existentialism". So with regard to its contemporary rise, Tillich defines it as a phenomenon occurring in the flow of the predominance bending either on essentialism or on existentialism in the history of philosophy. He writes:

"Existentialist philosophy is a revolt against the predominance of the essentialist element in most of the history of Western philosophy. It represents a revival of the existentialist elements of earlier thought in Plato, in the Bible, in Augustine, Duns Scotus, Jacob Boehme, etc." ¹³

Thus, Tillich understands by "existentialism" the flow of classic existentialism "as an element, then as a revolt, and finally as a style".

This definition has been an influential one. As to its validity, an interesting point is that Tillich himself characterizes his theology as "fifty-fifty" essentialist as well as existentialist. But, if it is "fifty-fifty", it is not "existentialism", to my mind. Further, with regard to other existential thinkers, it may be impossible to point out a merely "existentialist" philosophy if this measure is applicable to them. At any rate, Tillich's definition of "existentialism" seems to mark a boundary leading to something more dynamic than is pursued by the thinkers in question.

Fifthly, on this boundary of the universal concept of "existentialism" stands finally Maurice Friedman, who sets up "the worlds of existentialism". In doing so, Friedman identifies "existentialism" as concentrated on a "mood" or "temper" which unites the diversities existing throughout man's intellectual history. By "mood", he means:

"A reaction against the static, the abstract, the purely rational, the merely irrational, in favor of the

dynamic and the concrete, personal involvement, and 'engagement', action, choice, and commitment, the distinction between 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' existence, and the actual situation of the existential subject as the starting point of thought." 14

At this point, a brief recapitulation of these five stages seems to open up a wider horizon necessary for understanding Jaspers. First, we have hitherto considered the concepts of "existentialism" by assuming a hierarchy in which those representative concepts may be arranged in order. We may now identify such a hierarchy as an order of anticipations carried by these authors. To sum up, such anticipations range from (1) the sociological category (revolt), to (2) the mode of thought (existence and phenomenology), (3) the problem history, (4) classic metaphysics, (5) the existentialist stream, and finally (6) Friedman's "mood" as the source of thinking.

Seen from the perspective of the living dynamism of thinking, the first four may be characterized as anticipations based on possibilities of thinking, and hence the inward movement, attributable to the existential thinkers, is forced to vanish into mere possibilities correspondent to these anticipations, which are applied from without.

Compared with this tendency to lose what is sustained as life, Friedman's attention appears conspicuous for its pointing to the inner dynamism to be described. Nevertheless, in reality our impression is that this pointing-to is centred on individual psychology. Therefore, it may be said that, if applied to Jaspers, this inner description is not capable of indicating the importance of the vistas opened up by such things as "faith", "communication" or "historicity". For Jaspers, these states of mind are not the secondary but the primary concerns.

Such is the situation in which we propose a communicative, dialogical approach as preferable to the fashion shown by the "existentialism"-bound critiques of Jaspers.

1.2.b Treatments of Jaspers' Approach to History

In the existing climate ruled by interests predominantly in "existentialism", Jaspers' approach to history has not yet received the attention it deserves. Similar to what has been seen in the foregoing concepts of "existentialism", critiques of this specific subject seem to have presented themselves in a hierarchical order. Assuming that any reflection on history may be considered in the last resort as inward movement, we shall next deal with these critiques in reference to three premodial historical thinkers: Hegel, Heidegger and Jaspers.

First, following up Hegel's position that philosophy of history is a total knowledge of history, there are critics who treat Jaspers' philosophy of history as a "system". Thus, in this case his philosophy of history is identified as the whole of his thought on history.

For instance, F.H. Heinemann argues that Jaspers' philosophy, passing through his concentration on "philosophical logic", culminates in his philosophy of history, i.e., in The Origin and Goal of History. Then Heinemann holds that the philosophical logic established Jaspers' systematic conception of "The Encompassing" and that the subsequent work The Origin and Goal of History indicates philosophy of history as, like
15
in Hegel, the all-inclusive knowledge of this very "Encompassing".

This interpretation of Jaspers' philosophy of history is a typical example of those who impose Hegel's idea of philosophy of

history upon Jaspers', which Jaspers himself regards as a "cipher" producible in the process of increasing clarity of the inward movement going in association with the current empirical knowledge of history. Jaspers' attention to the impossibility of the Hegelian all-inclusive knowledge remains conspicuous ever since his methodological discussion in the Psychology of World View, published more than a decade before his three volume Philosophy. In The Origin and Goal of History, he writes:

"Today the attention to history that known as an overseeable whole (holistic) is being surmounted. No exclusive total outline of history is still capable of satisfying us. We do not obtain a final, but only a currently possible, integument for the totality of history, which breaks up again." 16

Another notable instance similar to Heinemann's is that Richard Dietrich identifies Jaspers' reflection on history with his philosophy of history and characterizes this as "theorization" of total history. Dietrich thinks that Jaspers derived his philosophy of history from his philosophy. So Dietrich treats Jaspers' philosophy of history by classifying it as a "system" pursued by a speculative philosopher contrasted with an empirical historian.¹⁷

Such a derivation seems not to be supported by the fact. As we shall see later on, Jaspers' philosophy of history was in fact substantially prepared as indispensable for the structure of his three volume Philosophy. In other words, his Philosophy was formed along with his very comprehensive reflection on history, including his examination of all current philosophies of history.

In short, to impose the holistic Hegelian idea of philosophy of history on Jaspers' does not enable the critics to participate in

the dynamic breadth of Jaspers' thinking, which produces a unique philosophy of history along with fulfilling the afore-mentioned inward movement. Next, we shall consider critics who deal with Jaspers' thought on history from the view of participation in the inward movement. Critics on this level reduce Jaspers' historicity to "existence" understood as the phenomenon of Being. Thus, Jaspers' historicity is viewed after Heidegger's pattern, who in his fundamental ontology identified historicity with the temporal nature of "existence".

Hennig, e.g., first notes Jaspers' concept of the transcending dynamic, and then holds that this inward movement or existential subjectivity "absorbs" objective knowledge of past existential transcending. This transcending-absorption, Hennig goes on, cannot but minimize the weight of the past which is of peculiar importance for the becoming of present existence. That is, it is peculiar in such a way that it is the past that first interprets the present. So far as this relation goes, the past is "irrevocable" and therefore must remain in its "concreteness". Hennig's objective knowledge, to be sure, is not identical with empirical knowledge of the past, but with existential objectivity, which he calls "testimony". This means that the testimony works as "material" for the present becoming. If it is to be absorbed by the present transcending, then it turns out that the past no longer remains concrete but "empty", holds Hennig. Not only the past but also the present transcending (and therefore the present existence) as well becomes mere "form" and thus it is
18
"empty".

Hennig's approach to Jaspers' historicity may be characterized as transforming Jaspers' expression of inward actuality into

a scholastic formalism, treating it as fixed phenomenology. Jaspers' inward movement, stretching to the height of the eternal-now, consists in taking on all temporal "possibilities" of Existenz including the objectivity of the past testimony. The conversation between the past and present is communication between inward movement and inward movement, without making any objectivity "absolute" at any level of thinking.

Thirdly, N. Rigali is representative of those who treat The Origin and Goal of History in close reference to Jaspers' own conception of philosophy of history. Rigali notes the structural difference lying between Jaspers' philosophy of history and those which seek an overseeable totality (holism) of history. Thus he upholds the fact that Jaspers' philosophy of history is "praxis" of the task of "existential self-understanding" or "existential self-actualization".

Rigali also penetrates further and stresses that this self-actualization is rooted in the imperative of "communication" between Existenz and Existenz.

With regard to the meaning of Jaspers' schematization of world history, Rigali identifies it as a procedure for bringing about existential transformation. The "transformation" however, does not mean comprehending the past within a cognitive system, but means that Existenz in its full breadth as well as depth has been handed down to the present by the great spiritual tradition climaxed during the Axial,
19
or Pivotal Period , and present Existenz participates in the continuity of the same heights by means of objectifying the tradition by the medium of the rational schema in order to unfold its inward depths.

In this sense, the schematization of world history is in truth a praxis of transcending as well as of communication. Rigali writes:

"The structure of world history intended by Jaspers is by no means what could be made visible by inquiry into the total schema of world history. The schema is secondary. For Jaspers' philosophy of history is primarily not a search for a comprehension (Verstehen) of history but a self-actualization. Jaspers' Axial Period is not the axis of world history but our common ground that is the source of boundless communication required for the actualization of our self-being." ²⁰

Rigali's contribution to lifting out the inward dynamic structure of Jaspers' philosophy of history can be rated as high. Finally, in connection to this inward structure three authors will be mentioned as representative of dealing with Jaspers' major conceptions without paying much attention to the inner unity of his philosophizing and approach to history.

Bernhard Welte, in his comprehensive description of Jaspers' philosophical faith, discusses this central strength of Jaspers' thinking without referring to the historic structure of this conception. ²¹ Rudolf Gerber, in dealing with Jaspers' conception of Reason, never refers to the existential historicity of such Reason, while for ²² Jaspers Reason is Praxis. Charles F. Wallraff, in his comprehensive analyses of Jaspers' major conceptions, discusses Jaspers' historicity by paying much attention to its practical implications, though without ²³ going further than its doctrinal texture. These treatments raise the question of whether Jaspers' philosophy as a whole can be properly discussed without emphasizing his historic consciousness. For, as a matter of fact, his philosophizing was intended in a sense to be an actualization of his historic consciousness.

In any case, Jaspers' communicative approach to history is

not limited to his philosophy of history. Many notable developments after The Origin and Goal of History follow in versatility: his active participation in such communal issues as the Church, University, State, Mankind, etc. are to extend his praxis of communication with history. Moreover, it is our position that Jaspers' communication with history is not what can be derived from his philosophical doctrines. We shall try to trace it as rooted in his historic consciousness present in all stages of his thinking activity. Finally, our approach in such a direction owes much to the following passages of Jaspers' which deal with the possibilities of reporting on his philosophy.

"It is something else again when the critic, in discussing the philosophizing on which he reports, himself goes along philosophizing in the spirit of what he has understood. In that case, he gives a present to his author, lends him his own thinking, and brings the reader into the same specific realm in which the author philosophizes....

Every critique, on its own part, makes conscious or involuntary presuppositions, as for example, concerning what it expects from a philosophical work in general, that is to say, what philosophy itself is and which philosophy it stands ready to recognize as such; then of the standards it applies; and finally, of a surveying, comparing standpoint, which provides for the critic a deceptive sovereignty from outside.

Consequently, in an anti-critique the moving questions are: whether the critique attends to the real intention of the one being criticized or makes improper demands; which are the standards it really applies; whether it has an inner connection within itself or is more a conglomeration of accidental observations and remarks from greatly varying points of view; whether these latter can be lifted out or are lost in the conglomeration; what, conceivably, might be the unconsciously claimed standpoint outside."²⁴

1.3 Construction of the Thesis

Our assumption with regard to Jaspers' historicity is that Jaspers' actual historic consciousness finds in it its own conceptual completion. As for his historic consciousness, we think that it

remains present in all stages of his philosophic growth, which can be traced back to his childhood, so far as its structure matters very much. Furthermore, concerning the relation between his historicity and historic consciousness in this sense, we think that his multiple integration of man's possibilities in time makes his historicity most significant, and that such an integration is in fact identical with what is practised by his historic consciousness throughout all stages of his growth in thinking, the growth since his childhood. From this point of view, we posit the thesis that Jaspers' historicity is better assessed when it is traced back to the significant presence of his historic consciousness viewable as a key element that drives his cognitional thinking toward the growth of his philosophizing. In this sense, his cognitional thinking may be regarded as centred on his actualizations of the historic consciousness, which is structurally of Existenz from the beginning. Thus, we construct our thesis as follows.

Three parts will follow the present one. Part II is concerned with the presence of his historic consciousness as orienting his cognitional activities. However, this does not mean that we deal with the issue simply in chronological terms; Jaspers always remains a scientist even in the midst of philosophizing, and we deal with this presence noting the fact that such connections characterize his present sense of historicity. Thus, Part II is divided into two chapters: (1) Jaspers' youth and methodologies, and (2) Jaspers' unification of the subject-object cleavage.

Part III is concerned with the whole of creativity as assured by contrasting Existenz with a-historicity. Our discussion is based on his Psychology of World Views, though not because we intend to fix his doctrines developed therein. We do so because we think that this contrast leads to Jaspers' existential awareness of the present moment in the face of the eternal mystery under which history exists as the plane for human possibilities sharable in spiritually heightened communication. We view that this present moment clarified through this cognitional understanding becomes the moment for his overall philosophizing as a response to the past communication that he confirms by this work. Thus, Part III is divided into two chapters: (1) the a-historicity, i.e., nihilism and rationalism, and (2) the historic present considered as a matter of salvation.

Part IV concerns itself with a dialogue with Jaspers' appeal for faith as he understands this at the peak of his conception of historicity. By this projection, we divide this part into two chapters: the first one will describe Jaspers' conception of Existenz' historicity, by moving into his Philosophy; the second one will present Jaspers' historicity as a matter of eschatology, especially the Biblical, and will relate it as such to three types of theological interpretations of eschatology as represented by Bultmann, Tillich and Barth.

CHAPTER II

THE LOCUS OF JASPERS' HISTORIC CONSCIOUSNESS

"If I conceive history as a whole, whether as cipher writing or in figures of immanent unity, I make a closed objectivity of it.....

First to revolt against this entirety is our knowledge. We know that the whole is unknowable, that it is merely set forth - whether as cipher writing grown immanent and misconceived now as mundane knowledge, or as a picture to justify our own Dasein, which we want to stay the way it is, or as the picture of a whole from which the discontented deduce their right to fight for other forms of {Dasein}.

Besides, however, the self-being of Existenz rebels against all attempts to fit it into a foreknown law of its existence. Denying historical necessities, Existenz declares that nothing is impossible, that everything depends on what the individual makes of his situations. There is no whole of history; there is one creative act at a time. History can arouse enthusiasm for greatness in self-being; but history is not the unequivocally compelling burden as such that plots the course of the present."¹

In most cases an approach to history, when it carries the metaphysical of profound inward movement, is assessed after the Hegelian pattern of philosophy of history, though this pattern too can be interpreted as just another way of expressing inward movement. Reflecting this general atmosphere, Jaspers' approach to history is discussed predominantly with reference to his philosophy of history represented by The Origin and Goal of History. The above quotation, from his Philosophy seems to be enough to give a glimpse of Jaspers' own perspective of philosophy of history. It appeared nearly two decades before The Origin. As we shall discuss later, for Jaspers, philosophy of history is an essential part of becoming Existenz in time, but only because the present becoming in existential freedom matters most. His thinking, however, is open to, or rather positive about, valuing any contemplative philosophy of history in order to contact the Existenz of such a philosophy. Owing to the transcending

dynamism of his thinking posture, history is reflected on as a matter of Existenz, for which all modes of thinking, scientific or metaphysical, are regarded primarily as an important medium for clarity and communication.

Once this thinking posture is set aside, it seems that parts of Jaspers' multi-dimensional thinking cannot properly be treated as intended for his inward movement. It is for the sake of this inward movement that Jaspers devotes himself to scientific cognition and finally to philosophizing — philosophizing as communication instead of encasing mystery in a "system".

Although it is better identifiable by the word "existential" (existentiell), the beginning of his thinking, characterizable as such, may be traced back to his youth, earlier than when he came to know Kierkegaard's writing.²

Thus, his approach to history, which grows in correlation with his thinking as a whole, may be better assessed if we trace it back to his youth, i.e., to his Gymnasium days. A brief bibliographical ascertainment of the unity conceivable as consciously sustaining since that date may suffice for this purpose.

2.1 Criterion for Determining the Scope

To begin with, we have to establish how a reflection on history produced in the Existenz sphere of thinking can be justified in the face of the bending predominantly toward the pattern of philosophy of history. Secondly, to turn to Jaspers' works, prior to The Origin there are, to say the least, such major works as Philosophy, Psychology of World Views (hereafter The Psychology) and General Psychopathology. To our knowledge, no critic has made an attempt

to uphold something common to these works. Thus, our discussion needs a certain preliminary criterion needed for paving the way to our further discussions.

It seems to be reasonable to regard Dilthey as a turning point in the contemporary development of historical thinking. Since Dilthey, the task of laying the foundation for the Geisteswissenschaften has been initiated as well as split into two spheres: (1) methodology of historical sciences and (2) inward contemplation of history. However, as for Dilthey, so far as his influences on the existential thinkers are concerned, what must be emphasized is the fact that he dealt with these two spheres as one unity but not as separate.

Let us ascertain in the first place how close the distance between Dilthey and Jaspers is. It must be said that Dilthey is conspicuous for his initiative in focusing on man's inward historic becoming³; which too has been followed as well as developed by prominent thinkers such as Buber, Husserl, Collingwood, Toynbee, Heidegger and of course Jaspers. All these thinkers are at one in being deeply attentive to the limitations of empirical history, while at the same time emphasizing, in their own thinking, introspective strength in order to expand their minds far beyond the empirical sphere.

In view of the inward direction which binds all these thinkers, our point of departure may be to ask this question: what kind of will guides Dilthey's approach to history? First, to start with Dilthey's epistemological attempts they are notable for setting the task which was spurred by his will to become "man in time". In other words, the inward breadth of this will sets the task and remains the guide for his whole thinking.

He objectifies this dimension by reducing the Geisteswissenschaften to the structure of "lived-experience" (Erlebnis), "understanding" (Verstehen) and "expression" (Ausdruck). Dilthey writes:

"The Geisteswissenschaften rest on the connection which consists of lived-experience, expression and understanding. Thus, the development of these sciences depends on the deepening of lived-experience and on the increasing tendency to bring their content to the surface; and at the same time it is conditioned by extending the understanding over the whole objectification of the spirit (Geist) and by the increasingly complete as well as methodic extraction of the spiritual from all sorts of expression of Life."⁴

Then, he proceeds to identify "Life" as the origin from which the types of behavior arise -- such as "perceiving, evaluating and the setting of purposes -- with countless nuances merging into each other".

In his "analytic and descriptive psychology" Dilthey identifies this in form of cognition, calling it the "structural system of Life" (Strukturzusammenhang des Lebens); the individual centre of this interaction is identified with the self.

So, he found that as long as this idea goes, relativism of all historic objectifications become inevitable. However, Dilthey was not a mere epistemologist. His whole efforts for laying the foundation for the Geisteswissenschaften have their centre in his will to enhance the inward development of man. This will he has cultivated through his long concentration on such great figures as Lessing, Kant, Goethe, Hegel and Schleiermacher. In his "Inaugural Lecture, Bassel-1867", Dilthey characterizes these thinkers' generation as striving for "meaning" (Sinn) of the world as a whole, and states:

"From this context comes to them their task. Our task is clearly shown to us: we must follow up Kant's critical path and lay foundation for an empirical science of man's spirit. We must carry out this task in cooperation with researchers in other areas. What matters is to know the

the laws that govern social, intellectual and moral phenomena. Our knowledge of such laws is the source of all human strength face to face with the spiritual phenomena.

*

Man's purpose means action. Thus, philosophy will be able to offer really fruitful prerequisites for the action-minded Life -- action in all great direction, i.e., in society, moral change, education and law.

*

How far it can carry out this task depends on how far it unlocks man's inwardness and also on how far it teaches us to be active in the moral world in accord with clear knowledge of its great connection of order, instead of readily gearing in man's inward movement, which ought to be sacred to us all." 5

In correspondence with this inward movement of his thinking, Dilthey proceeds to unlock the realm of man's desire for the absolute. Thus, the perceiving culminates in a desire for universal validity; and the evaluating, in absolute value; and the setting of purpose, in absolute meaning.

But again so far as the historical viewpoint goes, all expressions of the absolute turn out to be relative. Thus, in his Weltanschauungslehre Dilthey struggles to overcome the anarchical states of the absolute. He seems to have attempted to solve this problem by turning to Life which actualizes itself through becoming the type of expression called world views.

Now, if we relate these developments to the afore-mentioned two directions of his thinking it has been now disclosed that Dilthey on the one hand philosophizes about history to uphold Life as actuality, and on the other to confirm such Life as his ultimate sign through which he wants to saturate the inward breadth reached by the greatest souls in time. Without this stretch of his thinking, his methodological inquiry is never to be fulfilled so long as it is projected as part of his whole thinking.

A similarly broad compass of historical thinking, in close contact with empirical history, has been disclosed by such thinkers as Collingwood, Husserl and Heidegger, for example. Collingwood's thinking did not rest until it reached the point that history as a matter of being man is the continuity of man's self-reflection in correlation with leading science in each generation.⁶ Husserl's thinking did not rest until it reached the point that history is the actualization of the spirit of Europe, whose present stage he identified with his idea of phenomenology.⁷ Heidegger's thinking found no rest until it reached the point that Being, which he defines as the wholeness of the world, becomes its phenomena in time.⁸

Thus, we note that with these thinkers, reflection on history is never confined to an idea of a science or of metaphysics, but stretches as far as their inward movement points to. The inward movement keeps stretching until all thinkable human relations are integrated so that the continuity of inwardly understood time and of being man cannot be separately understood. We assume a zenith of such inwardness when we apply the term "inward movement" in determining Jaspers' approach to history as it culminates along with his thinking as a whole.

First, since it is unusual to discuss his approach to history in such a compass, it may be helpful to begin by viewing how Ditley's sphere is broken up and then a larger sphere retrieves it in Jaspers' thinking.

2.2 Range of Jaspers' Approach to History

Jaspers' three volume Philosophy consists of three parts: Philosophical World Orientation, Existenz-illumination, and Metaphysics.

The dynamic breadth of his historical thinking throughout the book is intrinsically related to the nature of the philosophy intended therein. Jaspers wants us to read the whole book as intended to culminate, in essence, in communication between Existenz and Existenz.

"What this book shows of philosophy is not "the thing itself", which does not exist in the form of knowledgeable data. All it shows is what the thinker's own actuality must supplement to bring philosophy into being.

The point, for the reader, is to recognize his own thinking posture as he follows the train of thought; it is not to acquire a stock of knowledge that might be summed up in a doctrine. Thus, the "world orientation" of volume I presupposes the realm of the sciences and some experience in scientific thinking; without both of these the sense of a transcending ascertainment of the world becomes incapable of fulfillment.

*

Thus, the thoughts presented in volume 2, Existenz-elucidation, will require the reader's possible Existenz to vibrate with them. Thus, we shall talk in volume 3, Metaphysics, about mental operations, ciphers, and relations to transcendence, although no metaphysics can ever be fulfilled except in the reality of an Existenz touched by transcendence." ⁹

Next, with regard to this existential "vibration", i.e., communication, Jaspers already emphasizes it in the foreword (1931) to the book. The profundity of Jaspers' "communication" consists partly in its historically deepened aspect. Communication for Jaspers remains immature unless it is substantiated with understanding history in its fullness -- the fullness coming through intellectual history. When he refers to communication with the great thinkers in history, he means communication reached beyond a fulfillment of the Geisteswissenschaften. Thus, communication becomes an indispensable ground for his philosophizing:

"Philosophy, the goal of true community among men who are themselves, has been wrought by lonely, distant individuals. In an extravagance of agonies and certainties, they

sent us word but did not bid us to follow. The experience they show us was singular and unrepeatable. They were sacrificial victims, so to speak, whose visions -- translated into thought -- convey to us what a less hazardous fate could not have brought to light.

*

In our philosophizing we revere what they proved humanly possible. We want to catch their every word; they have made it impossible for us to take any knowable order for the only true one.

*

But ourselves philosophize in communication, not in isolation. Our point of departure is man's relation to man, the individual's way of dealing with the individual. In our world, linked fellowship seems like the true reality. Communication leads to our brightest moments and lends weight to our life.

*

My philosophizing owes its every content to people who have come close to me. I consider it true in so far as it aids communication. Man cannot place himself above man; he can approach only those he meets on the same level. He cannot teach them what to do, but together they can find out what they want and what they are. There can be solidarity in what must animate our existence (Dasein) if it is to turn into being (Sein)."¹⁰

Philosophizing heightening itself to such communication also has as its own substantial content an "existential historic consciousness" first in reflecting on this relationship with the past and then in signifying itself as the present that succeeds to the same task of the past in its unique situation. In the same foreword Jaspers states:

"Ideally, philosophy is consummate lucidity of being, perfect clarity about the beginning and the end of all things. Though set in time, it has been understood as timeless, a crystallization of timelessness. And yet philosophizing is man's way to touch being historically, in his time."¹¹

This intrinsic relation between philosophizing and the historic consciousness is, however, not identical with that between a doctrine of philosophizing and a doctrine of the historic consciousness supplied by the Geisteswissenschaften. Rather this very historic consciousness grows to its height along with the philosophizing. It

is materialized, so to speak, by the philosophizing. In other words, if any historic consciousness is characteristic of the thinking, like Dilthey's idea of Geisteswissenschaft, Husserl's idea of phenomenology, or Heidegger's idea of ontology, then Jaspers' historic consciousness is determined by his transcending philosophizing, and therefore by his conception of communication. It is in essence based on his awareness of the historicity of his philosophizing. It goes therefore along with his confirmation of philosophy as philosophia perennis -- eternal philosophy which is never to become complete once and for all, but each thinker participates in it at each time in order to fulfill time. This mutual stretch between philosophizing and historic consciousness is what Jaspers stresses with regard to the relation between the present philosophizing and the past philosophies:

"This is why we can say that throughout the scores of centuries of Western thought we have been living in a single philosophy, if by this philosophia perennis we mean the self-knowledge of true being.

And we can say that no one has it, that it is real only if in each succeeding generation it will be reborn, transformed, in individuals -- if each one, for all he knows about the thoughts of the past, has the truth from his fundament and from his present, in this historicity which no one knows from without." 12

This much for the significance of the intrinsic correlation between his philosophizing and historic consciousness. A detailed discussion will enable us to see it more in concreteness. We shall begin by comparing it with Dilthey's "history" bound to his conception of "understanding" (Verstehen), for in reality Jaspers' philosophizing takes place as his thinking comes to break through the Verstehung¹³ stage which on his part is represented by The Psychology, a Geisteswissenschaft.

First, Jaspers, discussing Geisteswissenschaft, explicitly

attributes the Verstehung performance to Existenz by drawing a sharp line between the Idea level (Geisteswissenschaft) and the Existenz level. The Idea level is now taken to be brought to the Existenz level in the sense that only in the Existenz level does Geisteswissenschaft gain its full breadth.

That is to say, Jaspers in the first place considers this science as concerned with the actuality of the spirit, whose objectifications are what this science starts with. The actuality that is dynamic is objectified into the static materials for this science.¹⁴

The break-through becomes inevitable and essential for this science when the researcher reaches—by means of his compelling, objective, scientific understanding—the point where he finds himself participating in an Idea (Idee) carried by his research object. In other words, in participating in such an Idea, he cannot but become aware that the realm of this Idea recedes into the depth which no scientific measures can reach any further.

The "intelligible" comes to soar at this point. The realm of faith and freedom appears to be the master, so to speak, of its objectification. The researcher by concentrating on this dimension of actuality comes to meet the realm of the self as a spirit which he has confirmed by his research. In this overall turn-about of thinking, the understanding (Verstehung) gains anew existential qualification, namely, communication between spirit and spirit. The "spirit" is in this case identical with the "Existenz".

"The absolute limit of the [Geisteswissenschaften] is the freedom of Existenz as the font of communication.

This limit brings me to myself. I am myself, no longer withdrawing behind an objective standpoint which I merely represent, and when another Existenz can no more become an

object for me than I can.... But it is not a passive beginning, as in nature; it means to be present as an unobjectifiable {actuality}. We might say that not coming to be present is identical with pure objective being, and with a view of being as a mere object. To be truly present, on the other hand, is Existenz. It is the capacity for moments of advancing beyond mere experience -- for moments of will, of decision, of fulfillment." 15

To formulate dynamism of Geisteswissenschaft, it consists of the following stages, which culminate in the existential awareness mentioned above: (1) "a factual objectivity as the possibility of being understood", (2) "valid intelligibility as it becomes evident to consciousness at large" -- namely, the scientific intellect, (3) "the possibility of intelligent participation in the temporary entirety of a spirit," and (4) "the actually unintelligible self-being to which we come by understanding alone."¹⁶ Thus, Jaspers gives the Geisteswissenschaft existential structure, saying: "Participation in Ideas of the spirit and communication with individual Existenz -- these are two substantial research steps in Geisteswissenschaft."¹⁷

In this existential pointing-to, the understanding (Verstehung) is methodic approach fulfillable only by becoming existential communication. It in this sense traces "the forgotten essence of the mind" to resurrect it before present men and at the same time has to hear and heed individual Existenz carrying unknowable depth behind itself. Thus, Jaspers distinguishes this science from "substantial sciences of the mind" which are mainly concerned with facts, though these are the first steps for the spiritual understanding.

"For what lends the deepest import to the (Geisteswissenschaften) is the will of Existenz to communicate with any Existenz that draws near. It is this will that involves the entire personality in true research in those sciences. The more far-reaching its inquiries and the more clear-cut its findings, the wider the scope it leaves to the unknowable but present Existenz." 18

Furthermore, in this communicative structure, it follows that the Geisteswissenschaft is essentially "historic science". That is, it stems from the present in which the past is understood, and it does not take flight to timeless truth, instead, remains deeply involved in the present world in which Existenz has its Dasein. The topics this science deals with cannot therefore be isolated from the present actualities that move dependent on Dasein or "being in the temporal-spatial world". It takes its root in Existenz as the bearer of Dasein, and it turns out to be nothing once it is isolated from the truth, that is, from Existenz that is no longer derivative from other truth. It indeed objectifies; what is actually objectified is the existential present; a historic world is represented by the medium of the Geisteswissenschaft.

"While the natural sciences deal with timeless legalities and with events in time that may recur without end, the substance of the (Geisteswissenschaften) is always a historic world that will be only more strictly itself in appearance as we define it by the medium of universality and lawfulness."¹⁹

Therefore, the Geisteswissenschaft itself is in this sense a historic activity by which a spirit with its historic consciousness actualizes itself in time by means of practising the understanding in communication. In this sense, again, the Geisteswissenschaft turns out to be a unity of self-illumination and self-actualization.

"The spirit achieves objectively, only indirectly and always historically, as a function of its own, and in this self-elucidation it becomes at the same time a factor that helps to create its own actuality."²⁰

In the most comprehensive structure, the existential dynamic that is expressed in such a way by the Geisteswissenschaft as the Verstehung is finally identified as the historicity of the spirit that becomes such Verstehung, as Jaspers says: "The (Geisteswissenschaften) are historic movement of the unclosed spirit aware of its own historicity."²¹

We have hitherto discussed Jaspers' way of breaking through the Verstehung stage by attributing it to communicative Existenz. The spirit in such a connection however is limited to the understanding of specific objects. When such a will to understand expands on such a scale that it takes up the whole of the spiritual world, thinking moves into the region of philosophy of history. It therefore acquires an Idea of universal history. In reality, however, this is not based on "coercive" cognition, for the whole cannot be known. The spirit by so thinking intends to be concerned with the ultimacy of Being, that is, by the so-produced Idea, the spirit in fact is "proclaiming faith".

That is, the thinker has now taken a structural turn-about by moving from "world orientation" into the sphere of existential freedom, which actualizes itself by being historic. World orientation is intentionally bound to objects, but in this level, the existential freedom has taken the turn to "appeal" to other Existenz by means of becoming Ideas. History is thus encompassed by the existential present. It becomes inward history in the sense of communication between Existenz and Existenz. The shape reached by a philosophy of history is the medium by which the thinker appeals for man's historic fulfillment. Thus, from the thinker's point of view, the realm of existential possibilities is opened up for all possible Existenzen.

"The second way [philosophy of history] takes us to possibilities of thinking which in world orientation are meaningless, because no object will fulfill them adequately. In such thinking we turn the world into an image, only to make each image disappear again; we turn the world into freedom and look upon it as if we were communicating with it and receiving answer.

*

We illuminate freedom in such thinking, thus appealing to possible Existenz; we read the cipher of Dasein and thereby

conjure the Transcendence. What we achieve is neither cogent nor hypothetical, neither plausible nor probable; it is the historic fulfillment of an objectivity that overcomes itself as it takes shape. The course of this thinking is not one of progress but of transformation. If done at all, it is entirely present, not promising to be perfect in the future." 22

For convenience' sake, we have based our discussion on volume I of Jaspers' Philosophy. This fundamental historic consciousness, however, is not limited to his examination of the Geisteswissenschaft as world orientation. It is always positively present at any point of his thinking throughout the whole book. His self-examination of this aspect of his thought is intensively carried out as one of major parts of volume 2, Existenz-illumination. That is, it becomes there his conception of Existenz's historicity. This, however, must suffice for a preliminary indication of Jaspers' historic consciousness as it is present in his Philosophy, in which a philosophy of history has been originated out of a source structurally different from the traditional contemplative one.

2.3 Jaspers' Psychology of World Views

The communicative breadth of Jaspers' historical thinking so active in his Philosophy is not what results from mere theorization of given facts of the Geisteswissenschaften. It itself is a consciously pursued historic becoming. This becoming process may be traced far back to his youth, as said before; its overall clarity in the face of the possible whole of man's spiritual history is reached in his Psychology of World Views (1919). This indicates the fact that the hitherto discussed existential, historic self-actualization has reached a firm orientation a decade before.

With regard to the historic nature of The Psychology, it

may be considered in various aspects ranging from his methodology, treatments of philosophies of history, toward his interpretations of Existenz. But for our limited purpose here, we shall confine ourselves to point out a minimum of indications that his methodic approach to world views is basically historic.

First, the term "psychology" attracts our attention. Jaspers identifies it as "verstehende Psychologie", as we mentioned before. And this reminds us of the existential structure of Verstehung (understanding) which we have hitherto discussed. In other words, it is essentially founded upon Jaspers' awareness of the inexhaustible depths of man's mind, which, as we have mentioned before, he later unfolds by his Existenz-illumination. Thus, this method limited by his existential sense of mystery was set up in clear distinction from those of causal and Gestalt psychologies. This idea of psychology originates in his earlier major work General Psychopathology (1913), whose historic nature we shall consider later on. The Psychopathology is the place where he made surveys of all available types of methodologies. He classified them into modes: the static and the genetic; his approach is decided to fulfil the second direction.

The static mode denotes to present psychic states to oneself or to objectify psychic qualities to oneself. The genetic mode denotes inward participation through presentation or objectification; instead of psychic states and qualities, "empathy, perceiving the meaning of psychic connections and the emergence of psychic phenomenon from another" matter in this case. The former is self-inclusive approach, while the latter is opened up. Now, analogous to the genetic openness, The Psychology is intended not to be a doctrine of

world views but to be "a taking view of a whole" in order that the realm of meaning may be opened up by the medium of its methodic, systematic formulations.

This implies that Jaspers emphasizes the limits of methodic cognition as in contrast with the inexhaustibility of each world view. The boundless depth of the spirit, which we have discussed in the above, is manifest in Jaspers' research here. Identifying the methodic knowledge which he reaches with "shaping" (Gestaltung), Jaspers begins the Psychology by first confirming the "Life" of the "Spirit":

"When order is applied, there appear to us indeed shapes, as it were, as compartments and as possibilities, in which the man either enters or does not. And one certainly anticipates about a man that he belongs in this shape but not in that shape.

At this moment every man appears to us as the boundless self, to whom all shapes belong or in whom all shapes are potentially patterned. Therefore none of the types to be described as arranged is the final possibility in the sense that the individual man has to make decision on it. Rather they are standpoints in which he can fall; but the man in his Life -- if we consider such Life as the whole of his biographical developments -- overlaps any of them The more the systematic ideas govern us, the more we adjust to unity, and accordingly the more unknowable the man is, like radii shine out of one centre." 25

We can see there that Jaspers' methodology has existential concentration. Jaspers recollects that he came to know Kierkegaard in 1913 and learned about Existenz from him. In The Psychology Kierkegaard's conception of the Instant (Augenblick), for instance, is given a special emphasis. The typology of The Psychology builds all types of world views in one hierarchic system according to the trichotomy of subject-object-whole. On the whole, the system consists in a pyramid-wise structure of the unity of world views as attitudes (subjective), world views as world images (objective) and world views as the Life of

the spirit (wholeness). And this Life of the spirit is identical with Existenz.

The Psychology by taking such structure culminates in the polarity of the mystic experience. That is, the ultimate mystery experienced by Existenz is the sphere where the subject-object cleavage no longer exists, and here also is achieved the peak of all world view possibilities. When the mystery is conceived in terms of direct possession, mysticism appears to us going directly into the unintelligible abyss. When it is conceived in terms of indirect expression in communication or in temporality, the Idee-mindedness comes to the fore.

26

Kant is regarded as representing the latter type.

If we should not take flight into eternity, the choice is to hold on the Idee-mindedness. Thus, the Idee exemplified by Kant's Idee as regulative principles are the way in which all objectifying creativity gains meaning. In other words, man who is in contact with the mystery maintains faith by means of the Idee on the one hand and actualizes this faith on the other by means of objectifying, in communication, his unending journey in the middle between eternity and temporality.

27

Now, if we identify this Idee-mindedness as philosophizing, we are pointing at the fact that Jaspers' overall philosophizing sets itself consciously by the medium of The Psychology, as a Geisteswissenschaft. The moment is existentially present in which he makes the turn-about to his own present Existenz after touching on the possibility that time is fulfilled by man's Idee-minded becoming. The temporal destiny of the subject-object cleavage is accepted so as to actualize the faith in eternity. Jaspers writes in The Psychology:

"The authentic life of the Idea is movement within the subject-object cleavage, and thus it is movement in the finite. The life of the Idea is not immediate and is not given and full like lived-experience (Erlebnis). On the contrary it is simply mediated by action in the world, in experience, in reflection, in self-understanding, and the like ...

The Idea lives not outside of the actuality ... but rather lives through the actuality to move and shape in it. However, if the Idea never lives without embodying itself in the finite, this means that it as such is not one of the finite but the finite is its means. The finite through it gains a meaning (Sinn), and eternal meaningfulness (Bedeutung).

It is combined with a whole and eternal. So far as man lives in the subject-object cleavage, or in time and space, it must be that the finite as well as the particular, the temporal Instant as well as the decision in this world, are very important in such a way as the eternal is first decided here and depends upon this temporal decision."²⁸

This view coincides with what Jaspers himself states twice in the same book concerning the nature of The Psychology. In the foreword to the initial edition, it reads:

"This book has meaning only for those who begin to wonder, to reflect on one's own self, and to see how much worth questioning life in this world is It appeals to life's free spirituality as well as activity by offering a medium for orientation, but never seeks to create and teach Life."²⁹

In the foreword to the fifth edition:

"The intention of non-committal contemplation, though clearly stated in my Psychology of World Views could lead to understanding of the book in false direction. One has seen therein a gallery of world views, which are shaped for choice. However, the intention in reality is to ascertain the possibilities as particular and to illuminate the wide space in which the existential decision falls -- the decision which is never anticipated by Idea, system or by knowledge."³⁰

2.4 Jaspers' Psychopathological Studies

The General Psychopathology appeared first in 1913. It was revised twice until the fourth entirely revised edition came into being in 1946, yet Jaspers states on this occasion: "The intention of this

book has remained unchanged." We ask: was this intention historic?

So long as this book is an introduction to psychopathology, the intention may be characterized as fluidifying the history of this discipline into creativity instead of adding to it any objective knowledge. Interestingly enough, the priority given to this fluidification becomes deepened in a sense as the volume of Jaspers' reference to the factual materials as well as to the theoretical developments in this science increases on an exhaustive scale.

This will to fluidify a science does not in reality have much to do with his methodological preference for phenomenology and the psychology of meaning, which we have mentioned as verstehende Psychologie. It is often said that Jaspers' philosophy is psychopathological, but the intention to fluidify lies in something that will lead us to the opposite. His intention was to clarify psychiatric methods in general, as he writes:

"When my book has been on occasion described as representative of the phenomenological trend, or of the trend of meaningful psychology, this has been partly correct. It reaches into a far wider sphere: the clarification of psychiatric methods in general, modes of comprehension and way of research. The aim has been to work through all the available empirical knowledge critically, by reflecting on the methods whereby it was gained, and then give it a general presentation." 31

This fluidifying approach may be simplified if we call it "Jaspers' philosophizing on psychopathology". But this philosophizing is not that by an outsider or observer; it is a philosophizing that is polarly united with this speciality as a science. In this polarity it on the one hand reveals the opened-up space for man's self-illumination and appeals to the thinker who is to remain creative in his science as well as in his self-becoming. On the other hand it presents a com-

prehensive, exhaustive general picture of this special field which is to develop independently of any philosophical confusion inherent in its history. Without such a purification of scientific thinking -- though this too must remain open so long as the above mentioned inner polarity is at stake -- the philosophizing is bound to become a philosophy without science. Such a philosophy is no longer capable of fulfilling the goals of communicative philosophizing mentioned before in regard to the Philosophy:

"It is not possible to avoid a philosophical basic attitude toward any particular science as a whole but this does not mean that one must get caught up in a particular philosophy and stay there.

*
Once we have won some definite scientific knowledge, this is independent of all philosophy, opinion and world views in general.

*
The vital thing therefore is whether our basic philosophical attitude contains the unconditioned will to get to know and therefore impels us to take the paths of science, or whether our philosophy makes conditions for our knowledge and so unfailingly inhibits or destroys any scientific advance." 32

This tension between philosophizing and empirical research, which characterizes his General Psychopathology takes its root in Jaspers' thinking as a whole. That is, because of the impact of his inward movement, Jaspers cannot devote himself to his scientific research without keeping open this particular or specific possibility -- open toward its meaning and therefore toward the existential depth of being man.

Thus, his General Psychopathology comes to take a shape that could be identified as having grown to be a gigantic "philosophical anthropology" -- as indicated by the volume as well as the range of the current edition -- which again consciously keeps itself open to the

possibility of philosophizing. Reflecting this movement-mindedness of the book, the last part, i.e., Part Six, deals with The Human Being as a Whole.

If all this can eventually raise the question of what sphere of thinking a science is to be encompassed in, it may be reduced to the question of how positively Jaspers refers to the creative dynamic of his psychopathological thinking. This creative dynamic cannot be isolated from the whole of inward man, which as actuality no special science can have for its subject-matter, but is to be illuminated by philosophizing. In the current edition of the book, Jaspers marks this aspect by enumerating six points with regard to how "disastrous" it would be to think of the exclusion of philosophy from psychopathology. They are:

(1) That without philosophizing the scientist cannot be conscious of the philosophy he inevitably depends on, and thus it brings about "a scientific and philosophic confusion".

(2) That psychopathology in particular does not in reality rest satisfied with one method only but has various modes, and to clarify all these requires "philosophic logic".

(3) That all ways of ordering knowledge and all ways of clarifying being can only be attained under the guidance of philosophy, so far as they must be done on a comprehensive scale.

(4) That a purely scientific psychopathology needs to know about the relationship between its empirical means (psychological understanding) and philosophical illumination of Existenz; without this it is bound to transgress beyond its limitations.

(5) That the metaphysical interpretation of the life of a human being is in nature completely different from science; without

philosophizing it clouds the scientific aspect of psychopathology.

(6) That psychotherapeutic practise depends much upon the doctor's inner attitude; it is a matter of the kind and degree of his own self-illumination; therefore it is a matter of both the strength as well as the clarity of his wish to communicate; and therefore it also is a matter of the presence of faith, without which the whole activity becomes rootless.³⁴

In brief, the point is that the creative sphere is described here as the dynamism of the polar unity of science and philosophy. The importance of maintaining this polar tension is based on the quest for clarity. The quest for clarity is not restricted to one-dimensional, empirical clarity but that pursued through the unity of science and philosophy. Finally, the whole issue of such clarity is identified as correlative with the doctor's inner, existential depth that integrates itself with faith and communication. Thus, Jaspers discusses science as a matter of man's inward practise; with this all-embracing insight we come to Jaspers' own existential decision. It is in this decision that Jaspers cannot but deal with his psychopathological studies in the tension between science and philosophizing.

Insofar as his psychopathological actualization is concerned, this inward concentration grows to Jaspers' insights into the object of that science, namely man. Along the open-minded research atmosphere that he shared during his clinical period³⁵, Jaspers at first proposed to Nissl, his research director, that considering the intellectual confusion arising from conflicts among various modes of psychology as well as of therapy, a revolutionary way of widening perspective on understanding man must be found. Noting that man, the object of psychiatry,

is first and foremost personality that also is the subject of the Geisteswissenschaft. Jaspers said this to Nissl: "We must learn from the philologists."³⁶ So, he began to look around what philosophy and psychology might have to offer.

"The belief that it was possible to develop methods which would enable us to comprehend man as a whole (as to constitution, character, body-type, and disease-entity) persisted in ever new disguises. Despite the fact that, within limits, all of them were fruitful, the supposed totality of being human, never this totality itself. For the totality of man lies way beyond any conceivable objectifiability. He is incompletable both as a being-for-himself and as an object of cognition. He remains, so to speak, 'open'. Man is always more than he knows, or can know, about himself."³⁷

Concerning the essential aspect of this concentration on man as a whole, two events very significant for Jaspers' growth must be related, that is, he has already been under Max Weber's strong influence since 1909 and has been married for three years.

At any rate, the point is that Jaspers' thinking at its psychopathological stage has already started as consisting in the polar dynamism. That is, on the one hand, it grows in accord with radical will to know; and on the other, by the medium of the sense of ignorance or by going beyond the limitation of scientific cognition, it points to the inward depth of "being man". Above all, this polar stretch entails his attitude to history already. The dynamic, comprehensive thinking-compass at this stage cannot be properly understood if his attention to the relation between history and man is passed by.

This inward orientation remains the same in such a consistency that in the current edition of his General Psychopathology, he relates the science to all major aspects of historical thinking. First, he draws attention to the influence coming from the rise of the nineteenth

century historical school to medicine and himself scrutinizes possibilities as well as limitations of the historical approach to mental diseases. Secondly, in concentrating the matter on basic principles of knowledge of man, he refers to the possibility of reaching the sphere in which man can understand history in correlation with the transcending. He says: "As he searches in the world and founders there he unifies and becomes
38
conscious of his true origins and destination."

2.5 The Unity of All Three Stages

(1) The criterion:

We started by questioning the conventional assumption that Jaspers' reflection on history is discussed in terms of philosophy of history as a system of the whole of history. Thus we made distinctions among (1) methodology, (2) metaphysics, and (3) inward movement. The inward movement was divided into two. One was the inward movement characterized by being bound to observation insofar as the thinker's posture at the ultimate boundary of transcending is concerned. The second was the inward movement correlated with thinking which is characterized by breaking through the boundary of such observation. Historically, we considered such a breadth of historical thinking as having risen since Dilthey. We applied the second to Jaspers.

(2) The philosophizing:

Our point on his Philosophy may be summarized as follows. That is, with regard to its structure of thinking, his Philosophy is distinct in that thinking expands as far as to the sphere of communication between person and person, in which expansion, a comprehensive understanding of all possible modes of historical thinking are meaningfully embedded.

Next, with regard to the historic implication of this thinking dynamism, we have come to the suggestion that it consists in the unity of two poles, namely, (1) the pole of understanding objectifications of the past inward movement in its full breadth, and (2) the pole of over-all conversion to the becoming of the inward self in time.

This becoming was Jaspers' philosophizing as communication, and it is in this philosophizing that Jaspers produces a philosophy of history and locates objective or methodic understanding of the past. The latter is done by Geisteswissenschaften.

(3) The psychology of world views:

We have identified The Psychology as existentially-oriented methodic, objective understanding of the past objectifications of man's inward movement in its full breadth. Thus, here again Jaspers' thinking consists in bi-polarity. That is, it is intended to become an exhaustive systematic only in order to clarify the existential present. Its methodic observation of the past was not intended to confine the past to an objective cognition by the present but to make the past present (vergegenwaertigen) through this objectifying procedure. This means that the thinking expands in the direction to cognition on the one hand only to increase on the other the clarity for touching on, or for bringing about, cognition-supported awareness of the space for the present Existenz. In short, the thinking becomes an assimilation with the past heights so that the present may actualize itself in the same depth and breadth.

It is in this existential dynamic that Jaspers fluidifies for creativity all possibilities of historical thinking. It is in the same dynamism that he in this work makes his thinking grow to a turn-about to a new consciousness of time-structure -- time-structure for the present Existenz but not for mere observation.

Thus, his awareness of the breadth and depth of thinking and also his awareness of the need for converting time structure in terms of thinking, became positive guides for The Psychology.

On this ground, one and the same historic thinking is to be identified both in his Philosophy and Psychology. In his Philosophy, the same thinking acts as the present, which is supported by the clarity brought about through The Psychology. In The Psychology, an objective confirmation of the past existential present was pursued in order that his present Existenz may philosophize in assimilation with the great of the past.

The two works are united to increase clarity (intelligent) for fulfilling time in the existential sphere of thinking.

(4) The psychopathological studies:

With regard to the thinking structure of the General Psychopathology, we have considered Jaspers' emphasis on the bi-polarity of his awareness of the inexhaustibility of man's actuality and the thinking possibility correspondent to this awareness. Jaspers deals with a special science as man's activity for man in disease of his personality. Thus, in this work Jaspers' thinking expands with concentration on cognition represented by psychopathology. We have noted the fact that, by virtue of the above mentioned bi-polar structure, this concentration on cognition grows accordingly in bi-polar structure. That is, it on the one hand points to empirical facts as well as to established methods, and on the other hand it creatively fluidifies (integrates) all these to uphold the creativity of cognition in that field.

Then, in this bi-polaric dynamism of cognitional thinking, Jaspers also scrutinizes the implication of historical thinking as

associated with the developments of that discipline. He of course deals with historical thinking only in terms of the fluidification (integration) fundamental to his thinking. Thus, the becoming of cognition -- the cognition which is intended to serve for the sustenance of "creativity" -- is meaningfully tied to the becoming of man's self-illumination, which points to the inward depth of being man.

This means that, beyond all approaches to history that are fixed to observation Jaspers sets first and foremost the task of fulfilling such becoming. In other words, by uniting scientific thinking and philosophic thinking (which is identifiable as a higher performance of self-illumination), Jaspers from the beginning sets an all-affecting "turn-about" in understanding time.

Now at this point we may note, though only tentatively as yet, that not only his General Psychopathology is part of his total inward movement oriented to fulfill time, but also these three works are united into one as continuation of one and the same task. The historic characteristics of these stages may be schematized as follows:

(1) His General Psychopathology indicates that Jaspers' thinking becomes an empirical science so as to set the task (Aufgabe) of reaching full clarity about time -- clarity indispensable for the becoming of the self.

(2) His Psychology indicates that his thinking becomes a Geisteswissenschaft to confirm the existential Instant (for the present) -- the Instant indispensable for full communication with past great fulfillments of time.

(3) His Philosophy indicates that his thinking becomes a philosophizing to fulfill time in the sense of full continuation of history, which is an inward world rising in response to the appeal of the past Existenz.

JASPERS' HISTORIC CONSCIOUSNESS IN HIS COGNITIONAL THINKING

CHAPTER III

HIS YOUTH AND METHODOLOGIES3.1 Jaspers' Youth and Historic Consciousness

"If I look back upon my whole spiritual development, I seem to see something which has remained the same from my childhood on. The basic disposition of youth has clarified itself in the course of life, enriched in content by knowledge of the world; but there have never taken place any change of faith, no breaks, no crisis, no regeneration."¹

The historic consciousness decisive for Jaspers whole thinking originated in his youth which we in this chapter identify as the period that ended in his marriage to Gertrud Mayer. In this view, we shall deal with his historic consciousness as it emerges from its matrix and develops until he decides to specialize in medicine -- chronologically, from his birth (1883) to 1907. Our discussion in the following puts emphasis upon this period on ground that it is during this period that his whole philosophic thinking gains its structural orientation. We shall try to unfold this origin by tracing the fact that an ever-expanding historic consciousness occupies in this period the centre of his integrating himself in struggling with intellectual confusions he encounters.

If we may say that eventually man's central awareness is to gravitate, in one way or another, to community (subjective) and nature (objective), we may start with these two aspects of Jaspers' youth. With regard to "community", Jaspers' recollections are found centered on his family, school and church. His church life, however, seems to have tended to merge into both the family life and the school life. At any rate, his intellectual growth in this period both in learning and in

reflection takes place in his close conversations with nature and community. We shall take up his experience of nature first.

3.1.a Nature

Jaspers was brought up in Oldenburg in Northern Germany, and influenced by visits to his grandfather's home in Jever, Eastern Friesland, and by his summers on the beaches of the Friesian Islands in the North Sea. His experience of the sea remains peculiar to his inward growth. He recollects that, since his childhood on, he cherished the memory that he felt as if the sea were "the self-evident background of life".

The mystery of the sea impressed on his youthful mind the sense of boundlessness, which gradually became significant for his conception of the boundless and finally of the Encompassing of his philosophic logic.

He reconfirms this experience, saying "The sea is an image of freedom and transcendence; it is like a corporeal revelation coming out of the ground of all beings."²

The sea, for Jaspers, was not only figurative revelation but also the matrix of life. So he identifies the sea with water, water in the sense that it embodies vivacity. Such vivacity or dynamism remains important for Jaspers; he loves to experience not only the sea but the brook, spring, etc.

Then, his experience of the landscape of his Heimat. His birthplace was a plain, marshy land. The landscape was open toward the completely free horizon. The sky appeared open and to be embracing everything.

This attraction to the open horizon reminds us of the way in which Jaspers leaves every level of thinking as incomplete in the face of both the object of observation and his "transcending" from level to level

until the mystery of being is felt to be towering above the clarity reached by such procedures.

The mountain was experienced in a way contrasted to these. The mountain was for him a treasure of countless many sorts of plant life. Jaspers loved it, breathing the air of innumerable representations stemming from it; but it did not lead his eyes toward the boundless as well as the open horizon. Jaspers later encounters the Alps for the first time at his age of nineteen; he recollects that he felt confronted with the mountain refusing his free glimpse and depriving him of the horizon.

Thus, Jaspers' acquaintance with nature did not fall into acquisition of knowledge; his enthusiasm for knowledge was always coupled with a sense of grace which hovers about the object. Neither, however, was to continue romantic enjoyment. The growth of his knowledge meant, in the main, increase of clarity extending along the bottomless space of the mystery.

3.1.b Parents

Jaspers grew up with his father who was a model for him. Of him, he says: "He reared me -- by his example as well as, in decisive moment, by his judgment -- in a spirit of reason, reliability, and faith-³fulness."

In relation to the world, his father guided himself with a spirit of independence, that is, by the will to be personal and responsible in all affairs including his relationship with the church. Jaspers portrays his father as being "without church, without reference to objective authority", and thus "untruth (Unwahrhaftigkeit) was regarded⁴ the vilest".

Whenever young Jaspers was driven to choose himself, his father helped him to accentuate the importance of being oneself even as a child. But this encouragement was far from the radicalization of selfhood. He had to learn the valuable tension between the will to selfhood and tradition. Thus, the choice of selfhood was not based on empirical self-assertion, rather it required him to keep himself open for the truth, which awaits the person's inward growth or maturity.

The communication between Jaspers and his father was not that which is integrated into an authoritarian, or reason-suffocating, one-way demand and into correspondent acquiescence. Nor was it that which precipitates traditional authority into the merely formal validity of the Enlightenment. On the contrary, it was a field in which humanity, concealed in often puzzling current appearances, begins to reveal itself.

In participating in this revealing field, Jaspers' self was rendered with an unswerving guide for broadening the compass of his reflection. That is to say, his self, which then struggled with a specific lane of reason, was able to proceed toward the vista where his concentration on resolution is faced with the trusty unconcealment of the depth of his own authenticity. Thus, resolution and responsibility are tied up together. His incessant questioning, bound up with his urge for resolution, was thus not to bind the self to his own rational honesty, but to call for such honesty so that the unfathomable depth of tradition could appear clearer.

Here is one episode which tells about this dimension of their relationship. When Jaspers became nineteen years old, as a Gymnasium senior, he came to have the idea that he would have to leave the church "for the sake of veracity". On hearing this, his father says:

"My boy, you may of course do as you please. But in your own mind you are not yet clear about what you mean to do. You are not alone in the world. Co-responsibility requires that the individual should not simply go his own way. We can only live together with our fellowmen, if we conform to the regulations. Religion is one of the regulative forces. If we destroy it, unforeseeable evil will break through. That much lying is connected with the church as, indeed, with all human institutions, in this I agree with you. The situation will be different, perhaps, once you are seventy years of age. Before death, when we are no longer active in the world, we may clear the deck by leaving the church."⁵

Incidentally, it happened that he left the church when he was past seventy. He did this in condemnation of the ecclesiastical distortion of morality, "love".⁶

His father's reverence for the Biblical tradition was not doctrinarianly oriented. He integrated his understanding of this tradition with an understanding of love and hope. Jaspers identifies it this way: "When my father lay dying, in his 90th year, and was taking leave, he opined to his pious woman physician, who had been close to him; 'Faith, love, hope, it says -- of faith I do not think highly.'"⁷ Thus, his family life under the guidance of this thoughtful father became for Jaspers the most stable visualization of the indissoluble breadth between the present and spiritual tradition. The depth of mutuality between parents' love and Jaspers' trust in response to it established the fountainhead of his spiritual growth.⁸

Jaspers' mother's image may be taken as more symbolical of the guiding nature of his family life. He describes her:

"It was her infinite love which made my childhood and that of my brother and sister sunny and our later years exceedingly happy.

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Her boundless vigor and spirit filled us with courage and determination; her deep understanding of our aims and ideals, which far transcended all conventionality, stimulated our enthusiasm; her wisdom gave us warmth and assurance of security." ⁹

3.1.c The Meaning of Jaspers' Experiences of Nature and Parents

With nature, Jaspers experiences an encompassing, lifebearing strength, and a revelation of a boundlessly open horizon stretching beyond all visibility as well as all knowability.

Here Jaspers' fundamental attitude to the objective world, the object of empirical sciences, gains its shape as well as its ground, and in such a way that his awareness of the unfathomable depth of the mystery of nature never fades away as his enthusiasm for its objective representations keeps increasing. The conversation between these two dimensions of his consciousness determined the way in which he approached the objective world.

In this sense, his relationship with nature may be regarded as a source of Jaspers' scientific thinking. The polarity of the mystic, by which he integrates his systematic of the past and present Existenz, appears to have its origin in Jaspers' infant experience of nature.

This re-emergence of his infant origin, however, cannot be separated from that of his relationship with his parents. His thankful trust in nature and his satisfied trust in his parents' love grew in mutual harmony. His awareness of the depths of nature and his listening posture toward the depths of great tradition represented by parental wisdom, moved on the same path of his consciousness. The imperative burden of choosing the self in decisive moments built the polarity of the will to be and the way he was related to the world and community.

Here we see the infant origin of the praxis-braced nature of

his philosophizing. The tension between uncompromising observation and the will to communication at the zenith of philosophic clarity may not be fabricated by merely systematizing collections of knowledge.

The relationship between Jaspers' later developments and such an origin is different from what psychology explains by the term "motivation". It is also different from what Gordon Allport explains by the term "possession of long-range goals" defined as central to one's personal existence.¹⁰ That is, his philosophizing is not a natural environmental outcome nor a "future-directed" becoming of this origin.

Jaspers consciously holds on this origin and regards his philosophizing as no more than the performance of clarification of the same. In a sense his thinking, as it increases this clarity, returns to this origin to confirm it in light of the increased clarity.

For Jaspers, this cycle means the maintenance of existential seriousness of time—past, present and future. This seriousness is rooted in the depths of "being man". Firstly, to see the way the present is indebted to the past, the task comes into being through communication with the past. Family life is the first field for a youth to share in such communication in its full depth, though the youth himself may not yet be clear about the significance of the past.¹¹

Secondly, to focus on what is reached by the later developments, all communicative production is determined by one's past life and present situation. No moment can be final; the becoming is to continue all the way through life. Each time is equally important as soon as one is awakened to his Existenz.¹²

Thirdly, if to consider the meaning of what is brought about through this becoming, to become man in time means that Existenz actualizes

itself through coming into this empirical world. Thus, Existenz takes on his responsibility for his empirical life, past life included. Particularly, what has been important for one's becoming must not be forgotten so that his empirical possibility may be meaningfully unified toward the end of life in this world. One's possibility in this world is bound to be limited as time goes on. Integration of one's possibilities becomes crucial. Thus, in order to be sure of one's empirical substance, he cannot but become serious about what was important for him in the past. Jaspers identifies this integration as "fidelity" (Treue) and states in his Philosophy:

"Fidelity itself is the historicity in which I take hold of my substantial existence by trying myself to what it rests upon, by refusing to forget, by keeping my past effectively in mind."¹³

It is in this context that Jaspers confirms the significance of the above mentioned cycle, saying "I cannot love myself without loving my parents"; and he continues:

"To be faithful, I must forever preserve experience of my childhood and adolescence, and I must take them seriously. Existenz has to be empty and at a loss to deride its own youth and to dismiss past realities as juvenile illusions. He who does not keep faith with himself cannot keep faith with anyone."¹⁴

When the cycle, in which the fundamental awareness and the thus guided clarification are unified is lifted out as the loyalty in such a sense, this means that Jaspers' thinking keeps ascertaining that his philosophic performance as a whole remains historic, not universal. By the continuity of the cycle, this point is ascertained again and again with increasing clarity.

3.1.d Jaspers' School Life

Jaspers' school life as well maintains a sustaining fundamental

structure, which corresponds to his experiences of nature and parents. In 1952, Jaspers wrote an article entitled "On the Limits of Pedagogic Planning": it reflects the nature of his school life. It reads:

"Children, we say, are to be taught skills and knowledge. Knowledge in its pure form is made available to us by science. Accordingly, we plan to transmit to the young the substance and the methods of the sciences insofar as they appear to be useful in adult life. History, for instance, rests not only for the teacher on critical historiography; it is taught as a science. Instruction in ancient languages and in the life and letters of one's own is permeated with linguistic lore. Bible classes turn into religious history. For children, however, such science is never important; what is important is to fill their young minds with sublime views, with images and figures. Important, therefore, is the communication of these things, the clarity of their conceptual structure, which involves a training in discrimination, in the conquest of vagueness."¹⁵

Jaspers recalls his elementary school days with deep appreciation of sincere personalities of his teachers. His response to them was respect and love. He stresses the experience that Biblical History impressed on his mind a consciousness of "solidarity and the depth of authority". Satisfied trust and joyous learning were united into one.

Jaspers' Gymnasium years is the stage where Jaspers begins to experience forces strongly negative to his will to the harmony of knowledge and to human relationships. Thus, he comes to fall into an extreme solitude, which drives him to the possibility of making open communication with history. It is during this period that Jaspers starts questioning the church. In such circumstances, his fundamental will to integrate his mind leads him for the first time to philosophy; he becomes attracted to Spinoza most. At the age of eighteen, after a series of false diagnoses and treatments, Jaspers comes to know that he is suffering from an incurable illness identified as bronchiectasis with cardiac decomposition.

His persistent gloom and this now disclosed menace to his existence
force him to intensify his consciousness of himself.

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To start with his general reaction to the way that knowledge was treated at the school, Jaspers feels dissatisfied with the knowledge transmission inclined to an aggregation of "facts" and to "a spirit of pompous philology".

He feels that such a way of learning never serves for approach to "the whole" both of nature as well as of humanity.

As to the realm of personality, Jaspers was faced with the moods of inclining to "obedience to a whole", exemplified by school festivals and loyalty to the Kaiser. Sensitive of the authoritarian lead of these, Jaspers felt that they did not cultivate the spirit of real community but of sham community. He understood that this tendency was by nature interchangeable with the close-minded postures of members of the school, both the staff and students.

Jaspers was occupied with an aversion to blind obedience to authority. He expressed this by uncompromising protests against orders which he identified with the military discipline. Naturally, his conflicts with the principal and friends continued throughout his Gymnasium life.

He protested this way not on the basis of like or dislike but of rational clarification. So, Jaspers found himself suffering from lack of communication.

The realm of personality was also related to learning. Jaspers observed his teachers by focusing on how the knowledge they participated in was really relevant to their whole personality. He experienced a variety of ways in this regard and responded by pursuing his personal will

to integrate himself through the medium of learning.

His attention was drawn to history teachers. Thus, he began to feel the distance between history interpreted along the dominance of phantasy and history dealt with in a spirit of critique.

For Jaspers, history class was something more than his other classes. Notable enough, his interest was centered on man's possibilities in the course of history. Again, such possibilities were not to be sought after in terms of aggregation or juxtaposition but in terms of meaning in relation to the whole.

Disappointed by the school atmosphere in this regard, Jaspers came to break through the tension by moving deeply into his hobby to recover historical figures and events in their relevance to a whole. He collected pictures of the past stories and attempted to step further toward the historical continuity. This collection was going so satisfyingly that Jaspers was able to recover the spiritual relevance of his school life. He says: "This picture collection became my spiritual resort outside the school; first of all I in this made alive for myself the information taught at the school.... To me this picture collection was for my own activity like a crystallization point around which all the otherwise divergent must be put straight."

3.1.e The Meaning of Jaspers' Interest in History

With young Jaspers' concentration on history, we come to a positive turn in his intellectual growth -- positive despite all his gloom, loneliness and experiences of the problematics of the community and of learning.

This activity, however, was in structure, something different from a curiosity-rooted enjoyment of facts of history. Similar to

his experience of nature, family life and elementary school life, it was the indication that his spiritual frame was to recover its buoyancy in the midst of his disintegrating situations.

It is characteristic that this positive movement called for a spirit of critique, that is, for reason exemplified as yet by mediating his understanding by empirical facts.

Such empirical facts were called for so that clarity as to the meaning of life may be reached. The unity of rationality and the will to meaning, which he had in his earlier days, now came to actualize itself in his pursuit of history. His purpose was to reach the world of insight through the medium of empirical procedures. He recalls:

"It became a foundation of my disposition that for me the fact is not successful at the undertaking in the world. Only the scrutinization, and then the information of the scrutinized, and the doctrine based upon such gave me courage to live in the world and a hope for success. The consciousness of powerlessness in all that is neither insight nor inward activity accompanied with insight was with me since my school days."¹⁹

The bi-polarity of inward concern and rational procedure, which is characteristic of Jaspers' philosophizing, had now taken its root firmly in his approach to history. It increased clarity by the medium of the consuming experience of the situations of reason.

His consciousness of the school's problematics mentioned above can be regarded as having reared the growth of such present, historic clarity. His protests which continued until the last moment of the graduation ceremony, was in a sense a sort of retrieval of tradition on the basis of his approach to history -- on the basis of existential sympathy.

Notable in this regard is his criticism of the church. As mentioned before, Jaspers thought of leaving the church. He thought

that confession was in fact not different from indifference and thus promoted all sorts of folly in the church, and that with such confession the church existed, which in turn effected so much dishonesty. We have considered his father's counsel on this. If considered in relation to his attitude to history, the point is that he seems to have fought for the existential meaning of the church. Despite the fact that young Jaspers had not yet reached such a mature reflection at that time, this became the basic tone of Jaspers' later philosophizing on the church. Incidentally, Jaspers himself remained a church member, classifying his position as that of a "liberal protestant".

Finally, we also notice here that his approach to history, searching for man's possibilities in time, had already at this stage begun to discipline his thinking structure. That is, the possible multiplicity of historic possibilities was integrated into his personal inward movement. The relation he built between the world of insight and that of facts is one example of this inward integration. This is not identical with what the contrast between the "subjective" and the "objective" means. In other words, the subjectivity contrasted in this manner means empirical subjectivity, whereas the inwardly understood subjectivity means subjectivity in terms of the category of "wholeness", which he regards as the origin of the dichotomy of the "subjective" and the "objective". At any rate, what is notable is that Jaspers has attained such a structure of integration, though perhaps without reflection yet, by concentrating on history.

This has to do with the question of whether Jaspers had shown any sign that he in his inward movement felt it important to be clear about the form of thinking. Jaspers later by his philosophic logic

consciously attempted to give clarity of this kind to his own philosophizing. As to this question, we may suggest that young Jaspers, though without reflection, had already extended his interest in this direction as well. This is indicated by his absorption in Spinoza, whom he at that time regarded as "the first" and "my philosopher". He recalls: "The contents of Spinoza moved me very much; I always thought over the ideas that the whole nature must be soulful and that God could be called a whole".²² We can see here young Jaspers' interest in the question of category, which is of course a matter of thought's reflection on itself.

In any case, the way young Jaspers related inward movement and the realm of objectively visible possibilities -- the intellectual possibilities included -- indicates that the hierarchical structure of his transcending began in his Gymnasium years to be shaped by his understanding of history. And the understanding stemmed from his inward movement. Later in his Geistige Situation der Zeit (1931), Jaspers reascertains the same inward structure:

"He who in youth has learned Greek and Latin and has read the ancient poets, philosophers and historians, and he who has gained familiarity with mathematics and has become acquainted with the Bible and the great poets of his own country, is filled with a world which in its infinite dynamism and openness gives him a substance not to be lost and make him responsive to all others." ²³

3.1.f Jaspers' University Life

"In Heidelberg, everything was as though mankind mattered most. Professors found themselves at home across all faculties not with mere companionship but with spiritual life." ²⁴

At the age of eighteen, Jaspers began his university career at Heidelberg. He went to Munich the next year and from there to Berlin and to Goettingen. Feeling that Heidelberg was the best university, Jaspers returned to the university in 1906, where he stayed until he was invited to Basel in 1948. He was matriculated for three semesters as a student of jurisprudence and then enrolled as a medical student. In deciding to switch to medicine, Jaspers at first planned to become a physician in a mental hospital, and then to enter upon an academic career as a psychologist. His will to be historic came to permeate his scholarship. His choice of medicine was motivated by his serious concern for his own self-integration.

Due to his chronic disease, Jaspers had to suffer from loneliness, interruptions, melancholy, and excessive self-consciousness. These negative forces, however, never came without arousing his firm spiritual composure. The lectures he attended during the first year were disappointing, especially those in law and in philosophy. Behind this dissatisfaction, however, lies a quickening of his philosophic and spiritual awareness, which enabled him to sense the disparity lying between his expectation of philosophy and the type of philosophy being offered at the universities.

It was his "basic faith", which we have considered in describing the previous stages, and his urge to "enter upon a concrete path of leading one's life", which were decisive for what he expected
25
of philosophy in the first place.

Confronted with the question of "what should I do?", Jaspers raised this inward dimension by confirming the place for philosophy. He says: "Since my schooldays, however, I was guided by philosophical

questions; philosophy seemed to me the supreme, even the sole, concern of man; yet a certain awe kept me from making it my profession." ²⁶

Thus, the dissatisfaction with law and philosophy courses was in fact something entirely different from a merely negative reaction. It was an expression of how he continually associated his task of integrating himself with the possibility of philosophy. His criticism of school philosophy at that time indicates how creatively he thought of philosophy:

"The lectures offered nothing of what I sought in philosophy: neither the fundamental experiences of Being, nor guidance for inner action or self-improvement, but rather, questionable opinions making claim to scientific validity." ²⁷

To be able to view philosophy as something more than fixed to scientific validity was not conceivable without the integration strength of his "basic faith". His aversion to any philosophy that was bound to such a validity, however, did not mean that he felt negative about science; on the contrary, in reality he believed that scientific "objectivity" is indispensable for clarifying his fundamental faith. It was this insight into the meaning of objectivity that caused him to transfer from law to medicine. In law courses, he "perceived only the intricate mental juggling with fictions". ²⁸ He wanted to perceive "actuality", actuality in the sense that he wanted to know what is possible and at the same time what lies beyond such a possibility-dimension, for actuality as coming to observer's inwardness is more than its objectivity, that is, actuality in this sense must mean a "whole" but not mere objectivity.

He intended to achieve this aim by concentrating on medicine. The motive was more than his concern with a profession. He recalls:

"I wanted to discover what knowledge is possible; medicine seemed to me to open the widest vista, having all of the natural sciences and man himself as its object of investigation." 29

In such struggles necessitated profoundly because of the popularity of his thinking, Jaspers attempted to enhance his faith by resorting to art, poetry, graphology, and the theatre. He wanted to experience "greatness", especially in art. So in 1902, the second year of his university life, Jaspers visited Italy to see "Eternal Rome", and to "sense history and gaze on beauty."

Thus, his study of medicine went on in intrinsic association with Jaspers' awareness of the mystery in which research — whose maximum breadth was symbolized by the university — and his own personal inward world were rooted. The University of Heidelberg gave him a comprehensive, trustworthy image or Idee of the community of man's inward movement. In other words, it was to represent the continuity of spiritual movement on the highest level. Jaspers found himself participating in this continuity; it is an expression of the depths of his participation in this that he proceeds to write several times on university as such a continuity.³⁰ He recalls his first impression at Heidelberg:

"My relation to university has a premordial character. As I at the age of eighteen entered its halls, they appeared to me like holy rooms. Nothing was for me so sublime as they. I had the good fortune to see and hear prominent professors, and at the same time the good fortune, though not yet fully reflected on, to believe firmly that the university is a great Western, supranational fact like the church." 31

This continuity furthermore was meaningful to Jaspers only because the members remained open in communication, through which alone the inward whole of each member was able to stretch in freedom. It is from this conviction that Jaspers was able to anchor his pursuit of medicine on the sea of immense possibilities of knowledge. Truth was

the truth in communication. This idea of truth, which is the core of Jaspers thinking as a whole, was identical with his logos, or clarification, of his own university life, which came to him as one of great spiritual traditions of mankind.

In short, through his university life, Jaspers' thinking which was increasing "clarity" -- clarity sought after by its conversation with his faith -- became conscious that it had to follow up the road of the great souls in history. Existential participation in spiritual history was the meaning of his plan for learning at the university.

But Jaspers himself did not yet make reflection on this until his thinking started philosophizing understood as a present of existential creation. To be sure, he touched on the realm of such a creation by his psychology of world views. In a sense, there is not his psychology of world views without his sense of university as an appealing present of the community of spirit in the highest sense of the word.

3.2 The Historic in Jaspers' Communion Relationships

"Man: his essence showed me the fulfillment of man's possibilities as guaranteeing that there is under the ground of being in any case something, for which we labor and through which our life itself can become a magnificent actuality.

I sought the man with whom such an unreserved friendship prospers. He is to be the man whom I love as if we belong with each other through all eternity. He is to be the man whom I with touching timidity see as all-shattering destiny of the fulfilled foundering.

These three have been encountered with: Ernst Mayer, my friend solidary in permanent struggle with myself; Gertrud Mayer, my beloved wife; Max Weber, a man who stays in dignified distance, experiences the world in doubting, comprehends things by knowledge and yet in himself remains decomposed and torn, without arriving at anywhere in the One and Pure."³²

Every thinking has its point of departure, that is, if not from a casual insight, it usually starts either from the authority of a teaching or from the expediency of a provided doctrine. For Jaspers, however, neither of these was the case. As considered in the foregoing discussions, his thinking is basically bipolar in its whole depths. Facing up to the objective world, he views the world of objects in the mood sensitive to the soaring realm of mystery which "recedes" all modes of objectification. Concentrated on the subjective inwardness, knowing is upheld as a matter of "clarity" whose ultimate role is to serve the growth of man's inward movement.

With regard to such an inward movement, its compass so long as it is present in thinking stretches in the manner analogous to that seen in the receding nature mentioned above. Jaspers is impressed with this direction by his communion relationships. These are so decisive that the thinking now identifies itself as an appeal which is to serve the becoming of man in inward communication, whose base is not to be left with any one thinker but to be kept opened up. It is as if all the previous steps up to this point had acquired their hidden, unflected-on meaning (Sinn).

3.2.a Ernst Mayer

Jaspers met Mayer for the first time in the summer of 1907, the year he began to specialize in psychopathology. The friendship remained genuine until Mayer died in 1952.³³ In the "Foreword" to his Philosophy, Jaspers describes their relationship thusly:

"To my friend, the physician Ernst Mayer, I am indebted for joint philosophizing since our student days. To this work he contributed creative criticism. He gave me communicative reassurance in the moments of doubt which recurrently and indispensably articulates our course of thinking."³⁴

The friendship was not one of mutual admiration nor of communication in the sense of a knowledge exchange. The frankest discussion which both the partners claimed as imperative was intrinsically rooted in an unconditioned mutual love and trust. Jaspers experienced "solidary philosophizing" for the first time. This solidarity between the two was so deep that in his "Philosophical Autobiography" Jaspers goes so far as to say:

"Of the connection of our work, in remembrance of the years 1928-31, I would almost like to say: my works are just as much his, as his are at the same time mine, if this were not saying too much after all."³⁵

Jaspers ascribes to Mayer many phrases used in his Philosophy. For instance, the phrase "I did not create myself" came from this friend, which he uses so vitally in expounding his conception of "philosophical faith".³⁶

In Mayer Jaspers thus encounters a man who with all the versatility different from his can "abandon himself disarmed by his humanness and thereby awaken others."³⁷ Reason was always bound up with kindness. Jaspers regards this as a self-giving disposition and recollects: "It was his joy when I seemed to succeed in achieving something; it was his pain, greater than my own when something appeared to him as incomplete."³⁸

This friend was conspicuous for his extraordinarily "intuitive" talents. He was endowed with a remarkable ability to get at the heart of the matter, in a sudden grasping of the totality in every subject-matter. Jaspers recalls: "It was as if, out of the depth of an encompassing vision, he were able to fathom the very foundation." Naturally, such a person was distinguished by the severity of his demands.

We see here not only the thinking posture of Mayer but also the openness of Jaspers' understanding of the unity of contradictions. Many misunderstood his friend. But this unreserved demanding, coupled with love, was never refused by Jaspers throughout the cooperation for the becoming of his Philosophy. Jaspers recalls Mayer's help as being "matchless in sacrificial selflessness". The inward whole moving by the medium of the rational was revered by the two partners.

To be sure, Mayer's love for Jaspers was not sentimental, moralistic self-sacrifice. Despite all the communicative cooperation in Jaspers' Philosophy, Mayer simultaneously pursued his own road and came to have his manuscript published, which he, being Jewish, exiled from Hitler-Germany, had prepared during his tragically forced exclusion in Holland (1939-45). This work was published under the title Dialektik des Nichtwissens (which was followed by his posthumous work, and Jaspers regards this as "an extensive nihilism" and hopes it will be published soon).

Thus, this rare friendship consists in a unity of unconditioned mutual trust and unreserved, exhaustive discussion. The trust leads to an unfathomable depth of faith, while the discussion, to the open space for rational possibilities. If we relate this structure to the one that characterizes Jaspers' attitude to nature and community, here what is swelling is an expanse of the thinking possibility, which rises between two present inward movements. The sphere of thought arises, not to be precipitated once again to the domain of mere objectivity, but to open up the vista toward the depth which the faith has seen and yearns for in reverent memory. So long as the strength of this faith is concerned, the thinking rising now in union with the

loving harmony of faith becomes characterized by being present, living movement, which rises or falls with the presence of that faith.

That is to say, here in this relationship thinking rises out of the substance of the conversation between Existenz and Existenz. Jaspers' thinking in such a present sphere takes a qualitative turn-about to identify itself as communication between Existenz and Existenz. In the face of the serious presence of faith, any attempt to absolutize a philosophic expression to the thus integrated cognition -- which is no more than a product of a specific possibility of man -- is bound to be exposed as treachery to the faith guiding the whole communicative movement. Such as the substance of Jaspers' conception of communication, as he states:

"When communication is not merely from understanding to understanding, or from spirit to spirit, but from Existenz to Existenz, all impersonal contents and validities are no more than a medium. Therefore defence and attack are means, but it is not means for gaining power but for approaching each other.

The struggle is a loving struggle, in which each man surrenders his weapons to the other. The certainty of authentic being lies only in that communication in which freedom stands with freedom in unreserved confrontation based on mutuality. In such communication, all association with other things is only a preliminary stage; when it is decisive all things come to be called for once more and then questioned from the bottom upward.

It is only in such communication that all other truths become fulfilled and in that alone I become myself, that is, I not merely live but fulfill my life."³⁹

For the chronological reason we have dealt with the relationship with Ernst Mayer first. But in reality, so far as Jaspers' decision on philosophizing in the sphere of existential present is concerned, the turning-point was his encounter with Gertrud Mayer, his wife. After Jaspers was introduced to his sister, Ernst Mayer left the university at the end of the summer semester.

3.2.b Gertrud Mayer

"The only great turning-point in my life was the union which my wife and I concluded with each other. In this union what had been there before was not merely strengthened but infinitely expanded." 40

Jaspers was introduced to Gertrud by her brother Ernst on July 14th, 1907. The marriage took place in 1910. At this time, Jaspers had been appointed a research assistant in psychopathology. He had known Max Weber since the previous year. Gertrud was studying Kant. Being Jewish, Gertrud deepened Jaspers' understanding of the Bible. She also contributed to Jaspers' approach to Kant's philosophy.

During the Nazi regime, the couple shared the suffering of Gertrud's family. In 1937, the government required Jaspers to divorce his wife, and as he refused this he lost his professorship at Heidelberg until the end of World War II.

Gertrud remains a member of Judaism, while Jaspers remains a "liberal" Protestant, throughout life.

We shall focus on how this encounter becomes the turning-point of Jaspers' thinking.

First, Jaspers experienced a first impression that Gertrud came to him as an appearance of inward nobility:

"Unforgettable when, accompanied by her brother, I first entered her room! She sat at a large desk, arose, with her back still toward the visitor, she slowly closed a book and turned toward us. I followed each of her movements, which in her quiet clarity, without artificiality or conventionality, unconsciously seemed to express the essence of purity, the nobility of her soul in her very appearance.

It was as if self-evident that the conversation soon turned to the basic questions of life, as if we had already known each other for a long time. From the very first hour there was between us an inconceivable harmony, something never expected to be possible." 41

Jaspers came to understand that her inward composure was that bound up with desperate struggles with hardship and trial. Her only sister was in a mental hospital; a friend of hers had taken his own life, etc. Jaspers felt that "the very foundation of things had been torn asunder for her, leading to insoluble questions." Jaspers sensed in her "the actuality of a soul which is refused to live by illusions" and the silence rising above infinite endurance of an extraordinary fate.

42

For Jaspers, this was incomparable with his own suffering which was limited to his own illness. An unknown depth of inwardness pushed forward toward him. A singular-minded man might have rested content with a psychopathological knowledge available for describing or comprehending such an actuality; the structure of Jaspers' mind, however, as mentioned before, focused on the "polarity" of this actuality. The unfathomable depth of inward world making its appearance in her composure came to Jaspers in a meaningful unity with her intellectual struggles. He saw a present of the philosophic actuality dynamic in all dimensions. His own philosophic actuality, which had been confined to the monologue sphere clouded with loneliness, melancholy and self-consciousness, is now released into the sphere of genuine dialogue. Everything had to be changed in structure. Jaspers writes:

"In her my own affirmation of life encountered the spirit who from now on would prevent any premature acquiescence on my part. Now philosophy began, in a new way, to become a serious concern for me." 43

Jaspers constantly heard a silent voice "Thou shalt not think that thou hast done enough with spiritual performance". The substance of Jaspers' thinking is now established and never releases him from this time on throughout his philosophizing. As long as love

44

rules all, Jaspers' awareness of this substance maintains the guiding position in his thinking. So in his From Heidelberg to Basel,⁴⁵ Jaspers looks back upon his creative years, saying:

"My philosophy has been worked out by myself indeed in what is conceptual. But in the substance she has shared with me. As for the decisive point, I would never reach it without Gertrud. Gertrud took me to the front of what must be faced with, when I owing to my conservative inclination inclined to the boundary of what is harmonic. She defended when I wanted to rest comfortable. Her love exalted together with me the demands which are unfulfillable and allow no rest."⁴⁶

When Jaspers identifies such love as the substance of his philosophizing, love is no longer what can be comprehended within the framework of any concept of love. Rather it is understood as the eternal voice, so to speak, coming to him out of the depth of man's inward world. It is the unconditional imperative for the thinking. It is the historic actuality in which man's reflection engaged in time is given a concrete, temporal voice of the eternal. In his Man in the Modern Age, Jaspers describes conjugal love as binding "two human beings together unconditionally for the whole of their future".⁴⁷ He then proceeds to expound it as the point where man points to his spiritual home. In so saying Jaspers actually confesses how historic his loving relationship with his wife is for the becoming of his thinking:

"What is important is this: that is, a man in conjunction with other human beings in historic concreteness immerses himself in this world so that he, amid this universal homelessness, may win a new, another home.

This distance to the world gives him his freedom and this immersion gives him his being. This disassociation cannot be performed by intellectual abstraction but only through simultaneous sharing in all actuality. This immersion is not a visible act proudly motivated by oneself, but it dwells in unstirrable unconditionality.

This distance gives an inward nobleness; the immersion awakens the self to humaneness. The former requires self-discipline, and the latter is love."⁴⁸

3.2.c Max Weber

"If we hold it to be possible that all that is criticized in our day is in reality no more than peripheral appearance, or depletion and degeneration of a substance, and if we believe that each epoch entails the present of eternity, we can see in Max Weber a substantial phenomenon of our times.

We understand him in the impulse which creates life, and this impulse comes from him to us. His present has given us the consciousness that even today the spirit was able to exist in the shape of its maximum quantity.

When we saw him, we believed first and rightly the quantity of the great dead figures who are known as historic men. We now know that he is equal in rank in such a spiritual community." 49

Jaspers met Max Weber for the first time in 1909. Weber's Heidelberg home was crowded with visits from prominent thinkers such as Troeltsch, Rusk, Sombart, Simmel, etc. It was a year after Weber published the two essays on the Russian Revolution, and three years after the publication of Weber's essay on the methodology of social sciences.

Weber was a contradictory personality; accordingly views of his thought vary very widely. To simplify the variations, he has been regarded either as a politician or social scientist. Jaspers may be the first to characterize Weber as a philosopher first and foremost, and of the highest rank, insofar as the quality of his thinking is concerned. Weber did not write explicitly on his philosophy; Jaspers understands that Weber was for him the first-ranking contemporary philosopher, in the sense that his whole Existenz was a philosophy. We shall focus on this point.

With regard to the nature of the relationship underlying such an original interpretation of Weber, Moritz Manasse's article

"Max Weber's Influence on Jaspers"⁵⁰ seems highly contributory. Manasse suggests that Jaspers' relation to Weber is compared to that between Plato and Socrates; he thus presents the possibility of describing Jaspers' philosophy "as an interpretation of the idea of Max Weber's philosophical Existenz". Apart from Manasse's own reservation concerning his application of such an analogy, his insight is impressive enough to draw attention to how significant for Jaspers' thinking the shock of his unexpected death was. The vacuum Jaspers felt at the time appears very similar to that experienced by Plato:

"When Max Weber died in 1920, it was for me as though the world had changed. The great man, who had justified its existence to my consciousness and had given it a soul (and meaning) was no longer with us. It seemed as if that last resort had disappeared where, in rational discussion, the absolutely dependable though directly not expressible guidance had resided, that resort from whose deep foundation there came broadest perspectives, the possible insight into the momentary situation and the judgment of actions, events, and asserted knowledge."⁵¹

This shock spurred Jaspers' thinking to a philosophizing in the eternal-now. To be sure, Jaspers had already published his Psychology of World Views a year before, and Weber had praised the work and encouraged him. And the same year (1919), Weber gave the lecture "Science as a Vocation", wherein, though still implicitly because of his purposeful concentration on science, the existential sphere of his thinking frequently comes to the fore whenever he refers to the limits of science and to the falsity of pseudo-science. The lecture is in a sense characteristic for identifying science as the task for the man who is under the guidance of "Demon".

Then, in The Psychology, Jaspers refers to Max Weber as one of the four fundamental personalities from whom the decisive aspects of his psychology of world views had sprung. So Weber stands there among

Kant, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Concerning his indebtedness to Weber, Jaspers points out three, that is, (1) that Weber's works contain a mode of the analysis of world-view psychology, (2) that Weber's systematic objectification, with all its fragmentary shapes, is bound up with living vehemence, and (3) that Weber's separation of value from cognition is followed up in The Psychology.

What is more, Jaspers in classifying Existenz sets up a type he calls "demonic man". Jaspers' characterization of this type may be easily identified in Weber's work "Science as a Vocation."⁵² Jaspers' "Commemorative Address for Weber" (1920) and another more expanded work "Max Weber" (1932) are common in appealing for Weber as Existenz.

All these are expressions of one thing, that is, of Jaspers' existential communication with Weber. The way Jaspers sees Weber's integrity as a man, unifying all of Weber's versatile aspects gravitates to the broadest sphere of being, where the two conform each other along with the mutual dedication to the Absolute. Thus, Jaspers' relationship with Weber is not that of discipleship nor of a one-way influence. It is a rare encounter between two inward movements, though the backgrounds as well as the philosophic expressions are different.

Turning to Jaspers' side, the "Commemorative Address" is distinguished for its polar structure which results from Jaspers' conscious attunement to the substance of Max Weber as a whole. This is methodologically identical with the way in which he deals with world views. That is to say, Weber as Existenz is not to be objectively knowable from part of his fragmentary scientific achievement nor from a synthesis of the whole of his works. This existential depth, which may be confirmed only as a state of faith, surpasses all objectifications.

Thus, its actual wholeness is shared by his partner only in their mutual, loving communication. This success came from the two partners' being capable of adhering to this pole of being man.

On this ground, the other aspect of Jaspers' understanding of Weber is at best the "Idea (Idee) of this philosophic Existenz" thinkable only by reaching the unity of Weber's works as a whole. The term "Idea" applied in this dimension of being implies the way of the Idea as mentioned in his Psychology. It corresponds to the "demonic", exhaustive path of Weber's rational movement immersed in his profound faith or in his sense of the absolute.

"In this totality of the published fragments becomes a unity which cannot be formulated and is not rational but can be reached only in terms of intuition. It is the idea of this philosophic Existenz."

Max Weber has brought to light this very idea in our present age, in a particular, original appearance. This idea is as absolute, universal and timeless as it is in its ultimate depth." 54

Now, with regard to this particularity and originality of Weber, Jaspers takes him as the unity of his being a politician and scientist.

As a politician, Max Weber, Jaspers interprets, was guided in his activities by the genuine patriotism, loving and trusting the people in terms of both their material welfare as well as their human dignity. His judgments and guidance were distinguished for accentuating liberation from illusions based on will rather than knowledge of the ruthless facts.

"His unreserved truthful critique over against his fatherland was a critique out of love....."

This patriotism was for him, to be sure, the ultimate criterion for his political activities. He never confused

the welfare of Germany with such as the welfare of a certain class, the claim to a certain world view or to a certain specific political system.

Whether Catholic or Protestant, whether conservative or socialistic, whether monarchic or democratic, these things were secondary when Germany mattered." 55

As a scientist, Weber, concerned himself in the last resort with the never-ending advance of "sociology". Weber's global-scale research accompanied by his penetrating methodological reflections, however, was guided by his fundamental search for being. His contention that value judgment must be excluded from scientific cognition was not a subordination of his being to empty rationalism. Pointing to the unending growth of the sociology, both within and without his thinking movement, Weber's research activities were in reality intended to expand his own inward movement which gravitated toward a single centre.

In this connection we are reminded of the fact that Weber in his "Science as a Vocation" discusses the contribution of science to practical and personal life and elevates the question of "clarity" as serving to purify, so to speak, the individual's choice of faith. That is, Weber at first makes a clear distinction among three kinds of knowledge: knowledge for predicting both natural and human things, knowledge for providing thinking methods, tools and disciplines, and knowledge for the sake of clarity. Then, he proceeds, in referring to the role of university instructors, to point out that the thorough-going objectivity brought about by science can serve to make one aware of the distinction between his objective standpoint (culminating in his god), and the means to it known by the sciences. As to the scientific right to such a god, Weber goes to identify it as the source of the individual's inward integration, though this in reality leads to the point of "the

eternal struggle among gods", that is, to the fundamental fact of man's inevitable destiny to struggle for his ultimate position (faith).

So long as his "demonic", fierce commitment to the sociological studies goes, one may say that it appears that Weber takes no opportunity to formulate a system on this aspect of his being. Yet, Jaspers, being one of Weber's closest friends, regards it as the most central concern of Weber's scientific paths. Jasper terms it "a sense of the Absolute" which converges and expands throughout the scientific journeys of Weber's thinking.⁵⁶

It is because of this sense of the Absolute that Weber, despite his positively held relativism of knowledge, is not led to a despair of incompleteness, but rather continues to move more and more in the same direction. Jaspers understands that this unitary inward movement makes Weber's sociology man's self-reflection. It was a self-reflection characteristic for adopting an empirical science for clarifying his own being in the present.

The "existential meaning" of Weber's sociology is not a knowledge of humanity in general, but the fulfillment of his inward freedom as well as of man's possibilities in the face of the Absolute -- this freedom and the possibilities are never confined to an objectively fixed "image". In this sense, his sociology was a philosophy -- philosophy emerging out of the whole man in the way in which the great original thinkers undertake their task to fulfill their responsibilities in their times.

"He is a fragmentary thinker born of a consciousness of the totality and the absolute, and this cannot be spoken in another way. A man as a limited being can at best make the single one an object of his will; the whole and absolute he cannot grasp directly but only indirectly through the clearest differentiation, or distinct understanding of the particular.

In so doing, he deals with a wholly irrational conviction. He deals with the enthusiasm which puts the whole essence in the current single one. Thus the enthusiasm becomes in him the philosophic Existenz.

This philosophic Existenz itself then can never become a goal of his own intention, though it can be felt by others. Again it cannot be understood completely by others but always in a proceeding movement, whose documents are those great fragments." 57

Weber's vehement defense of science was far from a subordination of his thinking to any modern Ideas of the compelling validity of science. As long as every point of his achievements gains meaning only through the whole inward movement, his rational pursuit breaks through these possibilities so as to be guided by the inward sense of the Absolute. In this way the compelling validity of science was adhered to so that his own possibilities could be touched on -- as possibilities which were revealed as the sense of the Absolute was heightened and purified. Compelling validity was thus meaningful only because Weber ultimately concerns himself with his faith in the Absolute. This secret depth of Weber's being was disclosed during his deathbed delirium: "The true is the truth". Jaspers sees here the indissoluble unity of Weber's faith and his scientific vehemence:

"The word, "the true is the truth", which Max Weber, as if a secret, spoke at his deathbed, is not what comes surely out of the rule of contradiction nor from the intent to approve the worth of the compelling.

In it is caught the whole of truth in which that compelling knowledge as a medium is confined. It is the truth with which I stand and fall, and out of it alone surely the compelling science can retain its pathos which is derivative in this sense." 58

Thus, when the inward whole of Weber's science-disciplined thinking is interpreted as a living philosophy, it means that philosophizing is understood to be a way of fulfilling "salvation" in the

present situation. Weber himself hinted at this aspect in "Science as Vocation". That is to say, Weber started by justifying the paths of modern intellectualization and rationalization as significant for liberation from magic. He identified such a liberation as the meaning of progress in Western culture. His interpretation was that this had brought about an unforsakably determined destiny of modern times. That is, man in modern times has no other choice but to stand between the unknowable God and the salvation without a prophet -- "without a prophet" because modern thinking (empirical and rational) has cast⁵⁹ doubt on the authority of the prophet.

Weber thought that the necessity for adopting this destiny is rooted in the necessity of intellectual "loyalty", for the empirical and the rational are not inherited from the prophetic tradition. Thus, Existential decision was bound up with a historical consciousness. To think in modern times was for Weber to be conscious of modern man's historic destiny. Here we see an intensified sense of time. That is to say, if modern man does not fulfill this destiny in his own way, he no longer serves his own "demon", which for Weber remains an anonymous force. Those who ought not to commit themselves to "the sacrifice of the intellect" have no other alternative but to stir up their inmost courage and accept this destiny.

This consciousness of crisis, however, was tempered by Weber's faith as well as the so-guided dedication to love for his neighbors. And if seen from the relativity of the rational, which is left behind as the way of foundering goes on, such a dimension of faith or of love is upheld for its unconditional, inward appeal to the whole man. Thus, within the crisis consciousness, Max Weber's

understanding of his times becomes more than that drawn up by the consciousness of empirical, causal history. That is to say, the times are now a matter of faith or unfaith. This means Weber's time is in structure ⁶⁰ prophetic time.

Now we turn to Jaspers once more and see how his understanding of Weber as "a philosophic Existenz" includes the same time-consciousness.

Firstly, as we have considered before, Jaspers' self-reflection had been existentially structured, and thus the realm of the great in the past is contrasted with the states of the community where he seldom experienced good communication. There are signs that he began to comprehend this relationship by distinguishing between authentic faith and false faith. As to the early stage of his university life, Jasper recalls:

"I was discontent with myself and with the state of society, with the false beliefs prevalent in public life. My fundamental reaction was: something is radically wrong not merely with humanity, but also with myself; at the same time, however, I felt the magnificence of that other world, namely, of nature, of art, of poetry, and of science."⁶¹

Secondly, in perceiving the meaning of Weber's never-ending inward movement, Jaspers came to be aware that for Weber the sense of the relativity of his ever-growing knowledge was bound up with the sense of the ⁶² correspondingly increased clarity of the faith in the Absolute. Because of the increase in the clarity of the faith, his sense of relativity did not lead his integration to a faith in relativism. On the contrary, this sense of relativity, as long as the enhancement of the faith in the absolute matters, meant that his knowledge was purified as such a sense of relativity increased. This way, Jaspers understood that, when seen as a whole, Weber's thinking was intended to be inward movement based on faith.

Here Jaspers came to confirm that a fresh realm of thinking was made possible as a result of a saturation of genuine faith. Such a thinking is based on the inward decision of Weber rather than on a conformity to a form of knowing, which is in quality not equal to the Absolute but is only "relative", as a medium for clarifying the faith by the inward movement of his own research. This kind of thinking is thus distinguished from those which can be reducible to the idea of universal validity; for here thinking is no longer subsumed within an idea of the purely objective entity. Rather, in opening up the realm of inward freedom in each present, and also in retrieving its products by inward responsibility, thinking which maintains this structure is characterized as "historic".

That is to say, it is on the one hand aware that it is determined by its understanding of the times and on the other it remains a becoming through a "strength of faith". In this sense the whole meaning of Weber's thinking can be interpreted as awakening a single one to the eternal-now understood as the meaning of his times.

Jaspers writes:

"Max Weber purified knowledge by confining it to empirical knowledge, not in order to restrict our thinking to this kind of knowledge, but in order to clarify and to make really possible the other modes of knowledge with their different meanings and their always (historic), never universally valid foundations Recognition of the fact that knowledge is relative only enhances the purity of faith." 63

Therefore, thinking in this sphere indicates that reason takes a new shape in becoming an act of the faith in eternity. And in this sense, it enhances faith, and faith is no longer identical with that which is subordinated to a mode of thinking, rather faith

animates reason in its wholeness so that the generation as community may rise on that faith.

"When we survey his epoch and our own, it becomes evident that at a time when men in general were succumbing to illusions and fanaticism, when irrationality was being consecrated by false prophets, deceived deceivers, and violent despots, Max Weber represented the undying presence of reason.

And in an age when reason was becoming intellectualized or degenerating into a mere thinking technique, into ungrounded knowledge and sophistry, which can only undermine and destroy, Max Weber was the incarnation of man; his humanity was the [historic] manifestation of reason.

Reason is impersonal; it becomes human through its movement in time. In [historic] situations it inspires solidarity among men, the struggle for justice, the tolerance that knows where to stop, the courage to support or to oppose a cause at the risk of one's life. To show Weber's humane reason in action, one could go on endlessly, relating what he did, how he reacted, how he judged, and what he loved."⁶⁴

Thus, for Jaspers to see in Weber an integration of faith meant that in its inward movement the whole destiny of the times was being stirred up along the inward movement of its representative. In the "Commemorative Address" Jaspers states: "In Max Weber we have seen in flesh an existential philosopher; while other men mainly know their individual destiny, in his wider soul functioned the destiny of the times We through him have reached the clearest consciousness of the present and of the instant".⁶⁵ In "the man of the strongest faith in our times"⁶⁶, Jaspers sensed that thinking, while rotating within the individual's inward depth, "liquefies" or dissolves (back to the original creativity) not only all of the current ideas of history and the correspondent ideas of the present age, but also the thus established senses of the destiny of the age.⁶⁷

This broadening of time consciousness, however, was not to precipitate once again to a frozen existentialist doctrine of time as

related to the eternal-now. Rather, it is meaningful only when the realm of each individual's Existenz becomes present in each man. A man in this dimension finds himself encountered with loving relationships, which rise above any rational shaping in any sphere of thinking. So what Jaspers experienced in his relationship with Weber could not but culminate eventually in his awareness of his Existenz. Weber's Existenz became a "victim" insofar as his 'partner', so to speak, fails to touch on the depths of Weber's Existenz and freedom, regardless of his "theorization" of Weber's "scientific achievements". In other words, Jaspers' understanding of Weber was focused on the latter's philosophical Existenz, and therefore what Jaspers pursued was not an objective knowledge of this Existenz, but an inward participation in Weber's existential movement which had made such an Idea possible. This inward participation meant his awareness of his own Existenz looming around the rationally shaped clarity. In short, for Jaspers, to understand Weber as such was to raise the eternal-now in each man; this eternal-now was to be confirmed only through the rational appearance which was understood as concrete and historic.

68

Now, Jaspers thought that Weber's death indicated to him that the philosophizing in this sphere of "being man" must be continued, and he decided to accept this challenge. He made his decision clear at the end of his "Commemorative Address":

"The Idea of his philosophic Existenz is ultimately a secret as with all great thinkers. But for us it is the source and task of a philosophy which will be not reproductive, not romantic, not of empty timelessness, but present. And only in such a present day shape does it become aware of the eternal." 69

3.2.d Jaspers' Historic Consciousness in the Relationships

We have hitherto discussed how Jaspers, at the stage where his thinking began to integrate itself, encountered with his friend, wife, and the "demonic" thinker Max Weber. Insofar as Jaspers' awareness of the depth of the actuality is concerned, his communicative relation with these three persons was retained in the same sphere and in the same quality. But the extent of the possibilities he was to create reached its full breadth especially in his communication with Weber. Both his faith in the actuality and his urge for the clarification went in polarity.

Although Jaspers led his thinking by means of scientific research, his self-integration did not follow the pattern of constituting a thought by arranging empty ideas as if they were to exist apart from their inward context. For Jaspers, ideas were to be taken as "possibilities", because he saw them from a polar perspective, which consisted of two: his awareness of the mystery on the one hand and his will to clarify by scientific objectification on the other.

In encountering with these love-minded persons, Jaspers sensed a moving guarantee, as it were, that the mystery pole was overwhelmingly present to him through the loving relationship. With regard to the rational pole, the boundlessly open communication rendered him able to enjoy freedom by dissolving (into the creativity) objectifications both given and to be created, in correlation with a lively awareness of the mystery receding beyond all objectifications. The tension between the actual and the possible, or the tension between faith and knowledge, is sustained as the most productive factor in such a communicative relationship.

Next, another living guarantee was his experience of history. The greatness of the possible in history encouraged him to trust in such a tension. This fundamental contact with history was never forgotten whenever Jaspers reflected on what he could do in the face of the tension between the world of faith and the world of knowledge. So his "Commemorative Address" was concluded with his identifying Weber with the great souls in the history of "Spirit": "When we saw him, we believed first and rightly the quality of the great dead figures who are known as historic men; we now know that he is equal in rank in such a spiritual community." Thus, the conversation between his understanding of history and his trust in present communication was the source of his growth in thinking.

In a sense, it is this attitude to history that plays the major role in Jaspers' unique interpretation of Weber. For instance, characterizing the type "demonic man", Jaspers stresses how "historic" its representatives are:

"They are never to be known by a specific form; they are never to be determined as existing only for a certain concrete current task, and they exist for the highest responsibility over against the irresponsibility of the chaotic type of man. They are not sure of whereto their path leads. They are representative for the whole sequence of all generations -- if indeed they must not be regarded as the pattern of mankind." 70

Jaspers seems to have identified such an attitude to history
71
in Weber's conception of "ideal type" ; he interprets Weber's ideal type as based on Weber's vehement interest in the present which is visible in the past.

"For Max Weber history was a means for achieving a clear consciousness of present (actuality) and of present aims. Accordingly, he approached each period of the past as a contemporary. The essential feature of this sense of the present was that he did not see the present as if

it were already history and as if all contemporary events had been necessarily determined -- one who sees it in this light does not live in the present at all but imagines himself to be a spectator of something that is always in the past." 72

At any rate, what is notable is that Jaspers' intensive concern with man's possibilities decisive for his being man was promoted simultaneously by this encounter relationship with Weber and by his contact with history in the above sense of the word.

This indicates that his attitude to history determines the whole structure of Jaspers' thinking here. All objective ideas, seen in terms of the creativity of the communicative relationship, were one-sided, that is, possibility as contracted with actuality, which is polar or unknowable in whole and at the same time knowable in aspect. If seen from an idea produced in the context of the above mentioned present, all universal ideas are to be characterized as "timeless" because of their universal validity. This timelessness is
73
itself a possibility insofar as the unity of the actuality goes.

Now the point is that Jaspers understood any idea of history, scientific or philosophic, in accordance with this attitude to history, because of the mutual support between this and what springs from the encounter. This, however, does not mean that Jaspers was able to sustain that attitude without using empirical history, nor that he disregarded philosophies of history. They were regarded as significant, as possibilities. They were roads for the actuality of history. And this is the way he treats views of history both in his General Psychopathology and in The Psychology as well. Here we see a living tension between Jaspers' understanding of history and his understanding of the meaning of the encounter with history. Neither is isolated from the other.

History is referred to as a matter of "man's self-knowledge"
74
or "self-realization" (Bernheim, Collingwood, etc.). The compass of
such a "self", so far as Jaspers' perspective is concerned, was not
limited to a ready-made idea of history, whether this idea is
'universal' or 'empirical'. The communicative, self-giving, loving
relationship, complete or incomplete, opened up the unknowable depths
of being man. As considered before in connection with Jaspers' rela-
tionship with tradition, the loving relationship understood in con-
junction with the great souls in time indicates that for Jaspers the
present self is never a sudden drop from heaven but is rooted in the
handing-down of the great spiritual tradition. The present is
responsible to history for this indebtedness. To rest on the modern
progress in universal validity, which is a "possibility", means
irresponsibility to the intellectual history whose wholeness remains
75
hidden to rational knowability. The breadth of Jaspers' outlook
with regard to the place of the self in the face of history was kept
open as wide as the depths of man's present inward mystery. But
Jaspers did not rest content with observer's attitude to history; his
thinking chose to reach a resolution about history within the Existenz
sphere of being. And his clarity about this choice has much to do
with his relationship with Max Weber.

Jaspers identifies Weber as the present incarnation of the
way of the great souls in the past, and like Weber he understood that
history must be dealt with as a matter of 'faith-or-non-faith'. Faith
in this case was identical with the sense of the Absolute, which Weber
had never claimed to be knowable but to be confirmed by a metaphor,
i.e., by a "demon". Non-faith was referred to a "romanticism" which

does not clarify, a fanaticism which clings to unalterable ideas, and to a nihilism which is simply faithless.

In his close personal communication with Weber, Jaspers touched on the secret of Weber's own vehement drive for a rigorous scientific approach to history. It was never-ending search for the human possibilities attainable by the present -- the present of Existenz or of the whole man. By the "demonic", exhaustive search for such possibilities, Weber, as Jaspers understood him, struggled to reach a full clarity of the Absolute which was present in his mind. Remaining faithful to this vocation, Weber testified, as it were, to the Absolute which he believed to be endowed every individual. Thus, anyone sensing this unity of the Absolute and the history-wide search for the possibilities in response to the Absolute could not but recoil on his own inward depths and therefore on his freedom.

At this point a man of faith, by retrieving the destiny of modern times which have lost the guide of prophecy, is to be filled with the sense of crisis -- the crisis of choosing either the fulfillment of faith or a life unconscious of its own history.

3.3 The Historic in Jaspers' Methodologies

"Knowing what I was about, I threw myself into the abundance of possibilities in order to find, through this process of understanding, direction and impetus in my own being.

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Unforgettable those years in which -- under the pressure of the First World War, in the midst of hardships which we, at that time, shared with all other citizens -- I found with my wife the happiness of thinking in this manner, in which we philosophized and, more clearly than before, found the way to ourselves.

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Unforgettable, too, the never-to-be-repeated inner buoyancy of those years, which would scarcely have been possible in a pure objectively scientific type of knowing...

When, in 1921, I learned that Geheimrat Professor Martius in Kiel had said, during consultations concerning his successors, that in the reading of my book [The Psychology] he had had the feeling that once more a new spring was budding in German philosophy, it came as quite a surprise. The judgment was an exaggeration; but it did do justice to the mood in which the book had ripened for us."⁷⁶

Jaspers' "secretely" philosophizing began to shape along his bringing cognition home to his mind. This process consisted of two stages: concentrations on a special, empirical science, i.e., on psychopathology, and subsequently on a Geisteswissenschaft, the psychology of world views. The former work represented by his General Psychopathology ripened after his marriage, whereas the latter grew under the influence of Max Weber; both works, though in the shape of scientific or methodic cognition, maintain their meaning only in the actuality of Jaspers' communicative relationship represented by these very profound cases. On the other hand, to speak schematically, for Jaspers his scientific cognition was in its essence concerned with the "possibilities" which are articulated out of the actualities which he had cherished since his youth in the polar structure of his mind. Neither work was to be isolated from the mutuality of these two fundamental awarenesses: communication through rationality, and rationality as man's possibility. With regard to such possibilities, Jaspers, being watchful of the current movements of historical thinking, grasped these as the "possible". In this connection, his concern with the actual, i.e., with what is to remain correlative with his sense of the present, was inevitably a decisive attitude to historical possibilities. And such an attitude was not to be a passing comprehension of the thoughts on history but in structure was an encompassing and new approach to history. That is, as possibilities, both the empirical and philosophic approaches to

history were to be challenged with a prophetic approach rooted not in the mere rational faculties but in the Existenz sphere.

The full development appears in The Psychology, while the orientation has firmly taken place in the General Psychopathology. In the forthcoming discussion, we shall focus on The Psychology after a brief discussion of the significance of the General Psychopathology as the stage preparatory for The Psychology.

3.3.a His Psychopathological Studies

"The guiding principle of my book on psychopathology, therefore, was and remained this: to develop and order knowledge guided by the methods through which it is gained -- to learn to know the process of knowing and thereby to clarify the material

This principle of methodological reflection and discipline appeared more important as the object of investigation in psychiatry is man himself. He is distinguished from all other things in the world by the fact that in his entirety he can no more become the object of inquiry than can the world in its entirety. Whenever he becomes known, something of his appearance becomes known, not he himself." ⁷⁷

Concerning the philosophic nature of his work General Psychopathology, Jaspers himself provides a reliable self-manifestation, so to speak, of the initial work, by continuing the revision up to the completely rewritten fourth edition. His various autobiographical writings as well support this self-manifestation. In the fourth edition of the above mentioned book, Jaspers ascertains: "The intention of the book has remained unchanged". ⁷⁸ As to the life-long continuity of the same nature, he says: "From early youth on I had been philosophizing; actually I had taken up medicine and psychopathology from philosophical motives..... I remained loyal to the pursuits of my youth; My Psychopathology never became a matter of indifference to me". ⁷⁹

Firstly, Jaspers' scientific thinking took its decisive step in a situation which fully encouraged his creative, holistic attitude to science. The clinic, where he concentrated on psychopathology under the enlightened leadership of Nissl, was a really authentic community of research. The conflicts among theories were intrinsically tied to respect for an open, free and flexible movement of thinking in accordance with the criterion that knowledge ought to be universally compelling. The dialectic between the study object and his theorization was not to be left to any dogmatic absolutization of established knowledge. His scientific productivity was consciously tied to his thinking which searched into an inexhaustible ocean of realities.

Secondly, Jaspers was able to perceive what was the general situation of both psychiatry (clinical practice) and psychopathology (pure science). Jaspers found himself surrounded by "intellectual confusions" exemplified by intersections of such things as: factual data and methods which were unfounded or based on real insights, or several schools of thought which spoke terminologies uncommunicable with one another. "There seemed to be no such thing as a common scientific psychiatry uniting all those engaged in psychiatric
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research."

In such a situation, Jaspers came to find a way-out by acquiring this insight: "Psychiatrists must learn to think."
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And the insight was in reality his rational response to another more basic one, that is, to his awareness of the inexhaustibility of human realities. Mental disease had to be regarded as the fact that the person is ill, instead of the body in particular. The person in this case must be taken as a whole man. This insight not only was objec-

tively valid but resonated more basically with what he experienced in his own inward depths as well as in the aforementioned communicative relationships. Thus, the actuality of the man and the possibility of knowing were insolubly united in the first place. This basic disposition to orient Jaspers' scientific thinking from the bottom upward accelerated his desire to serve for advance in his field by maintaining a living "polarity" between this desire and his will to increase the clarity of the communicative self.

This, however, did not mean that Jaspers diminished objective cognition at all. On the contrary, his concern was to purify psychopathology as a pure science in the true sense of the word. The scientific rigorousness he pursued may be seen in the manner in which he distinguishes between a psychiatrist and a psychopathologist:

"Psychiatrists function primarily as living, comprehending and acting persons, to whom science is only one resource among many; for psychopathologists, however, science is the sole and ultimate aim of their work. Their interest is not the individual human being. Their aim is to know, recognize, describe and analyse general principles rather than particular individuals." 82

Thus, for Jaspers the study of psychopathology was to be carried on in the creativity sphere of science. Knowing was to be retrieved by "thinking". The world of scientific objects, that is, of diseases, and the world of scientific possibilities, that is, of acquiring psychopathological principles, were to be kept open so that the science might retain its creative advance. So his idea was to collect all available definitions, methods and psychologies auxiliary to psychopathology, in such a way that each of them may be defined as accurate as possible and at the same time integrated into a whole according to the limitation which they show in the face of the multi-

dimensional structure of man's psychic life.

"Psychopathology is concerned with the ill person as a whole, insofar as he suffers from a psychic illness or one that is psychically determined.

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If we knew the elements that constituted the human psyche and all the forces at work we could begin with a broad outline of the psyche and leave details to be filled in later.

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But we need no such blue-print, since we conceive the psyche as an unending effort at comprehension, an effort which can never be concluded wholly, though we are always advancing through the many methods of research.....

*

We must, therefore, as scientists, keep an open mind for all the empirical possibilities and guard against the temptation to reduce human existence to one common denominator. We have no psychic master-plan, but we shall simply discuss a number of horizons within which our psychic realities present themselves." 83

Instead of believing that every piece of knowledge gives the thing in itself or Being in its totality, Jaspers intended to creatively "dissolve" the cognitions as relative to the methods applied respectively. They were thus given an "approximate appreciation of context" ⁸⁴, while at the same time the creativity of thinking was sustained and kept moving along the correspondingly "expanded horizons". The significance allotted to each theory or method was related to "an unlimited obscurity" looming around its limitation. In this way, Jaspers not only justified the rights of any given cognitions but also emphasized the simultaneously disclosed room for a creative approach. The tension between these two directions was "appealed" for as the source of psychopathology which he identified with creative thinking:

"We may disregard our methods as temporary but necessary tools, to be dropped when we supposedly grasp at the thing itself, or things in themselves may become temporary though necessary myths attending our incessant efforts to

know; they are theoretical realities which we discard as incomplete, but which keeps the doors open for further experience and research." 85

To turn to psychic life, Jaspers elevates its two-fold structure. That is, "psychic life as such is not an object", though it can be objectively spoken of by means of symbol and analogy; only the objective manifestation of psychic life becomes an object -- the manifestation determined by such as somatic phenomena, meaningful gestures, behaviours, and actions. Jaspers in this respect refers to the three stages of psyche receding from objective knowability:

(1) "Psyche means consciousness, but just as such and from certain points of view it can even, in particular, mean 'the unconscious'. (2) Psyche is not to be regarded as an object with given qualities but as 'being in one's own world! the integrating of an inner and outer world, (3) Psyche is a becoming, an unfolding and a differentiating, it is nothing final nor is it ever fully accomplished." 86

In the current edition of the General Psychopathology, we see Jaspers push forward this tension to the extent of refuting the psychological application of Heidegger's ontology, especially his "existentia" such as Being-in-the-world (Dasein), Emotional tone (Stimmung), Anxiety (Angst), Care or Concern (Sorge). That is, Jaspers regards them as characterizing "the ontological element, which pre-conditions all human existence and conduct and determines them". He goes on to say:

"The concrete illustrations are valuable but I consider Heidegger's attempt to be a philosophical error in principle because it does not lead the student on to philosophize in his turn but offers him a total schema of human life as if it were knowledge." 87

This permanent tension underlying his psychopathological studies meant that the work was in ultimacy an intellectual shape of his inward substance, which in its turn was to increase clarity by a

medium suitable for communication. The substance was his faith in man's inward whole. Here his psychopathology as his scientific thinking was not to be isolated from his attitude to the practical, humane stratum of medicine at large. So the current edition of the book comprises the part "Human Being as a Whole", which is in reality an anthropological presentation of his whole philosophy culminating in his appeal for communication. This part was for the demand for the doctor's self-illumination without which the creative sphere of the psychopathology would be left unclarified. Jaspers' two essays, "The Idea of Doctor" (1953) and "Doctor and Patient" (1953) are indications of how important this point is for his treatment of the matter. He points out there that the relation between doctor and patient is left ingenuine unless it is centered on boundless communication rooted in the inward depths of the two sides.

To focus on illness first, Jaspers stresses that one is here dealing with two realms: the illness as an objectifiable mechanism and the illness as immersed so deeply in the person, who is in nature so free that no scientific objectification can comprehend the illness in the breadth of its actuality. Thus, on the one hand the illness is seen by a doctor trained as a scientific expert, but only in terms of probable, experimental knowledge, so far as the wholeness of the illness is concerned. Next, on the other hand, it is seen by a doctor born in personality to fill by a humane approach the sphere that his skill cannot reach. "The two pillars on which medical treatment rests⁸⁸ are natural science and the humane approach." Only as long as the doctor is clear of, and bears with, this tension, can he remain a rational human being.

Jaspers defines such a humane approach as "rational communion⁸⁹ (Gemeinschaft) with the patient". This communion, similar to that of a minister, is filled with a deep awareness of "the limitations of man,⁹⁰ his impotence, his infinite suffering", in addition to his relative confidence in the validity of medical science at large. This is the area where the physician stands and falls with his "human ethos". A warm heart and scientific coolness must interact here.

"The doctor sees the ~~limits~~ of his skill. He cannot abolish death, even though he is now able to prolong life in unprecedented fashion. He cannot abolish mental illness, even though in some cases he can help. He cannot abolish suffering, even though he is now able to alleviate it beyond all previous measures. For all his triumphs, the physician feels more strongly what he cannot do than what he can.

It is in his nature to show human kindness even where he cannot heal, and to succor even hopeless cases. As for mental patients, the physician's ethos tells him to furnish these unfortunates, whose health he cannot restore, with a maximum of viability -- to honor the human being even in them." ⁹¹

It is communion that makes the medical sciences a meaningful human performance -- the human performance that continues to keep wide open the room for the physician's own self-integration in the broadest compass of his being. Jaspers elevates such a human depth of the medical profession and contrasts this possibility with other ones which are equally possible by modern scientific thinking. For example, the same scientific thinking, encountered with such an inevitable revelations of human misery, can cause a physician to turn into a cynic, that is, to turn into a skepticism, paralyzing his inner centre with disgust. A physician can leap from modern scientific thinking toward naturalism, in which he sees "nothing but causal connections, pitiless nature, and the unexpected turns of chance"; thus, "every individual is a matter of total indifference". Modern rational thinking also can

lead him to be an "unbeliever", that is, to atheism, losing sight of the deity because of the endless cycle of human misery.

Over against these temptations to despise human beings, the physician who is aware of the living bond between the rational and the human approaches to his patient cannot but concentrate on his own self-illumination, for only by such conscious, solitary contact with the inward depth can he continue to preserve the living awareness as the source for his creativity as well as for the fulfillment of his pro-
92

fession. "The psychotherapist who cannot help himself can never
93
really help his patient"; the quality of such self-illumination, however, is not identical with resting even on the most advanced "depth psychology", but with keeping one's mind boundlessly open, in the creative tension mentioned above, to communication revealing insights out of the unknowable depths of humanity. Concerning the possibilities of such inward-illumination, Jaspers suggests possibilities going beyond even the possibility of 'utilizing the doctrines he pro-
94
duces in the process of his Existenz illumination. As considered before (in connection with his human relationships) Jaspers situates such possibilities in the sphere where an individual illuminates his being by the medium of understanding an individual philosophy in terms of the whole of history:

"We cannot secure what Existenz itself must foster. Nor can we control or attest to intra-psychic events which always remain unique and unrepeatable. It is, therefore, worth considering whether the demand for self-illumination should be denied, the widest possible play of choice for its actualization.

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The individual should be able to choose whether he will entrust himself to someone else for analysis or whether he will indirectly stimulated by personal contact or whether in the course of life he will link himself with the great

illuminating experiences of history (e.g. Kierkegaard's 'Sickness unto Death') and receive his own personal revelations, or whether he will do all of this together." 95

Further, Jaspers regards such possibilities as intrinsically related also to self-manifestation, and thus sees the matter in the sphere where an individual may unify all modes of thinking, all modes of philosophically clarified being of himself, and all human foundations:

"What the individual is manifests itself at three levels. (a) He is shown to be an empirical reality in the various ways in which he becomes objectively explorable as a creature of this world. (b) He illuminates himself from his own sources in making use of the different encompassing modes of his Being. (c) As he searches in the world and founders there he unifies and becomes conscious of his true origins and destination. It is only at the first level that he is accessible for scientific investigation." 96

Finally, in connection with the physician's relationship with the patient, Jaspers deals with those possibilities in the sphere of life-long encounter to be held up beyond all professional success as well as failures:

"The psychotherapist is only kept from a contempt for humanity through the fundamental attitude of wanting to help people as people. He is helped in this by being aware of his weak points, his own derailments and failures and preserving them in his memory throughout life, but he is also helped by his knowledge of possible success and the liberating and supporting character of fresh encounters." 97

Thus, Jaspers founds psychopathology upon "the consciousness of infinity of each individual human being", that is, upon "the necessary reverence for each person", which faith, however, cannot remain true unless the patient as well is treated in the same quality. "Every sick person is, like any other person, inexhaustible" 98 ; even the insane retains the nobility of being man:

"It is altogether false to treat this free will as an existing quantity, to be explored and reckoned with

like a known causal factor. For as far as science goes -- in other words, as far as objectification has been achieved -- there is no free will.

It is true that doctor and patient enter into an encompassing human, and not scientifically based relationship, so as to come from this to really meaningful action. But it is false to contend that the scientific physician eliminates the element of personality. For the physician applies his science in that encompassing human communion with the patient; he does not use science to dominate the communion." 99

To recapitulate: The study of psychopathology, undertaken in appearance as an overall actualization of his scientific thinking, was distinguished for its polarity of science and faith. His perception of the scientific situation of his age, despite his enthusiasm for cognition, did not fix his thinking to the ideal of universal validity but expanded to an inward interpretation of man's possibilities in the context of man's actuality, which was present in his experience of the communicative relationship.

Scientific thinking, which attracted him to the point of an inward consolation, proceeded according to his will to integrate himself as responsible to the communicative relationship. In such a context, scientific thinking, amid the modern contests for merely usable doctrines, was pursued in the sphere of its creativity. Thus, the sense of the limitation of cognition, and further the sense of relativity of all cognition, became significant for his will to advance the science of psychopathology on the one hand. That is, in order to maintain the unity of the possible and the actual, the thinking had to bring the possible back to the idea of its movement which serves the actual; his sense of the limitation and relativity of science at large was not to degenerate into a negative attitude to cognition, rather animated his derive for knowledge in a way comparable to that of the 'universal scholar'.

Increase in knowing meant increase in clarity with regard to the unity
100
of the mystery and the knowable.

Jaspers "fluidifies" all scientific achievements on the basis of a relativity lying between method and cognition. This reduction stems from his sense of the mystery which he perceived both in nature and in man, or in another way from his awareness of the inward depths of 'being man'. To a science, a human being was more than a cognitive object. For Jaspers, a human being cannot maintain the tension of the polarity between the mystery and the knowable unless he expands his scientific productivity, for otherwise he has no guarantee that he would not sink into the situation of the age.

Thus, the exhaustive approach disciplining itself by the criterion of universal validity, with which science stands and falls, was in fact his practise of the will to be a whole man. His reverence for love led him to attribute the same structure to the object of the science; that is, illness was to be treated as a phenomenon of man as a whole. This perspective made his psychopathological approach expand beyond all possible spheres of understanding a human being.

The actuality of the physician was vividly enhanced to the sphere of faith and unified with his own scientific treatment of the patient. Thus, not only the inward actuality of being a doctor, but that of the patient as well, which included the incurably insane, became rationally clarified in one meaningful context, that is, in the reverence for humanity. This reverence for humanity, once again is never to be fixed to any rational self-illumination but to be kept open to the freedom of each individual person. In this sphere it appeared that Jaspers' own thought knew that it had to stop at this

service for clarification so that it might not invade the potency of the actual human being.

This inward movement, which he sought for a self-illumination spurred by the situation of the age, came to expand its compass to perceive a revelation of human history as a whole. Such was the intention of Jaspers' psychology of world views. Also, it is in such a framework of his thinking that General Psychopathology is in essence "historic".

3.3.b His Psychology of World Views

"A doctrine of world views drafts images by aesthetic empathy or logical constructions; it cannot take us to the point of any {actual} world view. Our world view is {actual} for us only in the singular. It enters into communication by way of struggle, of understanding, of discussion with others. In time it appears unfinished, starts moving, and in meeting others seeks itself on its own ground".¹⁰¹

On the general nature of Jaspers' psychology of world views, this paragraph from his Philosophy seems to describe best the framework as well as the dynamism of what he intended by the work. To begin with, Jaspers lifts up the struggle structure of world views. And its indication is that for Jaspers a world view is polar in its authenticity: it consists of two faces, namely, objective construction and existential actualization. Next, authentically, it is also communicative: it manifests itself in the unfinishable movement to enhance the meeting with the other person to the sphere of his inmost creativity. Thus, the one is always with the other; that is to say, if applied to The Psychology, no logical construction exists apart from the enhancement of the existential awareness of one's own being as a whole; otherwise the study defies the world view it treats.

In order to trace Jaspers' thinking movement, we shall

discuss the work by emphasizing the polar structure rather than its particular doctrines, since an attunement to the above-mentioned character of the work seems decisive. We have to emphasize the movement-mindedness because it is in such a framework that The Psychology is at the same time Jaspers' clarification of prophetic time, or conceptually, of the eternal-now. We shall discuss in the first place how this inward structure comes to acquire a "form" -- a history-encompassing form -- by his unique and profound understanding of Kant's doctrine of Ideas, and then we proceed to his methodology, which is in essence "historic".

(1) Jaspers' Kant Interpretation:

The Psychology made its appearance as the first consummation of Jaspers' early lectures on psychology, that is, of his lectures on social psychology, psychology of ethos, psychology of religion, psychology of morals, psychology of character, etc. These subjects were dealt with in conjunction with his lectures on the psychology of meaning, memory and weariness. The method applied was one which was conceived in his General Psychopathology as "the psychology of meaning" (verstehende Psychologie). He extended this method to "the wide
102
expanse of world of history" through these lectures.

By combining such a factual expanse and meaning, Jaspers continually fostered his concern with the world of meaning as it looms around the objective, factual treatment of mind. He rated this method as identical with "what had been done in the great tradition of understandings pursued by the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften) and by philosophy". His ever-present awareness of "wholeness", which had made him prefer the idea of the psychology of meaning, was thus extended

to the wholeness of being man in time. Let us begin by confirming this aspect present even in his psychopathological approach.

"The understanding psychologist proceeds as follows; he starts from a comprehensive intuition of meaning. He then makes an analysis: expression, psychic content, phenomena on the one hand, extra-conscious mechanisms on the other, while existential potentialities are detected as an empirically unexplorable base. As a result of this analysis of facts and meanings he gains an enriched understanding of all the connections. In the given case the results will be scrutinized, the procedure repeated and insight steadily increased by the collection of objective data interwoven with fresh intuitions of the whole, which lead in their turn to a fresh analysis." 103

Here we see Jaspers thinking of the spiral rotation of endless objectification and unfinishable but intuitively-present awareness of meaning. As this concern for meaning approached the whole, history-wide sphere, Jaspers was confirmed that the polar unity of creativity and objectification reached its zenith in the great souls in time, as the comprehensive substantial possibilities revealed by them are followed either by great movements assimilating with the original breadth in each particular historic situation, or by proliferations heterogeneous with the original in quality. Such an approach, which reminds us of the continuity of his insights in his youth, was firmly set with his "Kant's Doctrine of Idea" (Kants Indeenlehre) which he had prepared for a seminar class in his student days¹⁰⁴ and attached as "Appendix" to The Psychology.

With regard to the significance of this essay, it is worth noting that Jaspers considered Kant a source that was most decisive for the becoming of his psychology of world view. Jaspers writes:

"Kant, through his doctrine of Idea is the creator of the thought which underlies the whole of this world view psychology. That which is wholeness or Existenz,

that which is meant by words such as Idea (Kant), Spirit (Hegel), Life (Dilthey), and Substance (Spinoza), is never demonstrated and undemonstrable. It defies each formulation (objectivity), for each formulation must be called back to it; it is not a rational presupposition nor a logical principle but rather an unendingly stirred-up thought and indeed something more than thought. It is the source as well as goal of this work, and it is what is embedded in the rational formulation performed in this book. Therefore, such formulation is not what is self-sufficient or self-inclusive but in some way is dependent on somewhat translogical factors." 105

Jasper's interpretation of Kant, which he later expands in his Great Philosophers, is of course a very unique approach. The uniqueness comes from the existential structure he consciously applied already in his "Kant's Doctrine of Idea". We shall discuss how such an interpretation decides his Psychology of World Views.

Firstly, Jaspers himself characterizes the essay as contemporarizing¹⁰⁶ Kant in the sense that Kant's doctrine is understood as an expression of his inward movement -- the inward movement opening up "new horizons" in limiting, defining and justifying his own times, i.e., the Enlightenment. This presentness, Jaspers thinks, is what is represented by Kant's thinking in itself. As it was decisive for Jaspers' own relationship with Max Weber, the contemporarization in this case became a standpoint correspondent with his own thinking movement, and he applies it throughout The Psychology. It is a principle founded on his idea of the psychology of meaning. In The Psychology Jaspers describes it as in accord with the movement of living experience:

"What authentically takes us to the question is the experience lived by the movement of the authentic world view. We make this experience in the consequence of the action and thinking, in the conflict with the actuality, which in its actual happening shows itself always as in some way different from what we have supposed; also in the spiritual flows in relation to personalities to whom we come close or by whom we are rejected or held in a frozen relationship.

In any case, we make this experience not through the thinking which is a cool, contemplative or scientific sort, but through living thinking; that is, through seeing the actuality from a standpoint which holds at each time as our own in which we are present in full life." 107

Thus, the contemporization intended by Jaspers meant an encounter between two (present and past) profound thinkings. It was not based on a merely scientific idea but on such inward "vibrations" taking place in the course of history. Again, the contemporization, if restricted to the present thinker, means visualizing every one of his possibilities, including the possibility of his understanding the past, within one master consciousness, that is, within the inward movement of being a man, in Jaspers' case. That is to say, in disciplining his own thinking with such an orientation, Jaspers chooses to practise an ultimate thinking at the root of creativity.

From this dynamic perspective, Jaspers in his "Kant's Doctrine of Idea" attempted to make himself sure of the dynamic of Kant's thinking as a whole by regarding Kant's conception of Idea as "the centre of his philosophy".¹⁰⁸ His hidden intention to get at the very heart of Kant's philosophy is seen in the fact that he uses it in its original construction for orienting his discussion of "Structures of Reason in All Its Forms", a chapter of "Kant" in his Great Philosophers.

Putting stress on the "positive meaning" of Kant's doctrine of Idea, Jaspers firstly detaches it from the context in which Kant, subjecting his reasoning mainly to deductive procedure, confined his doctrine to the three Ideas: Soul, world and Wholeness, in the First Critique, and Immortality, Freedom and God, in the Second Critique. Jaspers focuses on the point that Kant, by relating Ideas to the intellect (Verstand), identified them as "regulative", that is, as con-

trasted to those which are "constitutive". Then, reflecting his own present concern with the meaning of science, he turns to scrutinize the dynamic, mutually enriching correlation between the regulative and the systematic, namely, the mutuality between two structurally distinguished spheres of truth, the unknowable and the knowable. We see Jaspers practising a decisive refinement of his own standpoint by re-animating Kant's central insight:

"The systematic is determined not merely by the requirement occurring in the sphere of truth as representation, but rather by the archetypical truth in itself.

It is true that the whole is never attained in any domain, but we draw nearer it eternally. It is truth that only the particular cognition is determined, but the Ideas are not, Idea is problematic but all that is limited becomes for us scientifically meaningful by being unified in the systematic process, whose goal remains undetermined.

And the domain of the determined becomes greater and greater, and as an achieved whole it is meaningful and systematically reachable only in relation to the Ideas, though in any case it remains an undetermined whole

Therefore, the Ideas are not an order merely supplementary, but rather they already take part in the emergence of cognition in which they act self-sufficiently and detachedly but supply the shaky cognition, are nonetheless by the medium of the intellect what the cognition reaches; they are the authentic substance of such cognition." 109

Emphasizing this fundamental structure of Kant's conception of Idea, Jaspers thought that the number of Ideas is not to be limited to the three listed but must be sought throughout the three critiques. With regard to the meaning of Kant's doctrine of Idea, Jaspers proceeds to treat it as revealing the boundlessly open space in three spheres.

The first sphere is its "methodological meaning", that is, it guides the theoretical cognition, for without the Ideas empirical sciences cannot think of the ground for their systematic unification of particulars. But this connection, Jaspers holds, is not to be

delimited as a mere scientific function, but to be regarded also as revealing "the manifestation of the idea-mindedness in concretes as well as in what is determined in the most direct way".¹¹⁰

The second sphere is its "subjective or psychological meaning". In this sphere, the Ideas function as "strength, germ or process in the subject".¹¹¹ Here the Ideas reveal the depth of the unending enthusiasm of the will to clarity, without absolutizing any Idea as if it were a final knowledge of the whole.

The third is its "objective or metaphysical meaning". In this sphere, the Ideas are not limited to their methodological, technical function nor to the psychological strength, but lead to the "archetypal world of the objects", which defies being confined to any Idea but reveals the presence of the ground of all beings. Thus, in this sphere the will to the systematic unity of nature gains its objective ground on the one hand, and the Ideas come to be faced with the objective ground for their existence. Again, this, however, is not to be limited to how the Ideas are justified in ultimacy, but as long as the Ideas are meaningless without their contact with the unknowable whole, the tension of the objectivity, which is never to be completed, remains infinite as the source of the Ideas. The "objective reality", which gives ground for the existence of the Ideas, is left "undetermined".¹¹²

All three meanings of the Ideas, however, are not isolated from one another, so far as the essence of the Ideas are concerned. If one wants to understand any one of these, he must understand all of them, for "Ideas are simultaneously subjective and objective."¹¹³ Thus, Jaspers confirms the origin of the "subject-object-cleavage" of the intellect. It seems that Jaspers at this point shares in a

revelation (reflective) of the presence of what supports the existence of all dimensions of knowledge, the Ideas included. Jaspers makes this point clear in his "Kant".

"The structure of knowledge begins with sensibility and its chaos of sensations, rises to space and time as the forms of intuition, thence to the categories which provided the objectively determined form of the intelligible. And, lastly, to the Ideas whereby knowledge progresses toward systematic unity.

*

In this existence of knowledge, which in itself cannot be concluded but remains open, the supersensible makes itself felt by acts, not through any known content.

*

In the phenomenality of existence, in this area of universal objectivity produced by the intellect, the Ideas are the breach through which the supersensible enters into knowledge." 114

If we relate this contemporarization procedure to the inward movement of young Jaspers, we may see in this essay Jaspers penetrating under the guidance of Kant the fundamental of all the possibilities of thinking as a whole man.

Jaspers studied under neo-Kantians. He had heard Liebmann's as well as Windelband's lectures, and he read this essay at Rusk's class. The following statements disclose the philosophic nature of Jaspers' approach to Kant, which sought something quite different from what the trend appealed for.

"The whole Neo-Kantian movement can be summed up in two catchwords: 'Back to Kant' (Liebmann) and 'to understand Kant means to go beyond Kant' (Windelband). Both were misused. 'To go back' meant to find fixed, eternal truths in Kant, to sift them out from the dross and reinstate them. 'To go beyond' meant to do better than Kant, to gain deeper insight.

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A better interpretation would have made it possible to combine the two ideas. 'To go back' would mean to look for the source; and 'to go beyond' would mean, not to know better, but to enter the movement of Kant's creative thinking, to let it act within one's own self in the new situation." 115

It is in such a will to share the creativity of the great thinkers in history that Jaspers treats his Psychology of World Views. The greatness of such thinkers has, however, nothing to do with what is often referred to as 'German hero-worship', whatever may be indicated by this. For Jaspers the greatness meant the choice of creativity handed down through the community of souls who are engaged in thinking in the eternal-now and thus call each individual at each generation to the task of authentic "salvation" -- salvation in which man retains his highest nobility as well as love for his neighbors. Jaspers decided to succeed to this continuity by means of philosophy instead of by divine revelation.

"Man has a history; greatness speaks from the past. His bond with the divine depth, his ethical resolution, the character of his perception of the world, the clarity of his knowledge, all have their source in great individuals.

The rank of nations is determined by the way in which they make the great individuals their own, and the same will be true of mankind as a whole.

Every present comes to itself, all present greatness finds its measure, in their image. They are forgotten and reemerge. For a time they are seen clearly and then their aspect is veiled. Without them existence would be meaningless and without history." 116

As such a breadth of thinking leads his treatment of Kant, we may say that Jaspers' thinking had already grounded in the Existenz sphere. In other words, by attuning to Kant's Existenz, Jaspers was able to experience a profound, existential saturation of his own thinking, by raising the significance of Kant's Existenz. The polarity of Idea and the unknowable realm is here confirmed in a systematic combination with such things as methodology, subjectivity and the absolute. It is in this sense that Kant became the philosophical guide when Jaspers took the course of upholding the creativity core, while feeling himself caught in a "chaotic" complexity, in which his fundamental faith or

awareness and his sense of the meaninglessness of modern times struggled for a way out. And, Jaspers' world view psychology is a comprehensive or "demonic" expanse of the same, Existenz-oriented thinking. Thus, this approach, mediated by Kant, comes to prove itself by the fact that The Psychology itself culminates in the polarity of the two ways, the mystic and the idea-minded, which Jaspers exemplifies first and foremost with the transcending dynamism of Kant's Existenz:

"If we have assimilated to Kant, so far as that is possible at all, it is like what follows our climbing one of the highest mountains: we look out over all other mountains, and it is now easy to find the way back to our own selves and to get better acquainted with these others

What matters is not a mathematical thought, which can be enforced by complex operations; what matters is a spiritual turn-about to be accomplished by the thinking itself. What is important is not to grasp something as an object but to accomplish something non-objective in the objective ...

He himself, however, remains beyond any shape, because what he is, what he was able to say, soars above any mere shape." 117

(2) The methodic that is historic:

The Psychology deals with all modes of historical thinking as objects of the psychology of meaning, insofar as any of them is held to be decisive for the question of the world view. In view of this, it is conceivable for us to derive from The Psychology Jaspers' interpretation of past historical thinkings. The Psychology also entails his objectifications of all possibilities of philosophy. In this case, we may construct a philosophy of history from it, too.

The work, however, was not meant to be dealt with by such isolations of its particular aspects. The basic intention of the work has already been symbolized by the fact that Jaspers' assimilation with Kant's doctrine of Idea was centred on the point that all intelligible

possibilities, Geisteswissenschaften or philosophy of history included, are to be made "fluid" at the creative sphere where man lays hold of the unknowable by creating Ideas, which then become the guidance for rational thinking in all other spheres.

A side proof of Jaspers' fluification of conventional historical thinking is shown by the fact that Jaspers links with Kant three thinkers as the major sources -- in addition to Hegel -- of The Psychology: that is, Kierkegaard¹¹⁸, Nietzsche¹¹⁹ and Max Weber. We have discussed the implications of Weber. In ranking Kierkegaard and Nietzsche as "the greatest psychologists of the world view", Jaspers stresses at the same time that their creative turns-about to Existenz are characteristically mediated by their profound understandings of history.

"In receipt of the unending historical horizons which Hegel and the German historical science had visualized, both (Kierkegaard and Nietzsche) lived to remain content with thinking in inner opposition to the seduction of this horizon. What mattered to them was the life of the present individuality, that is, Existenz." 120

In The Psychology, Jaspers solidifies the same existential scope by his idea of the psychology of meaning. What is positively pursued by this methodic framework, however, is not to confine world views to a methodological framework. What Jaspers actually anticipates is something more than any cognitional achievement; that is to say, what is anticipated foremost is an increasement of the clarity of the existential sphere of being. Cognition is the medium in his case. The role of cognition must be regulated by the idea that it should halt within this boundary so as to leave to each person the possible furthering of the becoming, though Jaspers himself comes to commit himself to philosophizing from his own source in the present time. This convergence in the Existenz sphere of creativity, however, does not treat history as one of many possibilities.

On the contrary, the Existenz sphere comes to be elevated only because it represents the positive strength in which time as a whole is fulfilled as a matter of being man. In a word, Existenz matters to Jaspers because it is the creative strength in which history may continue in meaning. We shall, in such a perspective, proceed to describe Jaspers' own Idea of world view psychology.

Firstly, as to the object of this psychology, Jaspers starts by indentifying the world view as "prophetic philosophy". The "prophetic" indicates the sphere where man's time is conceived to be fulfilled by a fundamental orientation. That is, over against the trends which regard philosophy as either "logic, philosophy of history, sociology or psychology", Jaspers extends his sight toward the sphere where a philosopher (in movement as well as in giving an overall shape of the world) produces human community with such things as the meaning of being man (Sinn), the meaning of the particular (Bedeutung), the norm, or the table of values. In a word, a prophetic philosophy are distinguished for teaching "what is right, what to attain, where to live, how we should live, what to
121
act", etc.

Jaspers classifies prophetic teachers into three types. The first type is characteristic for setting up determined principles out of a rational basis, with regard to the rule of conduct and action; its representatives are: Aristip, Antisthenes, the Epicurians and the Stoics.

The second type is represented by Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas and Hegel. Each of these thinkers teaches a totality of life, leaving no part aside to build a comprehensive system which is characteristic for seeking to confine life in the rational framework. Yet they, for all this comprehensiveness, remain unpenetrating so far as the ultimate, existential depth of being is concerned.

The third type, exemplified by such as Socrates, Kant and Kierkegaard, is characterized as the prophet of "indirect communication". Their existences are contradictory, rejecting to be prophets, unattractive in appearance, remaining restless, and thus the real issue is left problematic without being subject to any fixed prescription. They never teach how to live, for what matters here is not a doctrine but an inward movement through dialogue. Making their appearance fragmentary; and without giving any possessable knowledge, they are characteristic for dissolving things into doubt and obscurity. But in truth they are men of communication -- communication not for capturing an individual soul in any fixed dogma but for indirectly awakening each one to his own depth of being. They are not anti-rational but rather trans-rational, as they stir up the creativity mediated with rationality. Their thinking is existential in the structure of communication.

"The indirect communication, as standing behind all the rational, is rooted in the life of the spirit, so long as it stays in living movement. Through this, all the rational gains a color that it does not have in the other two types."¹²²

Thus, prophetic philosophies are classified into three ways of communication with regard to being man. The first type resides in the consistency and coherence of rational principles; the second in the knowledge of the totality; and the third in the life of the spirit, which becomes present only in the Existenz state.

This, however, does not mean that Jaspers treats world views or prophetic philosophies either as a matter of typology of their doctrines or as a matter of the characterology of the philosophers. Guided by the idea of the psychology of meaning, whose objectivity-liquefying, Idea-culminating nature may now be found analogous to the above mentioned indirect communication; Jaspers penetrates the spiritual

life or the creativity source looming around the characterizations of philosophies.

History is dealt with as Geisteswissenschaften, as these penetrate numerous specialities. What is conspicuous within such a context is its rationality. That is to say, history as a manifestation of humanity is bound to be connected with the rational in whatever condition, though this rationalization is modified by one approach or another. But when seen from the prophetic creativity, or from the meaning of the rational, what matters to the rational -- in Jaspers' case, to the idea of the psychology of meaning -- is now the inhalation and exhalation, so to speak, of the life of the spirit, for it is in this sphere that man is faced with the ultimate task of fulfilling his being in time.

In The Psychology, Jaspers begins to identify this vertically enhanced structure of history by the word "greatness". By "greatness", Jaspers refers to historic attitudes which are sensitive to the source of humanity. Such a sensitivity, however, is not a romantic sinking into the past nor a utilitarian revoking of power; it is rather a 'reverent' recognition of the origin of history to which he feels himself responsible. Jaspers ascertains the tradition of creative assimilation with such a foundation of history:

"Along and against the adherence to the community, out of the eternal affiliation to it, there emerges in man an individualistic drive for independence as process, as living, antinomical problems, but not as abstract jump into an atom.

In history, out of such isolation of the individual, emerges the greatest part of the creative, which then after initial rejection is taken up by the community. It is as if without social solidarity, without continuity nor preservation of spiritual attainment; likewise without individually orienting strength for new creation

The mere community consciousness kills all the isolating strength. Only so long as the isolating strength is able to

assimilate with, and preserve it, does the community takes up such an individual. The strongest individualistic strength of spirit presses to all generations, in solitude when it is not eradicated." 123

By "assimilation" (Aneignung), which later becomes one of the fundamentals characterizing his philosophizing as well as his approach to the world history of philosophy, he means "living in company with the philosophers themselves" by going beyond all the five aspects which are employed in treating a history of philosophy. That is, the assimilating man reaches the creative sphere by absorbing such stages as the empirical, thematic, genetic, practical and finally dynamic treatments of a philosophy. In a word, Jaspers, in setting up the realm of prophetic philosophy, concerns himself with the creativity of history by an exhaustive reflection on all existing modes of approach to history. 124

In this sense, Jaspers' world view psychology is historic in that it lifts out "trans-rational", "spiritual" experiences of the past, with a full recognition of the rights and limitations of the Geisteswissenschaften.

Concerning the cognitive nature of this assimilative approach, Jaspers defines it as "view" (Anschauung), insofar as it is limited to The Psychology, which treats philosophies specifically as observable objects of methodic formulation. The pursuit of such an Anschauung mediated by the methodic formulation, however, does not mean clinging to this methodic cognition; rather the cognitive aspect is left flexible at each level in such a way that the unity of actuality and possibility is never invaded by a possibility, that is, by the cognitive formulation. On the whole, the Anschauung, though it is to occur on the verge of each level, culminates in the Anschauung attained to by the Existenz which soars above any cognitive achievements. Thus, it ends in accordance with

the comparison of degrees of the clarity which is reached by each philosophy, while the pursuit of the Anschauung focuses on the creative source, that is, on the life of the spirit, of philosophy. So the pursuit goes on in hierarchical procedures. The summit of this hierarchy is the meeting between the past Existenz and the present Existenz. This whole Jaspers calls "world view experience" (die weltanschauliche Erfahrung).

As to the way toward this summit, Jaspers, insofar as the role of The Psychology is concerned, suggests two different appearances of it; one is to live it as a researcher, and the other is to expect that the cognitive formulation becomes an "appealing" to each present Existenz:

"Unlike the factual scientists, we do not pile individual materials systematically or in order. Rather, we gain an intuitive view (Anschauung). In so doing, we above all sink ourselves in each situation and in each turning-point of the factual Existenz. Thus, we live along each element of the empirical existence (Dasein); for instance, we live as researcher along with all inquiries

Although these experiences are available to every man, yet usually dependent on luck, and almost always either unnoticed or obscure, it is to these experiences that anyone who speaks about world view psychology can appeal." 125

This reminds us of Jaspers' genetic understanding applied to his psychopathology. For the logical foundation of its expansion along with the world of philosophy, Jaspers refers to "the flow of lived-experience" (der Erlebnisstrom) and identifies this with "the actuality of lived-experience" (Erlebnismwirklichkeit). He then derives from this the idea of "the subject-object cleavage" as the "fundamental phenomenon" (Urphaenomen). We shall discuss it next.

The actuality of "lived-experience" is the totality of the spiritual emergence: it is immediate life; it embraces its mere phenomenon in its whole life; so it is undetermined, and as such it cannot be known in terms of universality. The whole is "the most concrete", while

any of these names is "the emptiest and most abstract", when seen from the actuality itself.

The actuality in its unending wandering, so to speak, produces things, expressions, ideas, creations, etc. Thus, it is in this actuality that the subject stands opposite to the object. This is the fundamental phenomenon of all phenomena, that is, the subject-object cleavage, the matrix of diversity.

From this the world of the lived-experiences is divided into two: the lived-experience determined by the subject-object cleavage, and by the mystical experience, in which no object is set up and no idea matters any more. A psychological thinking, therefore, must deal with both as its objects.

Now, to turn to this psychological thinking, the thinker himself becomes the subject to such an object, which is considered as the whole of the subject-object relation. Here Jaspers draws attention to the limitation of such subject who is already aware of the realm of the actuality as a whole over against the possibility of being made a psychological object. That is to say, any cognitive formulation of a world view as an existential phenomenon cannot be held to be "absolute". All the concepts, so far as they are seen in light of this sense of the wholeness, cannot be regarded as the final, though by no means as something that is not mediated with clarification. Even such concepts as the actuality of lived-experience, the subject-object cleavage, Idea, spirit, life, substance, etc., too cannot be dealt with as if any of them were to provide "an Alchimedic point", so long as the limitation of the subject-object relation between the thinker
126
and the world view goes.

Thus, for all its cognitive, methodic formulation, what is really

positive is the task of elevating the Existenz sphere as "present" through the medium of methodic clarification. The Existenz sphere is the centre around which the rational performance turns and serves for the clarified (or cognition-mediated) awareness of such a centre. Jaspers¹²⁷ calls this centre the "substantial world view". Jaspers gives a generalized description of such a centre:

"1. The centre is authentic, there is a series of in-authentic forms.

2. The centre is concrete, unity of content and form, it is living. There is that which lacks content, and from this emerge inert shapes: formalization.

3. The centre is something substantial, which is the same from the germ to differentiated shapes

4. The centre is without pretention, without a desire for domination and without subordination. It is what it is in accordance with its potency with many relations, in accordance with its potency with one place in evermore encompassing totalities." ¹²⁸

Jaspers' conception of "Anschauung" (view) is used here in a highly encompassing sense. We have to see closely so that its intellectual structure may not be confused with non-existential notions of "intuition." In dealing with "Intuitive Attitudes", Jaspers enumerates the following five possible objections to the intuitive nature of in-¹²⁹sensible Ideas.

First, there is the view that only sense-intuition is important. All realities are ascribed to sense-intuition. Even spiritual actualities accordingly are regarded as perceivable only through sense-intuition. To this, Jaspers holds that intuition in this sense is blind to what is seen beyond the world of immediate senses.

The second view represents a negation of intuition, holding that what counts is not intuition but the creative strength of fantasy.

It values above all the relationship among diverse modes of intuition. To this, Jaspers holds that all intuitions have what we call "creative" and that in any case the visible character of all these "creations", or the inherent laws of the perceived contents, cannot be denied.

The third view is concerned not with a constructed view but only with feeling. The term "feeling" is referred to as a concept without any positive content. Thus, what the feeling is and what it is not are differentiated by means of a word which is not a positive concept. To this, Jaspers asserts that what is grasped from such a viewpoint cannot compete for clarity with the phenomenological emergence.

Fourthly, there is the view that contents of intuition must be clear and meaningful according to the essence of intuition, that is, it must be as clear and meaningful as any visualized object. Consequently, Ideas are regarded as unclear, inconceivable, and as having no determinable individuality. Jaspers holds that this view is not capable of understanding the inmost strength of man's spiritual life, which manifests itself by means of Ideas.

Lastly, there is the view that what is called an Idea or Type is a more or less precise general concept or an abstraction from sensations or from generic notions. To this, Jaspers points out that one must clearly distinguish the general concept from the concrete totality (anschauliche Ganzheit), for the general concept deals with particulars, while the concrete totality with instances (Fall). The relation between the concrete totality and the instances is like that between part and its whole. The general concept cannot overstep the realm which is opened up when properties of individual things are counted, and it is not necessarily a concrete totality according to its essence. Ideas,

however, concern themselves with the concrete totality, and as such they exist unendingly with particularities; they are never fixed once and for all either intuitively or logically. They are understood only by enumerating a line of their bearers and also by leading to Anschauung, for "they are not defined but are indicated and intended."

By enumerating views of intuition in this way, Jaspers in reality has led from the level of empirical psychology toward that of phenomenological psychology or, more precisely, of the psychology of meaning in order to identify the realm of Ideas as rooted in Anschauung. This much for the background of Jaspers' conception of Anschauung.

We have hitherto confined our discussion to the methodological aspect of The Psychology. The purpose has been to see how the cognitive performance is in fact a vertical, encompassing approach to history, even when considered at its methodological plane. In short, Jaspers' object has been shown as the "prophetic philosophies", and this indicates that his research is to extend toward the sphere where the fundamentals of man's community life in time are created. This view of the objectivity which is going to be formulated is in structure identical with his historic awareness of himself. We have uplifted this relation as assimilation on Jaspers' part. This assimilative lead, permeating the whole work, starts with his acute sense of the creativity of an individual person as Existenz. This self-awareness, however, was to be confirmed by the process of clarification, which Jaspers now performed by communicating with past manifestations of the same dimension of life. The methodological formulations of this work are uniquely Jaspers', and they are only for mediating his communication in this case so as to present the object as perceivable for himself as well as for the reader,

but only in sharing the tension of rational formulations with the trans-rational sphere. This much for the methodological aspect of Jaspers' psychology of world views.

CHAPTER IV

JASPERS' UNIFICATION OF THE SUBJECT-OBJECT CLEAVAGE

Jaspers' cognition of the past proceeds in accordance with his fundamental insight into the existential centre out of which the subject-object cleavage emerges as its phenomenon. Jasper discusses the subjective under the title "Attitudes", and the objective, under the title "World Images", and the centre he calls "the life of the spirit". The term "the life of the spirit" is identical with the "Existenz", as Jaspers himself often uses in the book the two terms as interchangeable. We shall next trace the pyramid-wise movements of Jaspers' cognition toward the Existenz sphere. Concerning the attitudes and world images, we have to deal with the direction in which they are set, by means of tracing the catalogue of types toward their summit, that is, toward the Existenz sphere. We consider along this path that the application of the trichotomy continues as an act of historic understanding of the past, as we have discussed in connection with the nature of his methodologies.

4.1 Toward the Existenz Sphere¹

World views as the subjective phenomena are classified as attitudes and these are further classified into three basic types: objective, self-reflective and enthusiastic types. The subdivisions of each of these major types may be traced catalogue-wise as follows.

(1) The objective attitudes:

(a) "Active attitudes" are characteristic for viewing that the world is independent of man's subjectivity and thus becomes the object of man's practical interest.

(b) "Contemplative attitudes" are characteristic for not ruling the world as object but observing it in disinterestedness; this type is further divided into three: intuitive, aesthetic and rational.

(c) "Mystic attitudes" cancel the opposition between subject and object, and an experience of what lies beyond rational comprehension becomes the goal.

(2) The self-reflective attitude:

(a) "Contemplative" self-reflection: it quietly contemplates the self without any final claim but an awareness of its problematics; thus contemplation is intended to be the medium for reaching the Instant.

(b) "Active self-reflection": it is primarily concerned with an ideal becoming of the self; the subdivisions are: enjoyment, aestheticism, and self-formation.

(c) "Reflective and immediate attitudes": a thorough going rational self-reflection grows to an overall understanding of time and points to an experience of the Instant of immediate actuality of the self. Kierkegaard shows the widest compass of this attitude.

(3) The enthusiastic attitude:

(a) While all hitherto described types are bound to something relative, determined and finite, the enthusiastic attitudes are in essence concerned with the limitless, that is, with the wholeness of all the actualities, that is with the creative substance of the self as well as of the essence of the world.

(b) As to the subject-object cleavage, this type has an affinity with the mystic in that it concerns itself with the essence of this cleavage, though, unlike the mystic, it soars to such essence only by remaining in the very cleavage.

(c) It is characterized as follows:

- i. It itself is of unity and strives for unity.
- ii. It brings about self-becoming by sacrificing the self.
- iii. The objective world is understood as immersed in the absolute and endless, which gives Being to all the objective world.
- iv. It mediates itself with the objective knowledge (Realitaet) attained by all the previous attitudes; but it does so in order to fulfil these aspects in the sphere of the Absolute.
- v. It is identical with "metaphysical" or with spiritual Love. In this sense it is the source of all creative performances. It is also the seat where the Ideas, as seen in Plato, are produced for unifying all in the wholeness of all actual as well as of possible beings. It is the ultimate type in which all other types gains meaning; Existenz is united with Essence, here.

Turning to the objective side of the cleavage, Jaspers classifies world images. The three fundamental types are: the sensuous-spatial world image, the psychic-cultural world image, and the metaphysical world image.

(4) The sensuous-spatial world image:

(a) "Natural-mechanic world images": this type seeks not an intuitive image but an indirect one based on analysis and abstraction, or on experiment and mathematical calculation. The world is an appearance which can be founded theoretically; it is regarded as merely quantitative.

(b) "Natural-historical world images": this type builds on

intuition reached as quality or form of the sensuous appearances of nature. The morphological meaning of all shapes characterizes this type.

(c) "Natural-mythic world images": this type converges all the previous world images in simple lived-experience (Erlebnis). It is therefore psychic as well as symbolic without being objective; a poetic, mythic, subjective reactivity to the mood, or form or process of nature matters here.

(5) The psychic-cultural world images:

(a) This type pursues the naturalistically conceived form of the psychic bound up with the natural appearances: elements, laws, synthesis of elements, theories and explanations, these are sought in what is given.

(b) It is exemplified by such as sociological, psychological and political world views.

(c) When absolutized, it becomes either psychologism or historicism.

(6) The metaphysical world images:

(a) "The essentialist type": it is subdivided into the mythologic-demonic world view and the philosophic world view.

"The mythologic-demonic world view": it originates in an unquestioning acceptance of tradition or of revelation and seeks to widen what is known in such a way.

"The philosophic world view": it is not based on authority nor on revelation but appeals to what is experienced by man in general. It can be seen by the following typology: (1) the absolutization of a particular concrete world view, (2) the rationalistic and panlogistic

world view, (3) the negative theology, and (4) the mystic-speculative world view.

(b) Jaspers now unites the essentialist type with the actuality of the thinker himself, at the zenith of the philosophic world images. Namely, world images as possibilities are related to actualities at the end of all these culminations. Here are modes of thinker in such unification.

"The viewing type " (der anschauende Typus): Jaspers rates this type as the most original and most unity-minded, on the ground that what is truly active here is the "existential personality" ² which defies the systematic when shaping the world. We may understand that Jaspers set forth this type as identical with what he understands with Kant's doctrine of Idea. Therefore we may be justified in viewing this type as encompassing the following types of thinkers.

"The substantial thinker" (der substantielle Denker): what matters to this type, with regard to the possibility of a world image, is objective knowledge or Sache (scientifically establishable facts) rather than the thinker's own actuality or Existenz. His thinking primarily concerns itself with solid, rigorous determination which is founded on "exact, basic work of ratio."

"The void thinker": to such a thinker, both object and Existenz do not matter. Thinking is taken to be utilized for various fixed purposes ranging from power politics toward sceptic ataraxia.

"The order-abiding receptivity": the thinker of this type considers it as his prime concern to reach "essentials" by means of all available materials. He never creates for himself but only gives order

to what approaches him as spiritual creation, life and reality. A closed intellectual system and a drive for a scientific school of thought characterize his way of thinking.

In short, in unifying the subject-object cleavage embodied in the division into attitudes and world images, Jaspers soars to take a turn-about to look back at all subdimensional possibilities seen in the substance of philosophic thinkers. The viewing type, as mentioned above, is the point wherein the cleavage is found united. Now, we shall move into the Existenz sphere.

4.2 Essentials of Existenz ³

In leading toward the Existenz sphere, Jaspers discusses the essential of Existenz. He reduces the realm of the world image as a matter of value creation and attributes this to Existenz's creativity. This value creation is dealt with as rooted in Existenz's becoming movement in its historicity. We shall consider this in the following order: existential value creation, value creation and Existenz's historicity, and Existenz's overcoming of value annihilation.

4.2.a The Value Creation

First, we must ascertain in what sense the world image is identified with value creation. Jaspers takes the following steps. If we focus on the interaction between an attitude as a world view and the world image which is bound up with this attitude, the attitude turns out to be the "form" of the shaping of the world image, while the whole of the viewing the world is coupled with it as the corresponding "content". However, when compared with the wholeness of Existenz' dynamism, this content must be said to be one-sided, because it is merely "objective", as the attitude remains merely "subjective"

This one-sidedness indicates that both the form and the content presuppose the existence of the central strength at work. This is so because in order that they may be lived and maintained, they must remain connected to a particular and concrete life: the general requires the particular. Further, prior to their becoming objective and general, it is understood that they have been experienced by a particular individual: without a concrete experience there is no world image. This particular experience is centred on the strength which in so doing inevitably performs value judgment.⁴

Such value judgment occurring within the strength, however, cannot be objectively determined, though it can be objectified in a certain way, as the attitudes and world images exemplify. When the value judgment is to be objectified and "adopted", once again the concrete, individual experience becomes decisive. The individual in this case is faced with multiple world views based on equally multiple values. Here appears the struggles among values; since the adoption means a choice of value, the ordering of values becomes a serious matter. Jaspers describes that such a value-ordering amid value collisions takes place in the real sense when the resolution of concrete existential fights are objectified.⁴

With regard to value judgment, Jaspers upholds existential value judgment by distinguishing it from two others: the value judgment considered as a feeling, and that extracted by the viewer from the actual action and transformed into an assessment insight. The one, the feeling type, is responded to either by sympathy or by antipathy; The value here never touches the whole spirit. The other, the intellectual type, is characteristic for objectifying such feeling by isolating it from the living context; it is used for assessing objects, men, works, actions

and value judgments. A value is thus an object of contemplation, but not yet what vitalizes the whole man.

In the existential value judgment, however, a value turns to the "will" instead of to the feeling or to the intellect. It becomes a creative source of Existenz, that is, the value judgment becomes "actual" for the Existenz and makes this "active".

"It (the will) in fact strives for something as good and does not leave (things as mere) sympathy and as wish. It makes choice, while feeling can prove everything. It lets Existenz penetrate with the chosen value. It is therefore actually substantial and is the most authentic value, for it alone leads to value experience in actuality and lets this experience be a criterion instead of a merely intellectual, ideal image or an unreal movement of feeling. Only in this way, does it feel itself consciously responsible. Here values live, here they are created, and here they formatively react back upon actions." ⁶

Next, with regard to the value ordering, Jaspers firstly points out the incompleteness of any attempt at a schematism of it, as such an attempt itself depends upon one specific standpoint among many, and as no specific preference can be imposed on all. What is authentic is not to make a schema for all possible values but to set up ranks of values. Every choice and every life are required in reality to set up such a rank order. When such an order is objectified and thus demands its universal validity, it becomes "a doctrine of life", which is a major element of any practical world view. It culminates in "the highest good".

The spirit in its creativity sphere is thus confirmed as responsible to its Idea of the highest good. Jaspers next examines it as related to the question of the goal of being man. He asks: whether the Existenz is to rest on this goal objectified as an Idea, or whether it fastens upon the faith in the realm of the substance without which the

Idea turns out to be empty. This indicates that Jaspers' understanding of Existenz manifests itself as decidedly tied to his understanding of Kant's doctrine of Idea . So, by dissolving all Ideas of the highest good, Jaspers now perhaps for the first time sets forth, in connection with the substance of history, his idea of the relation between Existenz and history.

Firstly, Jaspers enumerates the major doctrines of the highest good. He does this by extending the scope to the doctrines which identify the highest good or the goal of being man as the total knowledge of history. They are: happiness, pleasure, peace of mind, the golden mean, virtue, the mean of nature, the useful, the observation of God, contemplation (theorein), action and creation, the system of culture, etc.

Secondly, he interprets what is common to all these. Seen in the context of the substance of Existenz, all these are characteristic in that they are mainly concerned with what is "formal" and do not determine what the concrete, particular resolution of Existenz can be; while in actuality, any general and therefore merely formal Idea is not capable of reaching into its substantial inward movement.

Thirdly, because of this limitation, if an Idea of the highest good is systematically constituted to bind actual, living man's activity at the bottom, it defies the life of the spirit. The thinker in fact "knows" as much as he has attained, and the knowing is partial if compared with the actuality. To apply an Idea of the highest good in this manner turns out to capture the living experience as well as his responsibility only for the sake of what is merely objective or what is a factor of justification only.

Furthermore, such an expansive use of an Idea means proclaiming a knowledge of the whole. This trespasses upon what belongs to God only, for man cannot wish to possess the whole, being a limited being. Thus, on the whole the highest good, when formalized into a system of knowledge, captures and freezes the life of the spirit.

"Life as the highest good just does not exist; rather, it is always process and something that cannot be wanted completely as a whole, nor can it be recognized as a whole. Rather, it is desired as a whole and in such a way that the final goal remains dark and (therefore) an Idea." ⁷

Lastly, Jaspers holds that the highest good plays the role of "an opalescence equivocally hanging over between an object of wishing ⁸ and an object of pleasant contemplation." That is to say, if it were to be accomplished as an object of wishing, there would be no need for will any more; yet on the other it is regarded as the meaning of the whole emergences of the world, indicating that an object identified at a particular point of history is the goal of history. It seems as if a value, that is, the objective that appears within the subject-object cleavage, became the whole world. Thus, the issue is in what sense Existenz comes to terms with history.

4.2.b Existenz' Historicity

In breaking through that boundary of Idea which is regarded as the goal of history, Jaspers had already (in The Psychology) reached the fundamental structure of his conceptions of historicity as well as of philosophy of history. Upholding man's Existenz as the creative strength sustaining the Ideas of the highest good, Jaspers examines all sets of oppositions, whose employment is characteristic of his later philosophizing. For example, Existenz vs. Dasein, faith vs. objective, total knowledge, the widest horizon vs. encasement (Gehaeuse), decision

vs. cognition, Idea vs. closed system, historicity vs. system of the totality of history, to retaining existential tension vs. to rest on the wishfully fixed Absolute, etc.

Firstly, with regard to the system of history, Jaspers focuses on its principal contention that the world is a sort of development and historical emergences have their direction or goal. Jaspers interprets this as indicating faith in Dasein, i.e., in a being or thing in the world. In other words, one trusts in the passage of the world here, in terms of the nature of things: consequently he knows each individual's destination and mission once and for all. The wherefrom and the whereto of man's community life as well are known as determined of necessity. This means that man is to rest on a present conviction, believing that the present thought is of necessity, so that each individual must fulfill what is drawn up by such a thought. The affirmation of the present state of mind is so solidly held that the life of the spirit seems to have been grasped beforehand. What the thinker trusts in is not the undeterminable creative mystery of man but "human nature" knowable objectively once and for all.

Over against this, Jaspers sets forth the other way of being man who confronts himself with it by the word "it depends upon me" ("Es kommt auf mich an"). No one knows beforehand the course of the empirical existence; the particular overwhelms our knowledge. The development of the world is not of necessity but rather always problematic and therefore remains critical process. Its direction cannot be known by us. This man, Jaspers goes on, feels that what the world will become depends on the particular and on himself.

That is to say, although this man does not know in objectivity the ultimate goal, he has the "imperative" of his life, which is:

"To act and live goals concretely which are visible and valuable to him, under the widest horizon of his knowledge and of his experience, knowing well that these goals are not goals in general but a cross-section and limited thing beyond which he cannot command a view." ⁹

Thus, such a man does not take resort to a definite hierarchy of value nor to a doctrine of the necessary development toward the best of all possible worlds.

This man does not think that a thing comes to him of itself while he does not act. He can penetrate to the depths according to his own consciousness, and with his whole ultimate goal; what matters is that he determines to action with his whole strength. He does not know the highest good set up as absolutely valid. Life must show him first and must show wider and wider what he wills and what he can do. Any objectively grasped ultimate goal is limited, and only in this sense can one choose it; it is an Idea of his own faith but not the knowledge of
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the whole world.

This man, however, does not stop at relativizing philosophies of history; his falling back on his inmost self is not anything like replacing the great values with solipsist self-assertion or with nihilistic, destructive negativity. He draws a line between the existential meaning of a "speculative image of the emerging world" and an absolutization of its doctrine. The inmost self is Existenz but not mere empirical existence (Dasein). The creativity of a philosophy of history, or more positively, the creativity of the Idea of the highest good, must be unfolded beyond the world image so that, in his own present way and in his own particular, unique actuality, he may become clear once more of his

being in time, which task cannot be fulfilled without another contemporary becoming of the Idea of time. In this sense, the claim to such creativity entails an awareness of the need for another contemporary philosophy of history, which of course is never intended to be a system of history. Thus, Jaspers, in erecting this type of man, reveals in fact an entirely new Idea, which is exactly identical with the framework of his later philosophizing, his philosophy of history included. So Jaspers goes on to say:

"This man does not have so much trust in the course of the world, as it will run itself but has trust in man's will which shaped the world truly with current and concrete goals, with Ideas and shaky utopias, but in the last resort without any foresight of the wider future or of the final goal. He lives and performs his own part which he can see; but he does not know what empirical existence is upon him other than that it becomes torpid if someone does allege a knowledge of it and directly actualizes it." ¹¹

In other words, Jaspers' emphasis on the will indicates also his emphasis on the liberation of existential freedom. His disregard for the system of history is based on his view of the primacy of freedom. The "current and concrete" goals and the "utopia" indicate his positive intention to the historic understanding of Existenz' empirical existence. This two-fold positiveness of Jaspers' understanding of Existenz and empirical existence is uniquely Jaspers', and underneath this polar structuralization of Existenz, there is Jaspers' scrutinization of Kierkegaard's Idea of "religious Existenz". His position to Kierkegaard, which he consistently holds throughout his philosophizing, is already thoroughly discussed in The Psychology; Jaspers characterizes Kierkegaard's "subjective thinker" as lacking "the impulse for the shaping of the world" (Impulse zur Weltgestaltung), for instance:

"Kierkegaard points out the situation, denies finalities, and says nothing about the nature of world view experience

itself. He simply notes that these strengths are wholly outside the world: alone with God. He does not give any impulse for shaping the world. The ethical is a problem of attitude toward oneself, and the purposes are all directly focused on the absolute but not through world-activity. It is a reflective, solitary religiosity of thinking." 12

In brief, the centre of the world view creativity is revealed as struggles among forces or strengths; the strengths are represented in the will which sustains its being and shapes the world by authenticating its value creativity; the authentication gravitates around the zenith of values, that is, around the creative source of the highest good.

This creative source is ascertained here with the will which sustains its authenticity by keeping itself in process. This process, however, is not an indulging in merely subjective feeling without taking on itself the responsibility of the rational aspect. The process remains authentic only when it maintains its life by producing Ideas at a restless pace. The tension between the Idea and process is never loosened. Thus, the Idea dwelling in this tension becomes the creativity of history; an understanding of philosophies of history and a creation of a philosophy of history in accordance with the process gain meaning in the continuation of the tension.

As shown in the above, Jaspers' interpretation of the spirit as historic creativity is unique in its emphasis upon the unity of two realms: the mystical one or Anschauung, and the rational or objective. The unity as such is dealt with in its general form under the title "The Boundary Situations" (die Grenzsituationen). As such it refers to the limitation of rational thinking which is intrinsically bound up with the awareness of infinitude. Jaspers paves the way toward these situations by discussing "value annihilation" as the bridge between the question of world images and them.

4.2.c The Overcoming of Value Annihilations

Hitherto the discussion of the Existenz sphere has been centered on positive value creation, culminating in a creativity in which the absolute creation is affirmed within a dialectic tension with the absolute value negation. That is, the sense of the absolute is to remain creative and genuine only in a living process in which the Idea of the absolute is never given the place of the Absolute as such. By the "boundary situation", Jaspers penetrates the depths of such value negation considered as inevitable owing to the fundamental phenomenon "the subject-object cleavage".

(1) The value annihilation:

Firstly, the value annihilation (Wertvernichtung) comes into being hand in hand with value creation, for the way toward absolute value inevitably means negation of the absoluteness attributed to concrete values of empirical existence. In reality, however, the multiplicity of value annihilation goes along with the multiple aspects of the situation, which is felt in the opposition to the holding-out of a value accepted as absolute. Some of such value-negative situations can be overcome so long as the pursuit of absolute value keeps going; but there are situations coming as the last boundary of man's empirical existence.

This consciousness has its basis on the subject-object cleavage. That is, any absolute image of the world is a product of this cleavage; the objective is always in tension with the subjective which in its turn is never exhaustively confined to the objective. Thus, the objectively shaped world is fundamentally unstable, as long as the consciousness of the whole is to question it.

So far as the subject-object cleavage goes, man cannot extend his objective perspective beyond this boundary but has to face it; the Existenz sphere is thus confirmed as taking on itself this situation.

Jaspers calls it "the boundary situation" and generalizes its nature as follows:

"What is common to this situation is: that, always in the subject-object-cleaved, i.e., in the objective world, there is nothing firm, no unquestionable absolute, no hold (Halt), that can be held out for all experiences and for every thinking. All flows, is in restless movement of that which has been called in question. All is relative, finite, and torn into opposites. There is not the whole, the absolute or the essential." 13

In general, this limit of the objective world reached by man is experienced at the limit of the Idea of absolute value. Every system of absolute value is bound to be faced with ultimate opposition to its full realization, namely, with death, guilt, absolute accident, etc. Thus, the whole world of value comes to be founded upon the ultimate accident; the empirical existence of value appears in complete destruction.

As cognition and determination go deeper and deeper, this situation comes to be experienced in a refined general form. So, Jaspers deals with it by dividing experience into two aspects: the general and the particular. The general is "the consciousness of the antinomic structure of the world" and the particular is numerous, though Jaspers selects the most impressive ones such as "struggle, death, chance and guilt". These represent what are concretely happening whereas the general is the essential aspect of these. In any case, Jaspers brings his analyses eventually to that creative strength which, at the zenith of experiencing the boundary situation, takes on itself the world of the

subject-object cleavage and sustains its process-minded creativity. We shall discuss the "general boundary situation" first and then the "particular boundary situation".

(2) The antinomic structure of the world:

Firstly, Jaspers' analysis in this part is based on his awareness of the whole of the subject-object cleavage:

"The actual -- thinking, feeling and acting -- man simultaneously stands between two worlds: before him the realm of the objectivity, and behind him the strength and structure of the subject. His situation is determined from both sides: before him the object, and behind him the subject; both are infinite, inexhaustible and unpenetrable. Decisive antinomies are on both sides." ¹⁴

From this point of view, Jaspers classifies the antinomies into: the antinomies on the object side, and the antinomies on the subject side. The former is subdivided into: the antinomies for thinking and cognition, and the antinomies for value and action.

With regard to the antinomies for the thinking and cognition, Jaspers follows up Kant's "antinomy of the pure reason". For instance, as pointed out by Kant, the Idea of "space" is conceived simultaneously as finite and infinite, and thinking is here faced with an insoluble contradiction, insofar as the thinker has an awareness of infinitude. This situation may lead to three directions: the first is the sceptical nullification of cognition as well as of the world; the second is to be led by the strength of Ideas, in which both the finite and infinite dwell at the same time. The third is to fix such contradictions and build an antinomic system of the world. Jaspers ascertains this situation as fruitful for the second direction: "Here the man is in an ultimate situation, through which he in cognition leads him always to fall into doubt, and yet surely because of it he gains Idea-minded strengths." ¹⁵

Concerning the antinomies for value and action, Jaspers points out the contradiction which is inevitable because a value is actualized only through strengths and conditions, which in themselves are negative to the value. Likewise, as to the action, it is pointed out that in the great human society two mutually opposite strengths, individualistic and collective, identify each other, bearing a simultaneously positive or negative accent.

Next, under the title of the antinomies on the subject side, Jaspers refers to the oppositions experienced in regard to the drive, psychic development, character, personality development, and Existenz.

In classifying reactions to such antinomic situation, Jaspers compares three types of consciousness. The first is that the person feels himself split in such a way that he leads his life without consistency. The second is that the person without getting into the reality of the antinomic situation loiters around it, evading it by compromises or neutralizations of the oppositions.

The third is to gain strength in the midst of the opposition. The person becomes deepened in development and spurred to unending strife for unity. Jaspers calls this "the life of the spirit itself". 16

In distinguishing this reaction, Jaspers in fact describes the encompassing creativity of the Existenz sphere. The man in this state maintains his resolution to take on himself the unending chains of the antinomies, on the one hand. And on the other, he holds this side of his strength within his resolution to actualize his faith in the infinite or Absolute, which is never to be confined to the rational or to the universally valid. The whole tension lying between the rational and the inward strength which takes its root in the infinite is unending

movement, without which no rational performance, bound to the suicidal contradiction, maintains its truth value.

"The man strides ahead, without fixing, on an unending way, in always new experiments of a formless, living synthesis in order to reach a resolution, which never rejects anything rational and yet is never established by anything rational in a manner of satisfaction and of general acceptance. A will to unity, though without possessing such unity, springs for himself out of the antinomy, as strength of life. This strength is acquired always only anew in upheavals, while at the same time for the person an intention to the metaphysical, that is, a contact with the infinite, is experienced in an unobjectifiable way." ¹⁷

(3) Suffering:

While all these boundary situations are experienced as to the objective world, suffering is experienced as their "reflection" on the self. Therefore, suffering is the subjective reflection of all boundary situations. It is experienced as negative in value, while man's life contains at the same time what is positive in value, for instance, delight, inquiry, meaning, spiritual wake, etc. Pleasure and suffering are thus experienced as chasing each other. Both are in this sense the ultimate, the overpowering, and the unovercomable. This antinomic boundary situation emerges when the whole of the empirical existence is passively contemplated while the positive goes along with the active life, which is process.

In discussing reactions to this boundary situation, Jaspers refers to it as originating both pessimism and optimism. When stress is put on pleasure which is held to be positive in contrast to suffering as negative, optimism develops, whereas when stress is put on suffering, pessimism develops. These are one-sided, so far as suffering is concerned.

So Jaspers focuses on the case that suffering is experienced

as something that is a "totality". Four types of reaction to this are enumerated: resignation, evasion from the world (suicide, reconciliation in nothingness without moral or religious commitment), heroism and religious-metaphysical justification of suffering. Jaspers' goes on to discuss the religious-metaphysical reaction.

Once again Jaspers draws a line between those resting on a doctrine of suffering and the cases of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.

As to the doctrine-minded (Zarathustra, the Indian Karman doctrine, and the doctrine of predestination, for example), Jaspers characterizes it as thwarting the existential "strengths":

"Every doctrine formulated about the whole becomes an encasement (Gehäuse). It robs the original lived-experience of the boundary situation and thwarts the emergence of the strengths, which seek in movement the meaning of empirical existence in the future by means of self-intended experience, in order to set in their place the rest of a peered-through, accomplished, soul-satisfying world of eternally present meaning." 18

Overcoming this falling in the doctrines, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, though the one is religious while the other is areligious, reveal the type of man who goes beyond, but not 'against', a doctrine of suffering. "For only the medium of our life is absorbed in the doctrine, but not the essence". 19 So, Jaspers goes on to elevate the existential synthesizing of suffering -- synthesizing by affirming life, process or meaning in one's own activity: the world is not "what is", but "what becomes". Suffering in this sphere no longer binds the man to an absolute value judgment or to a systematic doctrine but remains in tension with incessant stirring-up, resolution and appealing to his authentic strength of life as well as to that of other man. 20

(4) The particular boundary situation:

There are boundary situations which have more concreteness;

the most impressive ones are "struggle, death, chance and guilt". These too are experienced in antinomy: struggle vs. heavenly help, death vs. life, accident vs. meaning, and guilt vs. redemption. In the empirical level of life, these boundary situations are experienced as "value-negative" ultimate limits. In the religious-metaphysical consciousness both sides are experienced in antinomy. Jaspers' discussion of reactions to these limits leads to the existential overcoming of each of them.

Firstly, on struggle. Reactions to this ranges from the choice of love to the struggle by masking under such as utopian pacifism, and to the affirmation of struggle for struggle's sake. The existential reaction, however, towers above all these.

That is, in this case the man, being substantial, meaning-minded, objectivity-concerned, and person-centred, chooses inward truth while being in his limitedness and temporality. Thus, struggle becomes unavoidable. He understands that struggle is the "form of empirical existence". In his fundamental relationship with the Absolute, there is no struggle as such but the substance of struggle matters. Jaspers formulates: "struggle in love", meaning that "struggle can be expression of a process to intensify understanding in love."

As to Jaspers' understanding of love, it may be better noted here that he discusses love also as characterizing the enthusiastic attitude, by distinguishing among sexuality, erotic and "metaphysical" loves. He in that part elevates "the enthusiastic love" as the most authentic. He indicates love as the source of the philosopher's being able to shape a positive, all-unifying world view: that is, love in this unifying thinking is something more than man's psychic quality or erotic

intoxication but is something between the Absolute and the seeker after such Absolute. For a world view, to attain the goal of love means serving "for the manifestation of the unutterable Absolute;" the examples of such goal of love are: "the heavenly kingdom, the eternal salvation, the uplift to the One, the ethical self-cultivation, the knowledge of Ideas, the integration in the world by contact with the Absolute, etc." 21

Secondly, concerning death, Jaspers considers such reactions as, the nihilistic submission to the chaotic empirical existence and doctrines of immortality. With regard to such doctrines, Jaspers interprets that they are expressions of lived-experiences based on the awareness of the relation to the Absolute. That is, they reveal the faith that there is beyond death meaning or Being; man strives to enhance his soul by going beyond the limit of death. 22 So, once again Jaspers' discussion culminates in his reference to Kierkegaard, who in his faith in God never drew up any specific explanation of immortality but remained taking on the position of a faithless seeking faith. 23

Thirdly, concerning chance, Jaspers points out the futility exemplified by attempts to overcome it by holding on some experience of necessity or by resorting to scientific operations. The Idea of man leaves the possibility of measuring the multiple differences of man by means of an Idea of man in general and of an Idea of his sameness. But this never eliminates the sharp contrast between the difference and the sameness. The doctrine of predestination absorbs the accident in the ungraspable act of the Absolute, the infinite or God; yet this cannot eliminate the accident of the arbitrary personality of such God. So, Jaspers holds that underneath such a doctrine lies the experienced anchor of the religious man; in this experience the accident is not to

be experienced as a springboard toward the Absolute.

Finally, on guilt. Jaspers deals with ethical antinomy by assimilating his perspective with what is experienced by the profoundest religious thinkers such as Augustine, Luther and Kierkegaard. Stoicism is thus counted as ethical optimism resting on the self-confidence which is basically not the certainty of personality but that of the schema which is finite. It is "arrogance of the finite", blind to the antinomy.

The consciousness of guilt as an antinomic boundary situation is an experience of the inevitable imperfection as long as the man finds himself called to the highest standard of ethical action. The empirical sense of guilt does not stand on such enthusiastic concentration of self-reflection; so the matter is what is to be accentuated in deciding ethical values.

25

Toward the religious heights, Jaspers takes three steps. Firstly, an accent may be put on the relation between deed and consequence. Yet, the inevitable consequence in such a case can hardly be identical with what is intended in the deed. Thus, if ethical value is to be judged on the basis of deed, it eventually leads to the irresponsible ethical life, for the consequence is not necessarily bound to the acting person's intention. An action without responsibility is "non-action" (Nichthandeln).

So one holds that conscience and motive must be accentuated. These mean the strength of self-control. Action is thus always called back to responsibility of such self-control. Yet, such self-control is not always "pure": for instance, the motive cannot be isolated from the totality of feeling and as well as of conscience; conscience is not always pure in assimilating with the whole meaning of the reality it faces.

Thus, finally the accent comes to be put on all the states of feeling as well as on all the modes of psychic movement. An overall self-reflection movement becomes the centre of gravity which orders the whole ethical life. What matters here is the whole person's relation to the whole that looms around the Idea of man. The self-reflection is driven "in a bottomless infinity". All states of mind are created in accordance with "the consciousness of complete uncertainty":

"At this point, he (man) no longer knows where he should find himself, what kind of man he should become, insofar as he is serious about self-control and self-contemplation. Duty and inclination, ecstatic inquiry and enduring motive, good-will to the right and artificiality, genuineness and vitality which is mortal and finite, etc., are contradictions which he cannot in the end surmount." 26

The whole man stands in the face of "an absolute standard", and in such a state of mind he has no choice but to abide in the consciousness of ethical imperfection and of debt. In the profoundest case, this experience, so far as the individual quality is concerned, lies beyond the possibility of "communication", regardless of his will to communicate it. In short, the man finds himself falling in a "boundary situation".

Turning to the question of reactions to such a "boundary situation", Jaspers' discussion again centres on Kierkegaard, whom he in this case distinguishes from the following three types of such reactions. Firstly, ethical antinomy is fixed as the ultimate end and then objectified into a doctrine of the radical evil or into a dualistic world image. The second type of reaction is the Early Christian doctrine of justification. Here the antinomy is no longer an end but abrogated by the grace of God which is lifted out above man's free will. The third type is what

can be exemplified by the consciousness occupying a typical hangman whom may be characterized as "half-suffering and half-satisfied", as sins are used for edification.

While all these types are common in fixing the ethical antinomy to its objectification in one way or another, Jaspers' views, Kierkegaard by objectifying the contradiction of the antinomy puts stress on what grows in subjectivity as a reaction to the antinomy. In other words, the three types absolutize objectifications, and Kierkegaard by the medium of such objectifications accentuates the subjective and thus "absolutizes the guilt consciousness in the subjective Existenz". This means that Kierkegaard is distinguished for concentrating on the inward actuality lying beyond the antinomy. This inward actuality is the point at which Kierkegaard brings in the decisiveness of "resolution", in the sense that in resolution he soars to the living relationship between this guilt-clear Existenz and the Absolute. To know the contradiction means striving for Existenz as the substance of this relationship which is animated by absolutizing the guilt consciousness. And the striving originates not in a merely contemplative thinking but in his faith or rather in his sense of the crisis coming from the tension between faith and non-faith or between Existenz and empirical existence. This way, for Kierkegaard the boundary situation is what is experienced as a matter of becoming a person.

The intensity of the becoming is so encompassing that the question of guilt is elevated above all particular senses of guilt as well as above all merely universal validity-appealing (viz., psychological, anthropological, sociological and metaphysical) explanations of guilt. The contemporary meaning of this encompassingness is included

here consciously. That is, modern rational thinking, which must be regarded in ultimacy as individual person's performance, is experienced as eradically shaken and reoriented in the sphere of faith -- faith in the sense that it does not mean resting content with any knowable object but exists in the "Instant" where Existenz touches on its own self-creation.

With this Existenz manifestation, Jaspers comes to be confirmed that the modern age, because of its forfeiture of authentic faith, is lost in mere time isolated from eternity. Jaspers writes:

"Kierkegaard, for the relationship to the Absolute (to 'eternal blessedness'), seeks and finds everywhere a typical expression for the modern consciousness, that is, for the man who in critical philosophical thinking has forgotten the naive knowledge (Wissen) of the supersensual world, of the absolute. He finds it for the authentic faithless, insofar as one understands by faith the tangible possession of the contents which are the Absolute, for the man who nevertheless strives for faith, who nevertheless has the consciousness of the Absolute in general, of the decisive importance of an Existenz who demands a religion that is beyond knowability (Religion des Nichtwissenkonnens)."²⁷

As mentioned before, Jaspers, with all this Kierkegaard-assimilated discussion of the Existenz sphere of the spirit, concludes his interpretation of Kierkegaard's existential religiosity by pointing out Kierkegaard's lack of the impulse for shaping the world. Logically speaking, Jaspers understands the Existenz sphere as the creativity which in existential faith and resolution takes on itself the tension of the subject-object cleavage. Thus, this creativity involves self-clarity fastening upon the eternal now by retrieving its objective shaping in order to become an appealing between Existenz and Existenz, which Jaspers later on fully develops by the conception of "communication". Let us recapitulate, by way of a formalic, the essentials of our foregoing discussions.

4.3 Recapitulation

(1) Jaspers' interpretation is guided by the will to clarify the fundamental awareness of the whole which manifests itself in the subject-object cleavage of man's consciousness.

(2) The human manifestation of such a whole can be experienced in understanding world images; world images are the shaping of the world, whose totality is mankind's history. Such shaping is actualized through creating the order of the highest good, so that the Idea of the highest good is the temporal manifestation of the inmost strength (the will) of the spirit, which is faith in the absolute.

(3) Insofar as the subject-object cleavage means the structure of this manifestation, the inward strength sustains its authenticity by retrieving its objectifications in the restless movement of creativity, which recurs only by resolution in the "Instant" of the fundamental awareness.

(4) The retrieval of the objective in such a whole is therefore actualized in the tension between absolute value creation and absolute value annihilation, so far as the life of the spirit has to remain pure, for the objective world created by the absolute value creation is never identical with the Absolute as such, but a manifestation of life.

(5) Value annihilation for the sake of the sustainment of the creative life is experienced by overcoming the antinomies resulting from the subject-object cleavage structure of the afore-mentioned manifestation; This experience is the consciousness of the boundary situation.

(6) The overcoming of the boundary situation does not mean absorbing it in a more subsumptive doctrine of essential antinomies, but to become clear of the substance: subjectively, the overcoming is

the clarity of the tensive unity of Existenz and empirical existence; objectively, it is that of infinitude and finitude.

(7) Only in resolution on behalf of the existential fundamental relationship, which is never exhausted by objectification, that is, by any modes of the rational, can the clarity of this tension maintain its unity without fixing its strength to finite objectivity.

(8) If without the ever-to-be-"fluidified"objectivity, however, the existential resolution loses its control over its empirical existence; the objectification is in this context the medium for the wake of Existenz. The whole of such thinking is not to sink life into such things as cognition, doctrine or system; the thinking is in essence an appealing to Existenz, both one's own and one's fellow's. The whole line of such objectivity is rooted in the creation of the Idea, which is simultaneously universal and concrete, holding itself opened up to the unknowable mystery of the whole.

PART III

THE CREATIVITY WHOLE:

AS THE CLARITY OF EXISTENZ' HISTORIC PRESENT

Jaspers' cognitional thinking sustains itself by his intention to reach the present clarity of the creative whole of all the prophetic philosophies in the past. Such a whole indicates the actualities in which all the hitherto discussed "possibilities", both the "attitudes" as well as the "world images", can be authentically retrieved in their creative origins.

The culmination at the zenith of this creativity proceeds in the pyramid-wise movement of overcoming: it soars in this movement toward the pole of the whole in which the oppositions between the "subjective" and "objective" are retrieved so that they may remain creative in time. The spiritual states in the past, which are overviewed by this movement, are classified largely into two major levels.

The first level means the opposition between states of diffusing values into the ego-centric self, i.e., between "Nihilism", and those of maintaining values by adhering to the finite. The latter states are identified as "Rationalism", which are subdivided into: "Authoritarianism", "Liberalism", and "Value-absolutism".

The second level means the states which adhere to the infinite, and the spirit at this level is called "Demonic Man", in the sense that it solely concentrates on the awareness of the Absolute by positively taking on the inevitable antinomies. In accordance with the subject-object cleavage, the spiritual states at this level are classified further into two ultimate levels.

The one is the opposition between the self-becoming of demonic man and demonic man's adherence to objective reality. The other is the mystic experience in which the awareness of the Absolute, or faith in eternity, is actualized in two opposite ways. The one is the way of mysticism, in which the spirit takes flight from the world into eternity, and the other is the way of Idea-mindedness, in which demonic man, in retrieving his possibilities on both sides of the subject-object cleavage, takes the course of going forward by staying in the middle between eternity and temporality.

The former opposition indicates one-sidedness because the self-becoming abandons the shaping of the world, and the reality-mindedness lacks the open-mindedness of the self-becoming. The latter opposition is the zenith where the choice between eternity and man's historicity is appealed for in full clarity. Seen in such a direction, the level where the states of chaos and those of absolutizing the finite can be characterized as "a-historic" states of the spirit, because in such states the sense of the Absolute is not so genuine as it is mediated by fulfillment of time, and also because the temporal possibilities are not fully mediated by the sense of the Absolute. Such is the prospect in which we are going to discuss the creative whole by dividing it into two topics: "A-historicity" and "The Historic present".

CHAPTER V

THE A-HISTORICITY¹

5.1 Nihilism

In adopting Nietzsche's definition of nihilism, Jaspers generalizes it as follows: "It is 'radical rejection of value, meaning or of desirability' (Nietzsche); it is the state of the soul in which every goal is absent; in which every answer to the question of whereto is absent; in which all values are made valueless."²

By his insight that no nihilism can successfully attempt to fasten upon "absolute nothingness", Jaspers classifies its variations into two types. One is the type that somehow rejects all values and all meaning and clings to an affirmation of mere reality as valueless and meaningless. The other is the type that considers reality as undependable and worth annihilating on the ground that such reality, when seen from the viewpoint of value and meaning, cannot be justified by any means. The former, "value nihilism", is represented by the practical materialist, while the latter, by Buddhism.

5.1.a Three Streams of Nihilism

With regard to the way the soul starts bending to nihilism from each "form of the objectivity", Jaspers points out three basic streams. Firstly, when a certain world view is intentionally pursued, the soul comes to experience the fact that the ideal case inevitably becomes contradictory to the real experience. For instance, it comes to find that an idea of human equality cannot be actualized without confining the idea in a fixed form and without invoking legal authority; a cosmopolitan inevitably becomes a chauvinist, and a socialist inevitably becomes a despot; a belief in the meaning of life is hardly supported

by real life, and so on. This experience could lead either to a constructive process or to a fixation to the negative and thus to despair. This despair, when fixed as such, is nihilism; when thinking turns from this despair to carrying through a reflection, it becomes a process leading to another bending from objectivity, so we have the second stream.

The second stream grows in accordance with the nature of reflection as such, or with the rational attitude. The rational attitude is characteristic for circumscribing and isolating parts from the whole of the intuition; it discriminates one from the other: "generally speaking, the rational shaping inevitably moves in contrast."³ Thus, a side or a viewpoint is isolated from the totality in which it immediately stands, and this procedure goes on as another side comes as valid; the fundamental interest of such reflection is to accomplish certainty. As this develops, the reflection comes to experience that every foundation has its opposite, and therefore finally no fixation can remain absolute. All that is determined comes to be cancelled and relativized. This experience leads to nihilism.

The third stream results from taking a turn-back at the point of such experiences. The man in full pathos turns back from the reflection to the "essence", the "true" and the "substantial", as Jaspers describes it: "The man desires to be truthful, actual and serious." The man wants to live in the Instant and in actuality, instead of indulging himself in mere "general schema". The will to truthfulness nullifies all objective possibilities. This is the thorough-going nihilism which was experienced by Nietzsche.⁴

5.1.b The Nihilistic Fixation⁵

The nihilistic experience develops into some stages of movement. This development reveals that a perfect nihilism without fixation cannot be accomplished. So Jaspers formulates it into four types leading toward that which anchors on the primitive self.

(1) A man takes himself as nothing and turns to seek value in the other world, without committing himself to any thought or to any action in this world.

(2) A man seeks to achieve his substantial self by negating himself. The nothingness of the bottomless depth is the foundation of such negation. Thus, the will to such nothingness applies violent self-denial to the point of disposing of himself by suicide.

(3) A man turns to increase the scope of his lived experience by making every thing a sensational object. Every world view of the past, every religiosity, or every art deserves his passing experience. Intoxication in all emotional possibilities, fanaticism of such as spiritual type, generation or mankind, empty excitement of the formalistic beauty of such as the artistic and critical cognition, absorption in such as music, church fellowship, circle and master, etc. are interwoven into a colorful, chaotic shape of life. In philosophy, the forgotten substance of the past is pursued in order to fill out the dissolved mind. Finally, after all these pursuits of the object of experience, he falls in complacency and rests content with a sort of technique, church, community, music, personality, or material objects. Thus, nothingness bound up with irresponsibility rules in all:

"It is what is analogous everywhere that what is sought in intellectual discipline is not insight but edification, in art not idea but ecstasy, in music not strength but decomposition ('release'). In the rich pretence of irresponsible movement of mood, there is everywhere nothingness." 6

(4) Finally, out of the third type develops the self-consciousness of the momentary ego or of the empty Existenz. A man here is confined in circumstances and deals with spiritual formation as a means; no spiritual product is participated in as a matter of the whole person's assimilation but as a merely formal possibility. The thinking is allowed "ad libitum", without penetrating the essence but with playing arbitrary, incidental intellectual games. Since he never trusts any, he forgets what has been told; so he receives nothing but engages himself in producing something heterogeneous. In fear of triviality, his wording becomes ceremonious and pretentious; the simple, short, and natural expression which is clear and purposive disappears; words and phrases are intensified and repetitive. Thus, he resorts to making himself attractive by friendliness, acting in good faith, and closes eyes to the spiritual, and to sharing the historical.

It is in this type that "the primitive, egoistic self" represented by the sophist, the sceptic, and the practical nihilist; who, while recognizing himself as important on the one hand, manipulates as means the nihilistic elements of such as culture and spiritual words. Here the self becomes fixed in agreeing to nihilism. The general aspect of this nihilistic self-fixation is described as follows.

(1) The sophist form: the sophist agreement is characteristic for utilizing every sphere of nihilism as a means to justify the sovereignty of sensual drives; for this, what matters is the sensual satisfaction

which cannot be accomplished without wrestling for power and cash-value. The sophist uses the nihilistic developments for the purpose of persuading others that any claims opposed to his own are the most doubtful and unfounded, and by this he intends to set up as unconditional his drives, inclinations, and therefore, his individual, subjective ego.⁷

(2) The sceptic form: the sceptic agreement too is for using the nihilistic development as means, but it is not for power or for cash-value. The sceptic by this means at first overturns his self in the consciousness of nihilistic unrest and of continuous wandering, until the nullification becomes felt urgent and complete. He, however, does not lead this toward the spiritual retrieval of nihilism, but toward accomplishing his will to carry through his self. That is, he seeks the feeling of self-certainty, namely, ataraxia, erectable at the end of understanding that every thought can be received as equal. The self is felt as certain, free from the unrest coming from the nihilistic.⁸

(3) The form of the practical nihilist (der Nihilist der Tat): He agrees to nihilism to turn to destroy all objective values. Life is purposeless; he rejects everything "dogmatically". The question left is whether the destruction be done in a theoretical, literary manner or in an active, practical manner. This nihilism feels a very deep disappointment as well as a sort of nausea in his empirical existence, which turns out to become a vandalism against all.⁹

In brief, the nihilistic fixation of the objective is to fasten upon a certain objective fixation; the objective is merely replaced with the subjective, which is in turn fixed objectively.

5.2 The Hold on the Finite: Rationalism

The world view creativity mediates its movement or process by shaping the world. This shaping retains meaning only because the thinker sustains his faith in the Absolute by each decision in the Instant. The resolution thus in the restless existential becoming calls its objective shaping back to the sphere of creative movement. This retrieval of the objective side of the life is done along the overcoming of the boundary situations. The nihilistic movements wrestle with such objective products in various directions in most cases without succeeding in fulfilling the meaning of the objective in which the negative contact with the boundary situations falls once more. Now Jaspers proceeds to concentrate on the fundamental problematicity of the objective side isolated from the living creativity. He deals with the whole problematicity by identifying it as "rationalism", subdividing this further into three types: (a) Authoritarianism, (b) Liberalism, and (c) Value-absolutism. We shall consider in the first place rationalism in general.

Firstly, rationalism is a type of the spirit, and therefore it is interpreted as stemming from the root of the spirit. It grows to be spirit's hold on the finite, while the authentic movement lays hold on the Absolute or on the infinite.

That is, in the creative process, man is faced with the unstable states of cognition, forms of Existenz, etc. He then experiences giddiness (Taumel) which stirs up his drive for a hold and rest. He seeks something "precise", that is, something valid and conclusive. He wants to have a guide for life, an image of the world, or an order of values. Unable to keep tackling the task and problematics, he reaches a prescription for his action, or a definitive institution.

Thus, the process comes to be fixed to a certain termination; he loves to rest on such as "the Being", "the unity" or "the uniformity". This Jaspers calls "the hold on the finite".

The examples are: principles, dogmas, demonstrability, traditional organization, absolute and general demands, etc. So, the characteristics of the hold are "objectivity", "nameability", "to be put in rational form", "learnability", "teachability", etc.

While the spirit lives in infinitude, that is, with the Absolute, here in this hold, the man strives to bring the Absolute to fixed possession; the Absolute thus becomes that which can be grasped objectively; the man is led "to firm conditions and mechanizations".

Jaspers characterizes such confinement of the spirit as "encasement" (Gehaeuse). "Encasement" indicates that the man gets out of the abyss of nihilism and loses the strength and enters into the domain which never becomes and is never to be reflected upon, but is rather taken as self-sufficient, absolute and unconditioned - so far as the anxiety of the movement has ceased to matter now. Instead of the freedom of the concrete, living tension, here the encasement rules the life by the fixed, that is, by "the compelling, the conceived, the precise in terms of the principle, the abstract, and the fanatic." There is a diversity of such encasement, and what is common to all is called rationalism. The general structure of this fixation is that the man, instead of holding the rational in his spiritual movement, "is faced in rational form with something universally valid, necessary and arranged, a rule, or with a law as a duty, prescription or belonging." 10

The diversity of rationalism is not based on the wholeness-minded inward strength, but on the "peripheral", "superficial" formation (Formung) which is entrusted to the intellect (Verstand). That is, the autonomy as well as compelling consistency of the intellect rules here over against the spiritual strengths such as "instincts, demands (for action), and Ideas".

Thus, the diversity of rationalism, considered as problematics of the spirit, consists in leading to various rational forms of superficial faith, as well—faith in the sense that the spirit here rests on an unreflected-on, dogmatic whole formed by the intellect. If to exemplify such forms of faith, they are beliefs in such as "human happiness, the will to power, the consciousness of the chosen people for the recreating of the world, political imperialism, etc." leading in such a direction, rationalism increases its superficiality, while there are long-enduring forms which have taken deep root as tradition.

When traced far back to the traditional depths of rationalism, it is found merging into the fundamental structure of "rationalization" at large. Rationalization in this dimension sustains the common spiritual fixation; it takes possession of the available materials in order to set up an inclusive world view, or it defines values to determine a guide for life. In any case, the diversity is reducible to the fundamental structure that it has anonymous spiritual strengths behind it and the material before it. Thus, the diversity reveals a variety of the spiritual roots as well as of aims, which diversify the rationalization.

That is, in connection with the strength side, the rationalization is reduced to the urge for such as demand for facilitation,

stabilization and power, justification of authentic Existenz, and for better environment. Next, the purpose of the rationalization varies as follows: to secure the means to maintenance of life (technique), to provide order for pleasant life (Epicurian discipline), to awaken the religious-mystical experience (spiritual exercise), to acknowledge the dignity of positions by regulation (honor or civilization), to erect self-certainty by self-discipline and asceticism (the Stoa), to live in obedience (Jesuitism), to erect learnable profession by prescribing the hand work or art (classicism), to establish a religious system, etc.

Seen as such a diversity, the rationalism seems to be a development of spiritual movements which are the most heterogeneous with one another. But as a type of the spirit, it can be formulated into a single structure as contrasted to the "irrational" of the life of the spirit. Jaspers describes this dimension of rationalism in two aspects.

The first is its manner of dealing with the wholeness of the spirit. In this aspect, it is characteristic in that "it persists in the determined and the determinable or in the fixable and finite; that is, it apprehends everything by the intellect and sees nothing more." ¹¹ No lived-experience of the infinite but fixing the infinite by theorization. The infinite is overpassed and thus sunk either into a chaos or into an order of concepts. What is essential is now what is thought by the intellect. The intellect exhausts everything, and man's action is now confined to a known purpose. Not an awareness, but a clear-cut intellectual thought becomes now man's hold for actualizing his awareness of the wholeness. It means that "he who lives in a closed whole

as fixed know that there is such a whole and accordingly that the world and life are such a whole." "This can be reached only through absolutization of a finite, a particular, or through an ordered fulness of such finitude of the infinite whole." ¹²

Now, to turn to the life of the spirit in this connection, it is distinguished as "an irrational", insofar as its whole is concerned, and what is rationally reached is either "a merely particular", "likeness", "symbol", or in the last resort "Idea". While these are never to be held as absolute so far as the life is the whole; rationalism isolates these from the life and absolutizes either of them.

Here looms the dimension where rationalism comes to "overcome itself". That is to say, when rationalism stretches itself as wide as possible to the point of seeing its own limits in the face of the irrational, that is in the awareness of the absolute irrational, it grows to determine itself; Jaspers refers to Kant's philosophy as having reached such limits of rationalism.

Here rationalism is retrieved "in the actual life and in the concrete individual person", in which something "unconditioned" dwells. The person's "pathos of the unconditioned" soars therein unless rationalism takes a turn to the chaotic or to the nihilistic dissolution of itself. Religiously expressed, the pathos of the unconditioned is identifiable as the awareness that "before God is everything nothing". The strongest strength of the unconditioned no longer turns to fix itself objectively and to absolutize, however. All is to be "relativized", but not because of the "weariedness of the thinking" (Treulosigkeit) but because of "an encompassing movement" ¹³ (das Umfassende). This encompassing movement in this case becomes "present and living".

Rationalism in this relativization is the point of crisis where the thinking either sinks into nihilism, or soars above it and, as the vivacity of Life goes, builds an unending hierarchy which has no limit but builds the limit only in itself. In short, rationalism is unified with the awareness of the infinite and receives, as it were, its creativity in the Existenz sphere of the person. When this course is not taken, rationalism fixes itself by submitting it to the will to "purpose" (Zweck), though Life too is what intends purpose; yet, having purpose is not Life as a whole."

The second aspect Jaspers focuses on is this: that the rationalistic fixation indicates that "over against the man, the necessary and the universally valid, no matter how painful it may be, are as such regarded always as what provides peace for him." The eternal law or the objectivity formulated by the rationalism makes the man feel himself "impersonal as well as timeless". Thus, the man is bound to lose sight of the becoming of his Existenz. "His temporal Existenz" is set aside, and the contemplation of the timeless and necessary is believed to bring about ultimate peace of mind, as exemplified by the Stoic, Spinozan, or Hegelian world image. Being protected by a possessable totality, the man here has cancelled the anxiety present in the boundary situations. Not the movement of life retrieves its contemplative possibilities, but the contemplation calms it by a self-inclusive world image. The spirit, that is, the creative, is thus opposed to rationalism.¹⁴

The spirit is an "absolute irrational", if compared with such a rest on the universally valid. And the experience of such an irrational persists even when the man takes on the nihilistic despair and

anxiety. It is confirmed by the appeal to the existential subjective strengths which remain authentic only in the unending, restless movement, and therefore only in crisis. Thus, "becoming" by unifying the concrete situation at each time is the meaning of timeless truth; to rest on a self-inclusive world image means dissolving the strengths and therefore the spirit. Insofar as an Existenz in time goes, every act of the man is intrinsically united with the inward depths of his being, and no act rooted in this inward whole loses its uniqueness. Truth in this context is not 'timeless' or 'universally valid' but "temporal", in the sense that all the temporal phenomena of his inward whole are to retain their meaning of existence in the continuity of the existential movement. According to the measure of universal validity, however, these phenomena are to be isolated from life and made subject to an "identity" on the basis of similarity.

"As all that is absolutely necessary is at the same time timeless, and the particular or what is not grasped as necessary, but only can be abstractly contended is solitary and concrete, everywhere infinite and unpenetrable becoming in time, so the spirit is the opposition to rationalism — rationalism, for which the essential is the timeless; and the spirit, for which concrete, particular individual becoming in time signifies what is decisive (that is to say), what I do or what happens is infinitely important, and (here) something is resolved on in time, which thereby depends on me." 15

In contrasting rationalism and the spirit, Jaspers' interpretation of the world view once more stresses that an understanding of the rational in its deepest dimension is decided by an understanding of history. As discussed before (in connection with his conception of Existenz), the spirit's creativity traced here in The Psychology is that which fulfils time. This time fulfilment is, however, different both from Hegel's system-bound approach to history and from

Kierkegaard's religious Existenz. That is, what characterizes it is that it is an inward movement which consists in the polar unity of the awareness of the mystery and the historic manifestation of existential strengths. When he contrasts at this point the temporal and the timeless, what he actually elevates is the spirit identified as historic creativity which is the matrix of the rational. His interpretation of the rational throughout the world view psychology is never 'anti-rational' nor 'negative' to rationality, for his principle of the subject-object cleavage indicates the essential importance of objectivity, to say nothing of his regard for the positive meaning of Nietzsche's nihilism, which comes to creativity through antinomic situations.

Then, this overall concentration in the creative spirit is materialized by his understanding of the becoming. Rationalism in its full development is now fluidified into the original creativity by his unique understanding of the becoming — 'unique' because the becoming is something more than the becoming of rational objectivity, or of chaotic, nihilistic subjectivity. Jaspers writes:

"For rationalism, the meaning for becoming or the historical, which no one can rationally break up, is lost. View (Anschauung) is replaced by law. There emerge universally valid doctrines of spirit, which become dead in their abstractness; doctrines of natural law, natural religion, universal human rights; doctrines which are inevitable for our ratio but become rationalism by being absolutized." 16

For the becoming spirit, the rational form is a lived-experience. But, in this case it does not mean fixation or coming to rest, rather "expression (Ausdruck) and mere steps". The original philosophic systems objectify world views in rational form; in an authentic case, however, the whole organism converges in the Idea which is conscious of the mystery. Such a philosophy continues to grow with its demand

for science in order to reach universally valid insights, or standards for moral activity and for existential choice. It also sets up a universal world image, system of life guidance, value system, moral demands, fundamental imperatives, etc. Thus, scientific insights and practical viewpoints intermingle to become a sort of "hold" (Halt). Yet, the living strengths and the external seriousness always attack such a totality. That is to say, the totality is guided by existential responsibility. No philosophic doctrine is identical with the Existenz of the thinker. The tension between the doctrine and the inward strength is never dissolved in a life-minded philosopher.

"The more consequent the rational work is in the objectification of the world-view strengths, the more the collision with the fundamental strength is experienced in the long run. From this there arise in crises of spiritual Dasein meltings and new creations." 17

Whereas the rationalist insists on his system, "the life-minded spirit, on the contrary, does not put doctrines in order (complete), but sets them in contrast to choice; he knows that world views are existentially chosen in life, feeling, or in action, but not as doctrines." For the rationalist, man's most decisive choice is to choose between rational doctrines. Thus, what is characteristic of the rationalist choice is its a-historicity or its contemplatively choosing the universal instead of something out of the whole man's "living act in the total concrete situation". Nevertheless, if it drives toward overcoming this inclination, it eventually serves to open up the path to the sphere where the spirit fastens upon the infinite. Before entering into this sphere, Jaspers expands his discussion of rationalism by subdividing it into authoritarianism, liberalism and value-absolutism. Since these conceptions disclose a dominant, massive a-historicity in

the modern age, we shall next consider these types in brief.

5.2.a Authoritarianism

In choosing the hold on the finite, a man is faced with a choice between either objective authority or the subjective self. The former develops into authoritarianism, while the latter into liberalism; either identifies itself by the medium of the other. Jaspers characterizes it as follows:

"The man under the task of his own self subjugates himself to an objective, without wanting or being allowed to exercise critique, whether this authority is a daily convention, tradition of a certain fashion, organization like church, or state, dogma, or a philosophical system. An unquestioning subjugation to an organization, system, master; a sacrifice of every possible questioning within the boundary of the authoritative (sacrificio del intelletto), of the task of personally live choice (the authority does not sanction the choice or heresy, so the rebellious are called heretics, i.e., the chooser), the consciousness of security in someone else—all these moments tie themselves to the consciousness that the actual person is equal, or that it (the person) is placed by itself as "rejected" or "feeble", the person is rescued only through the authoritatively objective." 18

The majority of men find encasement in authoritarianism, experiencing or wanting "something unconditioned". Liberation from such mass phenomenon usually ends up with spirit-lacking nihilism as a result of rationalist reflection.

Jasper distinguishes between the authoritarian man and the creative thinker exemplified by the prophet, the personally religious, or the philosopher, who, for all the objectifications he produces, never sinks his soul into them, but upholds the free personality, the inexhaustible depth of revelation, or the fundamental spirituality. The "great existential philosophers" never produce the strength for a mass movement, though they are often made into "authority" by means

of transformation. They want each individual to become himself by sharing the hold on the infinite.¹⁹

Jaspers, however, never overlooks the importance of "naive authoritarianism", which is unintentional, yet becomes a point of departure for life-minded spiritual freedom. "It is the matrix and shelter of the living soul." Such a soul contacts authority by experiencing his personal choice and then proceeds to overcome it in accordance with cognition and discernment. At this point, the life is active; so the issue shifts toward the hold on the infinite.

5.2.b. Liberalism

Liberalism stands in opposition to authoritarianism. Where authoritarianism seeks encasement in the objective; liberalism seeks this in the merely subjective "I", or in "the particular finite individuality". Its catch word is "freedom" - freedom as negation of authority. This freedom is eventually individual's "arbitrariness", which is determined by principles and demands. So, what matters is not the infinite individual, but what can be grasped in determined form.²⁰

This indicates that such freedom rejects authoritarianism on the one hand, and on the other subjugates the man to a determined arbitrariness. The latter in its turn does not sustain any spiritual nobility, for it in fact is nothing more than, e.g., accidentally sought happiness, health, economical advantage, or in a word, the arbitrariness of the individuals who are viewed as "strong" according to the power (Macht) point of view. A man subjugated to such arbitrary things or to power as the ultimate is not really free, if seen from the viewpoint of the spirit fastening upon the infinite. Jaspers goes on to say:

"The hold of these individuals rests entirely in the consciousness of their own strength; they regard their advantageous position not as an accidentally given "luck", but as justified by their competence. The consciousness of power, be it the exercise of power, or be it the "knightly" grant of kindness, help or patience, supports their self-consciousness, which is their ultimate hold." 21

With regard to world images developing from this type of spirit, Jaspers characterizes them as "a-metaphysical, totality-lacking" and "blind to infinitude". While for Existenz infinitude is decisive, for the liberalism infinitude is nothing more than "empty endlessness". Its epistemological standpoint is represented by the belief in 'facts of consciousness', which eventually leads to "solipsism" if not to a naive realism. Thus, the natural-mechanical world image or the objective cultural world image, that is, the progressionism-oriented view of history, comes from liberalism. Jaspers identifies its one-sidedness as a type of philosophy of history:

"The psychic-historical world is a sum total of individuals, who are considered, however, not as infinite essences, but always in full analogy to the specific so-called 'free' I (that is, the limitedly arbitrary I)." 22

Finally, from this existential perspective, Jaspers proceeds to describe the liberal posture as a combination of a tyrannic power to drive and intellectualism: "In the life sphere, the man takes in fact resort to power and is indeed tyrannical and, what is more, he does this in the forms of 'intellectuality' (Verstaendigkeit) - calling it 'reason'. Thus, although liberalism rejects the positive strengths of authoritarianism and of socialism, it in its resort to power is not capable of overcoming them, but remains as identifying itself only by negation; "Its whole essence is in the last resort negation." That is, it is not spiritually creative.

5.2.c Value-absolutism

When the liberal resort to power turns to objectively formulate it into intellectual principles, it brings about value-absolutism—principles such as universal human rights, duties, contracts, controls of all behaviors, etc. Indeed, in its dependence upon personal insights and upon the convincing power of the universally valid, it is in opposition to the authoritarianism. Nevertheless, as far as it lays hold on principles set against the inward freedom, it is linked with authoritarianism.

Value-absolutism consists in defining objective, general and universally valid values and sets up them as "a specific demanding object-sphere" to be accepted as absolute to all. This means that a recognized value becomes an "unconditioned being", and thus the life subjugates itself to a knowledge of value. While both in science and in philosophy the timeless or the universally valid statements, formulas and categories are held as "relative", here in this absolutism, such things are absolutized as if they were the spiritual hold, content of faith, substance or the world. The boundary situation is therefore evaded here.

Moreover, in this accentuation of general, universally valid value statements, value is dealt with as isolated from the bearer of the value, who is ultimately not universal but "concrete" and "irrational". The hold on infinitude is not experienced in the inward depths of each individual person; accordingly, the inward disillusion felt by the individual person is set aside by this resort to universal, absolute values.

"There originates of necessity contempt for the individual, there is not respect and reverence for the individual; true irrationality, blindness to personality continues; there is not lived-experience, and meaning of love. What matters, as one says, is not at all the individual person, but only the general values; the person is not important, but the "fact" (Sache). Finally, there occurs even self-contempt of the individual person, for this individual finds his "dignity", and simply pays attention to himself, in relation (recognizing, acting or organizing) to general values, as far as a light falls back upon himself from there." 23

In such defiance with the inward movement in the face of the infinite absolute, value-absolutism is a fanaticism similar to authoritarianism. Along with this becoming fanatic, a negative force is nurtured, that is, the expansion of the crude, arbitrary individualist nature such as "empty arrogance, the will to power, or the dominance of drives". The ascetic pressure tuned to the universal values goes hand in hand with the chaotic individual strength—chaotic because the thinking in this case lacks the capacity to give order in the context of the faith in the infinite.

In leading to the rational and recognizable relations to the absolutized value principles, the man never contacts the Anschauung and never penetrates "the inwardness, the essence of things and of man." "It deceives itself in all real particular value judgments", and clings to a sham absolute whenever the man has to face the "real disillusion". Thus, it prepares a path to a nihilism which turns to random humanity in defiance due to its negligence of real personality. It serves to eliminate man's experience of infinitude.

CHAPTER VI

THE HISTORIC PRESENT AS A MATTER OF SALVATION

6.1 The Hold on Infinitude

We have come to the level of the states of adhering to infinitude. We have already suggested the direction toward this level by discussing Jaspers' Existenz as unifying the divisions of attitudes and world images. At that time we focused on Existenz's value creativity. At this level, we shall deal with it predominantly as it is related to the Absolute. In order to begin by perceiving at first the shift to the most comprehensive sphere of the mind, we shall next describe the general characteristics of the spirit at this level.

6.1.a The Spirit as Infinite and Free

The spirit is infinite. Infinitude (Unendlichkeit) must be distinguished from endlessness (Endlosigkeit), first. Jaspers applies "endlessness" to possibilities of analyzing and perceiving any particular thing; so, it refers to the cognitive, "dead" datum or fact of particulars. "Infinitude" is applied to "life", which is characteristic for its unfinishable intensiveness as a purposive organism.

The spirit as life manifests itself by the medium of the psychic, and in this sense its phenomena may be counted as "endless". However, as long as every one of such phenomena meaningfully belongs in the whole of the spirit as life, not only the whole, but also any such part is "infinite".

The infinitude of the spirit is a "dialectic" culmination. That is to say, in its rational movement it never loosens the tension between its movement as a whole and what is shaped thereby; in pulling back to the prime direction, it keeps becoming and maintains unending,

"new shaping" "in assimilation rather than in accumulation". Thus, the world image shaped in this process of becoming is a manifestation of the infinitude of the spirit, which in itself is never knowable as a whole.

Next, the spirit is freedom. Freedom is spoken of either in opposition to necessity or in opposition to the individual's arbitrary will. When, as in the critical philosophy, freedom means the opposite of natural necessity, it is in fact set up as the opposite of this arbitrariness, whereas liberal arbitrariness is in reality freedom as "determined" by formulas or by principles which in the last resort rest on the exercise of power. The rule of natural law or of power over oneself and others is not freedom of the life of the spirit, for this life is "the authentic meaning" of all that it constructs. Thus, Jaspers distinguishes freedom as "lived-experience and experience of the living" from that understood as "petrified". If compared with freedom as an opposite, freedom as a "paradoxical concept" is that of the spirit.

With this consciousness of freedom, Jaspers adopts and then goes beyond Kant's conception of freedom; to the freedom of the creative process in which freedom goes along with deepening the imperative:

"Freedom of the spirit is set now just in how a man in his own insight or on his own responsibility comes to set before him something as binding. A consciousness of freedom has of course something that fulfills a duty by mechanically overcoming itself or perhaps by using force. A positive, live consciousness of freedom, over against this dead, compelling, but not shaping one, accompanies only the lighting-up of the content of duty as a duty, (it accompanies) the awakening of the imperative out of concrete, ever-unending situations." ¹

It is the freedom lived by the "spiritual Existenz". The soaring breaks through even the boundary situations. The man in this state of mind never rests content with a finite determination of his

finite self". In spiritual strength he pushes forward to bring the antinomies to synthesis. But he does not stop there to have such synthesis in merely rational "contemplation"; only a "spiritually dead man" gratifies himself with such a contemplation. The live spiritual Existenz soars further to experience freedom "as choice" of the individual person: such a choice is something closed to the empirical individual, but his spirit has it in his pathos of freedom as well as in his pathos of existential self-sustenance. Thus, he can soar a step further to reach rational form of such choice. Yet, his spirit does not stop with such form, for "the spiritual Existenz is what is chaotic and is mystification". That is, the substantial content of such form keeps soaring in further synthesizing, which breaks up again any fixation of such form of existential choice.

When seen as "independence", this existential freedom does not mean being independent of others; such independence destroys one's empirical connectedness, leading to evasion of the world. Existential freedom seeks independence in relationship with others and with the world. "The free man therefore does not evade the world, but seeks by all means every possible relationship with the world."

In a word, freedom in the true sense belongs to the infinitude of life. Freedom understood in terms of opposition is not that of the spiritually free man, for in opposition to the counter opposite, it is what is determined and therefore "conditioned", and it is not infinitude-based movement. The truly unconditioned for the free man is what is never exhausted by the universal, but is touched on only as absolutely concrete. This concreteness reaches its integrity in the becoming through the existential absolute resolution.

6.1.b The Spirit as Irrational and Faith-guided

The above-mentioned spiritual development continues by the medium of producing the objective, but this does not mean that the spirit in doing so shrinks into such objective productivity or into the rational at large. In the great soul, the whole life proceeds decisively only when it integrates every rational or objective consciousness by experiencing the all-retrieving turning-point at which the source of its fundamental strengths acts as the centre of the rational formation. This source in its whole depths is not approachable by the rational; it is "irrational" as soaring above the rational in all senses.

It is generally expressed by such words as "feeling, impulse, and inspiration." Socrates' daimonion is one of the most representative classic expressions of such irrational source. Such religious words as "rebirth", "conversion", etc. indicate the same turning-point of the spiritual process.

Traditionally, this irrational dimension has been identified as "feeling" contrasted to the rational. But, Jaspers is in this regard opposed to the view that feeling is isolable from the rational, for without the feeling of direction and difference, there is no rational performance. So he deals with it as "will" or "resolution" understood as existential strength.

Jaspers characterizes this zenith of consciousness as the choice of the infinite in the midst of the either-or that drives the soul at the limits of the finite shapes or of the merely empirical shapes. This either-or swells over against the self-satisfaction with mere intellectual contemplation. It does not lead to a decision which is founded on logical necessity. It leads to decision as a "living act

of choice which gives the ultimate goal (Telos) to the life." This decision, "the absolute decision" emerges through the medium of ratio, and nevertheless it is irrational. It is the concentration in which all partial aspects of the spiritual movement are called back to their control-centre as it were. And out of this decision, the soul once more turns to create objective forms so that through such forms it may secure its "objective Existenz" and "justification".

"So the absolute decision presses on toward prevention and control always and over again by objective rational forms. It seeks, as far as it reaches, to secure for itself an objective Existenz and justification in rational foundations and forms." 2

It develops as the responsibility impulse "which reacts ever more beautifully and ever more seriously to the subjectively experienced quality of the irrational act." In this sense, the life of the spirit does not lapse in linear continuity; this phase is always interrupted with crises, and always a new shape comes into the sphere of the empirical existence through the existential leap, which gives infinite meaning to the thus created objective forms, though these are no longer to be made "encasements".

2/ Now, we shall discuss Jaspers' conception of faith. The process of the life is guided by faith as it integrates its knowing at large. The locus of faith is ascertained as follows. Take the above-mentioned turning-point, for instance, it entails despair, doubt, nihilism, or encasement. The leap or conversion at this point is tied to concern for the ultimate hold, the infinite hold—by which the turn-about from the finite hold can be done—and the fundamental strength which leads the life forward. When this concern continues and urges, it is called faith.

Faith in such a sense is not a faith of something particularly determined, but "direction" and "what is unconditioned". Although this unconditioned comes to be divided into many unconditioned beings, these many are secured only within the faith as unconditioned and remain as particular and finite and therefore are relativized as the prime movement matters. Thus, faith is best clarified when related to knowing.

Jaspers locates faith, saying "Faith stands in opposition to knowing; it is the strength of the subject in opposition to objective, impersonal certainty." In this sense, faith is not properly understood if it is considered as "the first stage" or "the less valuable" to the so-called "certain knowledge". It is the ultimate strength of the spirit without which no spiritual performance, including the knowing, becomes meaningful if seen as emerging out of the life.

"The faith is not the first step to knowledge, but is an act that in general indeed first makes the movement of knowing possible and meaningful. It is the encompassing (das Unfassende), but not a particular force, nor a mere particularized strength, nor a particular content, nor somewhat specifically religious. Rather it is an ultimate strength of the spirit. Faith is spirit, and therefore we in this sense do not call faith restful, self-evident, unproblematic certainty of particular finite beings, on the ground that such a certainty by the will to the empirical existence has a direct life strength as long as it works to some extent." ³

The certainty of faith lies in fulfilling one's Existenz in its full breadth, while the certainty of knowing lies in being merely objectively valid. To fulfill the Existenz includes the taking-on of the objective. So Jaspers says: "The unspirituality can feel itself objectively certain in the absolute encasement", (whereas) "the spirit, thanks to faith, can become Existenz in the anxiety of movement."

Considered in its relation to the whole, faith is concerned with totalities and the Absolute, while knowing with that which is merely determined, particular and relative. Considered in relation to the soul itself, faith enhances the whole personality, while knowing, if isolated from such personality, falls in merely intellectual operations. Considered in relation to the rational, faith is concerned with meaning and goals, while knowing is a means of enhancing such meaning and goals. Thus, faith when considered as a concept is a "paradox", as long as concept means confining a whole to objectivity. That is to say, to build a concept of faith means producing an objective content out of the life, to project it into a concrete objectivity. Here a particular is thus connected to the infinite.

Such things as strengths, values and Ideas are produced in this sphere, and these are therefore not merely "theoretical", but above all is existential praxis. Ideas especially are identical with what is more generally characterized as faith. It is on the one hand an objective content and on the other is a subjective strength. As an objectification of faith, an Idea concerns itself with the particular and at the same time overcomes such particular, that is, it unifies all knowing in Existenz and makes action take root in the Absolute. In a word, what is produced by faith is not identical with the empirical content; it produces the particular so that infinitude or the whole may be visualized by that mediation.

Next, faith, when bringing the Absolute to objective form, presents the Absolute in the form of a "myth". Jaspers penetrates now the deepest hermeneutic sphere of spiritual phenomena.

With regard to the limits of such form, so long as an individual is bound to the subject-object cleavage, what he reaches is always finite before the Absolute. The Absolute is infinite to ratio, non-recurring (einmalig) and individual to universal validity. It is unknowable as a whole. The myth as form of faith stems from the existential touching on the Absolute; it is not for general cognition, but for metaphysical experience. It is an expression of a man of faith. In this living context, the myth is more "concrete" than it is "symbolic", for the man does not see the Absolute at an objectifying distance, but receives, by producing the myth, inward strength in his whole concrete being. That is, as an act of faith, the myth is "actuality". The faith never shrinks into form, but in taking the finite form, it acts in existential process, getting into determined knowing and into empirical being. Gnosis and Theosophy are characteristic for clinging fanatically to the thus determined content of the myth. Dogmatics is meaningful only if it is united with the living faith, otherwise it is nothing.

Usually, mythical content is understood in three different rational viewpoints: rationalistic, supernaturalistic, and reflective. Jaspers elevates the above mentioned actuality structure as beyond all these.

"The mythical faith contents are taken in rational consciousness either rationalistically as a sort of knowledge which virtually the intellect could acquire out of itself; or supernaturalistically as a supernatural knowledge, as a knowledge given by revelation or by visions, a knowledge knowable in this case however on the basis of authority; or finally it [such a knowledge] is interpreted reflectively as something that symbolically emerges as mere 'as-if'. Neither of these treatments hits the circumstances as it merges in the fundamental strength of faith and of the lively believing relationship with the Absolute." ⁴

Finally, Jaspers considers how faith bears objective content in regard to its relation to historical shapes both past and present. Firstly, on the basis of empirical knowledge, the great personality is admired as an absolute being. In this case, however, there is no existential faith, for it is a pursuit of a sign of possibility.

Secondly, the personality of a certain historical being is grasped as absolute and thus, a human being becomes deified. This means, Jasper thinks, that a historical being is made the representative of the myth.

Thirdly, this naive faith comes to be carried out in a thorough-going manner by means of reflection, to the point at which the historical faith is sublimated into a paradox. From this it results that the relation between these two "finite" beings becomes absolute. Thus, faith at this point becomes what cannot be thinkable. As in the relation between Kierkegaard and Jesus, the faith content becomes here something "absurd".

In general, the focal point of the historical relation of faith converges in whether the objective content is retrieved in faith as the creative strength of the life. Originally, the faith content emerges out of the Existenz which continues its prime movement. This movement is determined by the subject-object cleavage and also by the concrete situations. The faith content is produced as finite because of this determined structure of the Existenz' movement. The objective content is that which "becomes" in such a movement.

When the objective content of this wholeness is isolated and absolutized, the direction toward the hold on the finite grows; but faith begins to swell here by thorough-going nihilism, dialectic, or by reflection. When intellectual scepticism is concerned with the

faith content for the purpose of making the life meaningful, its doubt of the rational foundation of strength is itself an act of faith. Jaspers considers Kant as a notable example of how to deal with faith content in the sense "that such uncertainty of all content is for us as a finite being a particular means for bringing us to spirituality or to the strength of the mind."

6.1.c The Antinomic and the Mystic

The spirit comes into the phenomenal world, in the subject-object cleavage. The opposition between the subjective world and the objective world is the relation in which alone the life maintains itself as movement. "The opposition is what conditions the life and it is a phenomenon of the living spirit." Another way, "As all physical manifoldness emerges through opposition, so does the spiritual empirical existence through antinomy."

Spirit's relation to this opposition is a choosing of either side or a synthesizing of both. But so long as any spiritual act is conditioned by the subject-object cleavage, there is no "absolute choice" nor "absolute synthesis", for there is no resting on any objectification. Thus, since every point reached by the becoming means, without exception, either side of the opposition, spirit grows to "the pathos of either-or", for whatever it grasps falls simultaneously in the same opposition.

However, this does not mean that the spirit stops at wandering among countless relative divisions of things. When the spirit becomes aware that this either-or is a limit to its making ultimate resolution in the concrete situation, there emerges an overall synthesis of all living oppositions. That is, it comes to enhance its

inward strengths by retrieving this fundamental crisis of its life. The world of antinomy is encompassed by the synthesis of the life, which as the origin of creativity is no longer confined to any objectification. This synthesis emerges not in relating between objectifications, but in soaring to the inward height of its own relationship with the infinite or with the Absolute.

"But, the spirit, for which the either-or is in each case somehow a limit in the concrete situation, is nevertheless not to dismember endlessly all beings in two, rather it is capable of holding in itself all living oppositions. The antinomic situations lead the soul in tension, disruption, to the point of despair-filled crisis; the life, however, lets the strengths arise from this, which soar in the antinomies and reach syntheses, which are inconceivable, infinite and therefore unpenetrable." 5

At this point, however, such syntheses of the antinomies are never to be regarded as fully accomplished or ultimately fulfilled; the synthesis of the antinomies is acquired always in movement and available only in movement. It indicates the "present" of the life and remains open to further developments of this movement. Thus, in this centripetal synthesizing, the life maintains its path by treading "a thin edge between two possibilities", that is, between plunging from the synthesis into rationality-insulated "chaos" and sinking the synthesis into contemplation-gratified "petrification". Both of these possibilities are concerned with partial life, but not with the wholeness of the life.

The widest, encompassing sphere in which such oppositions as well as the corresponding syntheses emerge is regarded by Jaspers as the point where the spirit increases the intensity of its movement. To restrict it to Europe, Jaspers holds, such a sphere proves to be the polarity of Christianity and the Greek culture - the polarity in which "the newer European culture has burst forth at its peaks a movement-minded spirituality."

Now, in retrospect, the unending tension between the movement-centricity and the synthesis of the antinomies may be characterized as spirit's continuing commitment to the mediation through the subject-object cleavage. Without this mediation, there is no clarity of the soaring to the point of its authentic movement, no clarity of the infinite, but the sham clarity which serves for the rise of the nihilism leading to chaos and of the rationalism leading to petrification. Jaspers identifies this continuity as based on "the drive for clarity" (Klarheitsdrang) moving toward clarity or toward "the transparency in the subject-object cleavage". The transparency is then sought as in defiance with darkness and obscurity.

But this transparency is by no means to be sought by capturing the life in the rationalist encasement. In the sphere where the life of the spirit casts anchor in infinitude, this transparency remains alive in touch with the mystic present in the afore-mentioned ultimate awareness. Thus, the drive for transparency becomes also a point of departure for the mystic. To touch on this mystic is to "make infinitude present as mystical experience". It implies cancelling the subject-object cleavage. The spirit in its clarity-intending movement, however, never leaps into this mystic space, but has contacts with it as a "source out of which all the movements toward clarity hold their matter." The mystic, when seen from the perspective of all the movements, is "unique" and "gripped in the Absolute".

That is to say, the spirit holds the entire boundary of the subject-object cleavage as mystic and finds the scope of movement in the mystic sphere. Thus, all the specific beings in the subject-object cleavage gain their guiding light or "meaning" from this mystic source.

The mystic, however, is beyond expression, and what is said of it is only a "symbol" or "similitude"; it is cancelled again and again according to the unending will to clarity.

In brief: Firstly, the spirit as life is the wholeness of its manifestation. This wholeness is movement, infinite in its teleological direction. It consists in dialectic tension between its finite manifestation and the will to infinite becoming. The whole of this finite manifestation is called back to the infinite, in the sense that this is the meaning of its unending possibilities. The subjectivity of this infinitude-centricity is freedom characteristic of existential choice which embraces all modes of choice, including a possible rational petrification of this existential choice itself. The existential choice is the choice of the infinite becoming, the summit of all objectivity produced in the sustenance of the movement.

Secondly, the spirit in such wholeness manifests itself in the unity of the irrational and the rational. The rational takes root in the irrational that is existential strengths without which the rational sinks into encasement, which is a finite. This unity is actualized at the turning-point of the life - the turning-point in the midst of the rational. The concentration in this turning-point is guided by a consciousness of the Absolute over against the relativity of all rationals. This consciousness of the Absolute is faith, which is inward strength, and no objectification can exhaust this. The myth is the comprehensive expression of such faith.

Thirdly, in coming into the phenomenal world, the spirit mediates itself with the subject-object cleavage and accordingly it has to struggle with the world of opposition by a pathos of either-or.

The culmination of this either-or is a synthesis of all living oppositions. This synthesis emerges as spirit's soaring to its creative strength, active in the face of the Absolute. Thus, the spirit maintains its present by overcoming the crisis coming from the world of antinomies, and this continues unendingly and remains movement.

So long as this movement continues, the spirit keeps mediating itself with the subject-object cleavage. It lives this mediation as positive for manifesting the unknowable infinitude through clarity resulting from the division by the subject-object cleavage. The tension between the mystic and such transparency supports the continuing commitment to the subject-object cleavage.

Two possibilities emerge at this point: one is to take a leap into the mystic by cancelling the subject-object cleavage; the other is to see the entire boundary of the subject-object cleavage in light of the mystic experience, so that the phenomenal world is continually created as increase in the transparency of the mystic.

6.2 The Spirit between Oppositions: Demonic Man

The spirit has been discussed as movement to proceed on the "thin edge" between the irrational and the rational. The first stage Jaspers' typology has to formulate is how the spirit shapes itself, i.e. the subject side of the cleavage, as it is to develop through this paradoxical road.

As movement, the life of the spirit is in an antithesis. It on the one hand is "matter" and on the other "shaping". The former is identified with "chaos", and the latter with "form". The former is the fulness of matter, while the latter is such as "standard, limits, form, ratio, asceticism, etc. The life is struggle between these two sides.

In creating such form, it goes as unifying two world: the subjective world and the objective world, or personality and objectivity. It cannot fasten upon mere personality nor upon mere objectivity. While dividing itself into subject and object, it remains the whole without which this division is meaningless. In this aspect, the spirit holds out its movement between "individuality" and "the general", both of which never reach the world of "identity", but constitutes an opposition in the forward-moving process.

From this framework, Jaspers firstly classifies possibilities emerging between chaos and form into three types of empirical existence. First, as naturalism and romanticism exemplify it, "chaotic man" is characteristic for living "through accident of situations, temptations, instincts, or of what does not hinder him from carrying through life with all sorts of rational show without restriction." The second type is "consistent man", exemplified by classicism and idealism, or by the rigorist, stubborn, fanatic and logicist. What is characteristic here is that "principles are given at a time, and their realization is not only unconditionally fixed to them, but is striven for in all consistency regardless of all antinomies which have been constructed in reality for a long time." The third type is demonic man;⁶ it is this type that represents the hold on the infinite.

6.2.a The Unending Fluidification

Being "process" which moves forward between chaos and form, the man, without bending either to chaos or to form, experiences crises in his relation to the rational. Such crises are inevitable because the man has to retrieve what is created by him. He retrieves in this way in order to sustain his authentic creativity.

Jaspers describes this centrifugal-centripetal integration as a cyclic movement which the construction of the "encasement", the antinomic questioning, and the recurrence to the creative strengths are linked together. The cycle repeats within the same person "in the way of heightening or assimilative sustenance". It proceeds as "an eternal overcoming" that grows to ever new creation. The man never sinks into chaos nor into a faith in consistency-bound calculation and in prescription. His work as unity of the irrational and the rational never degenerates into encasement even at the consummation of its thorough-going systematic, but serves him for coming "to the nearest station of infinitude," increasing the process "from one infinitude to another."

6.2.b Between the Shaping and the Fluidification

Far from being a chaotic 'irrationalism', demonic man is the state in which "the opposition between advance in the finite shape and recurrence to the living fluidifying-process reaches its highest point." None of the dead, rationalist categories is capable of 'comprehending' this life.

Thus, the world of form gains a weight here that "consistent man" cannot give. This process is not 'anti-rational', but a deepening and widening of the rational in its relevance to infinitude. The world of action is not derived from any rationalist principle, but results from the entire situation of the man and is followed with relatively certain formulas or with relatively certain rational considerations.

The man carries, to the highest degree, dignity or power coming from the above-mentioned cyclic movement. As such process, he is not to be confined to a formula nor to a current task, for the

form and action are kept pulsating by the life of "the highest responsibility". In this tie of ultimate responsibility, his being soars to become "representative of the entire sequence of generations"; that is, in him history finds its most secret sphere in whose breadth it pivots as a matter of eternity.

6.2.c The Doctrine

Along the above-mentioned cyclic movement, in which the rational is to be retrieved ever anew to the point of the original creativity, the rational is produced in shapes such as "a doctrine" devoted to the wholeness of such being, "an imperative" devoted to its subjectivity, and "a justification" devoted to its objective validity. Let us identify all three as "doctrine" in the broadest sense.

As long as this structure of movement goes on, "the first, that is the creative, is the life of demonic man". A doctrine he creates is an expression of this creativity. The construction of such a doctrine goes along the fluidifying-process in which all forms of such a doctrine are to be overcome by another form. No such doctrine, therefore, is intended to be "a systematic overall generalization" of the life of the spirit.

Thus, this original nature of the doctrine is structurally more encompassing than a doctrine formulated by his followers who lack the strength to take on himself the antinomic life without which the founder or demonic man never brings about any doctrine, though the term "word" or "deed" may be more adequate here than "doctrine". Jaspers exemplifies the case by the disparity lying between "the demonic life of Jesus" and "the doctrine of imitatio christi", whose tendency as to the dynamic of the life may cover all forms of singling

out the external things of Jesus' life as this is done by a literalization of his statements.⁷ In this sense, it may be said that rationalism stems from a structural misunderstanding, or assimilation-lacking petrification, of demonic man.

Likewise, chaotic man as well may be authentically understood if we concentrate on his relation to demonic man. That is to say, chaotic man when seen in this context is characteristic for fixing his eye to the aspect of "the overcoming in demonic man". So chaotic man turns to single out "all impulses" in terms of his feeling and "lives simply demands and drives without discipline and formation." An extreme end of this direction is the Christian mystics who never attend to "the possibilities" latent in each individual life.

Finally, a doctrine of the church, or a system of a totality of Christianity, comes to be established over against Jesus' demonic life by "the rigorism of the consistent followers". Thus, a doctrine meaningful only in the faith-participating sphere of spiritual relationship comes to degenerate into an encasement, in which all antinomies, all possibilities are confined in a doctrine of the life on a gigantic scale - a doctrine which nonetheless lacks the life of the creativity lived by demonic man. The sphere of Jesus' demonic creativity is no doubt encountered with "the demonic religious fundamental experience" repeated in history in association with the repetitions of these degenerating possibilities.

6.2.d The Fragmentariness

Demonic man exists in infinitude, actualizing his Existenz by the medium of the infinite. Although this Existenz-actualization

is intended to reach a unity in which the whole phenomenal world may be meaningfully unified; he never accomplishes this goal in finality, but remains on the way and therefore in fragmentariness. He with stormy urges keeps soaring from search to search, from work to work, without reaching any self-inclusive completion, though this does not mean that his achievements in such context are necessarily less consistent than those of "consistent man". Besides, mere consistency pursued by consistent man is one-sided consistency when seen from existential honesty springing along the consciousness of infinitude.

In politics, he grows to a "grandios shape", and yet his greatness in this case remains within the boundary of what he can do, without intending to confine a whole generation to an exclusive, absolute political system.

In learning, he brings about a turning-point at which he fluidifies all the encasements as well as the chaotic states deep down from the sphere of existential "resolution". His thinking mediates itself with the rule of consistency, but he does not present it as a "system"; he lifts out love, but again this is not like that of a "follower"; he communicates with youth, but his actual thought stands beyond any "school of thought" ascribed to his name. The examples are: Heraklitus, Socrates, Kant, Nietzsche, etc. Incidentally, Jaspers contrasts this type to the "life-lacking" thinker exemplified by Aristototele, Melancton, Christian Wolf, Hegel, etc. These thinkers are characteristic in that they "set up gigantic systems to teach, without being aware of the deviations, and become teachers of the mass for many centuries." Demonic man, however, never acquires any "peaceful happiness", unlike these thinkers.

In art, search is as important as perfect creation, which he can never attain. His artistic works never stay at a fixed point, but keep moving to be his self-expression or to be an image of his spirit. Leonard and Michelangelo in contrast to Rafael are examples for this type.

In the shaping of a world view, the side of rational form is never "total", "perfect", "conclusive", or "fixable", but "determined", "relative" and "unrepeatable", for his world view is in essence a "spirally" soaring movement by the medium of the rational. This movement as such soars always above what is formed, whether it is a value, imperative or a world image.

He, of course, is well aware that the rational has its own laws of consistency. However, he also experiences that the whole foundation of such consistency is stirred when his Existenz is faced with an inward crisis or with boundary situations. That is, inward strength is never to be lost either into a shaped consciousness or into what is expressed. In the "theoretical encasement" strength "dies", while in the demonic movement, it awakens through the rational moment. In another way, the rational form too is to keep alive as becoming; thus, it becomes a condition for "new life" soaring above all forms of doctrine with which it concerns itself. "The strengths express themselves in such rational formulations, but these rational shapes are not the strengths themselves, for the shapes are simply their living products."⁸

Finally, in choosing among world views, demonic man is characteristic in that he chooses his "concrete" life as encompassing the antinomic limits of the rational, while the rationalist chooses

among principles, that is, among what are "general". This choice of the concrete, however, is not identical with choosing a "living act" to any abstract principle. Since his life goes along with his particular "impulse" swelling in his situation which he understands as something ultimate by the medium of "unending reflection", he chooses "concretely" for the life of the spirit.

Through understanding historical specific world views active before his eye, he focuses on the life which consists in its antinomies. He does not seek in them a conclusive formula or prescription for all men.

This choice of "the factual and liveliest state" distinguishes itself from any theory intended to be a "learnable" world view which is concerned with the antinomic structure of such life. That is to say, the life chosen by demonic man is not like that which is described by the organic theory of the psychic-structural development or of the individual-generic development; it is not like that which prescribes an absolute answer to "what should I do?" Namely, both a life theory that absolutizes tradition and a fanatic utopia of the life are not yet what is lived by demonic man. They are "encasements" and "far from the life". For the same reason, Hegel's philosophy as well, a typical example of conceiving the life as a doctrine, is far from the demonic life even though it is conspicuous for stretching as far as to the infinitude of the life, for life as such is not identical with Hegel's concept of "thinking".

6.2.e The Indirect Communication

Our discussions have hitherto traced the living stretch of the demonically-gravitating world-view; it has been stressed that the unending dialectic between mystical strength and rational formation underlies the becoming of man. Now, when such fundamental tension underlying rational formation becomes conscious to the thinker himself, demonic man is characterized as increasing his movement by reflecting on himself as "communication" with other potential self-beings.

Firstly, demonic man, having reached the form of the dialectic as the zenith of rational performance, does not sink into making the very dialectic a "doctrine for demands", but remains at the level of experiencing it as "creative material" or as "a medium". Here as long as the substance of this dialectic form goes, the rational (e.g., principles) or the dialectic is experienced as understandable in two alternative ways: that is, the rational may be taken either as "direct" or "indirect" communication (Mitteilung) of the demonically proceeding individuality, out of which the rational is shaped. The sphere of such substance is expressed by Ideas which are communicability. So the rational in this context turns out to be "indirect communication" of the Ideas. At this point Jaspers' concentration on communicativity, as essential to the world view, is indebted primarily to Kierkegaard's conception of "indirect communication", of course.

Then, to return to the unending development of the rational, demonic man does not pursue indirect communication as the life in itself, but remains in pursuit of the unending development of the rational which is directly communicable.

Jaspers elevates indirect communication by classifying "prophetic doctrines" into three types. The first type subsumes those which cling to principles determined by thorough consistency. Its representatives are Aristipp, Antisthenes, Epicurus, the Stoic. The second subsumes those which claim a doctrine of the totality of life; Jaspers considers that this type is represented by Aristotle, Aquinas and Hegel. The third is called the prophet of indirect communication, and is represented by Socrates, Kant and Kierkegaard.

That is to say, consistency-minded teachers are characterized by the pursuit of "followers and obedience to the known, formulated available truth"; while totality-minded teachers are characteristic in that they "do not appeal to the individual, but give, as sufficient, the encasements to everyone". The philosophers of indirect communication, however, appeal to the life of each individual person, without confusing the individual creativity with what is produced on the way toward unending reflection:

"The philosophers of indirect communication force as individuals their way through to each individual man. In so doing, they appeal to the life that is in others, whom they help to wake through stimulations and through developing the medium of unending reflection. Such an awakening, however, is not intended to be given as an imperative doctrine.

"They push back when a man wants to approach for adoring them in discipleship; they love the freedom in others. They in accordance with Ideas are superior to none even if they may be factually so. On the contrary, they live themselves in the communion of indirect communication in order to be good to pupil as well as to help him without giving something direct that could be essential." 9

Indirect communication, for all its insistence on rationality, belongs to the life of the spirit. The rational, that is, "what directly is there and seen there", is ultimately non-essential but is "indirectly

the bearer of the essential", so far as the living movement of this life is the cohesive sphere. Therefore, "no doctrine is the life in itself and also no communication of a doctrine is a transmission of the life." A doctrine as rational is somewhat general, whereas indirect communication mediated through a doctrine concentrates on the particular, that is, on the substance of the spirit. In other words, indirect communication is "existential communication"; its primary concern is with the Existenz, which is "absolute and individual." The solitude of the individual soul points to becoming through rational clarification as well as through communion with the other Existenz.

Indirect communication is thus a relationship between Existenz and Existenz. Within this relationship, the rational emerges not to be encasement, but to carry on, consciously, the unending development of the dialectic, the reflection and of the rational. Form is therefore not rejected, but rather called for in terms of the infinite development as over against fixation to such as principle, totality, master, prophet, apostle, union, school, circle, etc. The life as such cannot be conclusively confessed to others: it never subjects its seeing of the inward strengths to any rational fixation. The Socratic, Kantian, Kierkegaardian or Nietzschean personality-impulse and the Hegelian brain of abundant formation go hand in hand, without deifying any human being.

Thus, demonic man, in mediating his becoming through such indirect communication, attains a most positive awareness of community (Gemeinschaft). Community is no longer to be confined to a fixation draining the infinitude-bound life of the individual soul, but

is opened up for that kind of becoming, in which the Absolute and existential relationship which is guided by faith in such Absolute come to all levels of human existence. When this existential relationship is characterized in terms of the imperative of love, indirect communication means a praxis of love in its noblest sense, for demonic man's love takes root in the concrete "bloodwarmness" of what is absolutely individual.¹⁰

6.2.f The Historical Significance

In shaping the idea of indirect communication, Jaspers confirms in demonic man the dialectic of the becoming of the life and the becoming of the rational. Jaspers' indirect communication, however, is never to be an exhaustive transmission of the communion between Existenz and Existenz. Because of this inexhaustible depth of the dialectic, the relation between the life and the rational cannot be present to any mind as it authentically is, if it is "comprehended" by the "chaotic" and the "consistent" types. It comes to the present in its authenticity only through assimilation in a communion which is conscious of the dialectic between the two. This way the creativity of the life becomes present through the rational mediation which increases the life.

No understanding of becoming is possible without mediating through rationality. But here such rationality is no longer to be monopolized by rationalism, that is, no longer by such things as liberalism, authoritarianism and value-absolutism. The rationality produced in indirect communication is made "heterogeneous", if it is treated in the manner of a "rigoristically consistent systematic"

or of a "chaotic doctrine of freedom based on an extreme subjectivism." These approaches have in essence no capacity for bearing the synthetic structure of the demonic spirit. Nor is this rationality to be identified with a "construction of systematic totality comprehending the antinomic life", which is exemplified by Hegel's philosophy, for the life regarded as identical with dialectical form, no matter how synthetic this may be, has fallen in an "encasement". So Jaspers distinguishes the demonic movement as becoming "in mediated immediacy" (vermittelte Unmittelbarkeit); he illustrates its self-retrieving presence by modern man's process which culminates in Kierkegaard.

"And the life uses them (encasements) just as the medium for the growth of unending dialectic. It does not respond to them but thrives through them by carrying on the unending reflection of the antinomic, the possibilities, the difference. So the life claims and becomes demonic in 'mediated immediacy'.

"An example may be as follows: over against life emerged the logistic, intellect-bound explanation in the 18th century on the one hand, and chaotic romanticism on the other; out of both, in the totality of Hegel's system, grew a doctrine of life. This, however, as the medium of the highest growth of reflection made Kierkegaard possible by arousing at the same time its fiercest opposition." ¹¹

With regard to the medieval Christian encasement of demonic man represented by Jesus, we have considered both the imitation of Christ and the system of the church. Jaspers' view that any demonic man is representative of the whole sequence of generations. has been considered, too. Now, if we relate these references of Jaspers' to the major contemporary approaches to history, it may be said that Jaspers' demonic man culminating in indirect communication beyond all rational possibilities - including the dialectic of the life - implies demonic creativity encompassing all major contemporary modes of historical thinking.

Firstly, according to Jaspers' distinction between the life and the world image - under which the psychic-cultural world image was classified as less comprehensive than the metaphysical world image - the question of how to understand becoming moves into the sphere of the becoming of the rational as textured in the becoming of life, whose summit type is the demonic life. Thus, becoming turns out to be more than an objectivity.

Secondly, according to the widest breadth of the demonic inward movement - along which the rational is traced back to unending reflection - the question of understanding the becoming is brought to the point where all modes of the doctrine of becoming are to be called into the creative reshaping, which is intended for Existenz, but not merely for such things as the brain mechanism, principles, doctrines, systems, etc., even if these were based on the reflection on the very Existenz.

Thus, thirdly, when the assimilative relationship between Existenz and Existenz becomes present, the demonic becoming, instead of the life-blind contemplation of the becoming, is chosen by the present Existenz in the same spiritual sphere where the demonic souls have set the task of the individual becoming. The becoming is thus to fulfil the communion between Existenz and Existenz, and communion mediated through unending struggle for rational clarity! Next we shall discuss the becoming of the self in its synthesizing the subjective and the objective, which it produces in communication.

6.2.g Toward the Becoming of the Self¹²

Jaspers deals with the becoming of the self as identical with Existenz. It is Kierkegaard who, in confrontation with Hegel, first articulated becoming as the movement of man's will, in contrast to the naturalist concepts of it. Jaspers succeeds Kierkegaard's insight and constitutes the conception according to the form of the subject-object dichotomy. That is to say, he at this stage focuses on the point that man as life becomes subjectivity of decision, and he turns to constitute such becoming as lying in the tension of the antinomy between the finite and infinite. The constitution in the first place takes the course of confirming the life as overstepping antinomies occurring on the level of generalities. We shall begin by delineating this phase to trace the culmination in Existenz.

First, when seen from the actuality of the life all fixations to "abstract generalities" turn out to be contrasted with their respective opposites reducible to the subject-object cleavage. For instance, when a universally valid generality tends to rule, it is contrasted with an arbitrary one; when what is universally human is to rule, it is contrasted with what is characteristic or individual; when what is of necessity, with such as nature or destiny. In short, the generality is contrasted with freedom. This way, the life remains refusing to deliver itself to any generally set infinite.

Next, the life again resists being fixed to "concrete generalities". When 'man in general' is held to be an infinite, it is brought back to its tension with the consciousness of concrete individuals, if a sociological whole like man 'as a race' carries a sense of infinitude; the

sense of the individual man as an atom confronts it. Finally, when an idea of the world or of God is claimed to be a totality, it is found in tension with the self's will to be total over against it. Reaching this last antinomy, the life in struggling for true infinitude rises above the intention to possess a totality. To describe in accordance with the trichotomy (subject-object-whole), three types of life arise and struggle with one another in relation to infinitude: the life inclined to fixation to the finite or the false infinite, the life choosing to take a leap into infinitude, and the life which, nurtured by faith, stays in the middle to actualize infinitude in becoming. The third type is identical with what is meant by Existenz, the becoming. We shall next discuss it by leading to its stage of "the becoming-revealed", where Existenz appeals for Communication.

First, when considered as a matter of a whole life, the becoming of the self is dealt with by purifying what is thought of as "self sacrifice", for this act refers to a life in its full meaning in whatever sense. When a life is reflected on in terms of its meaning, death inevitably comes to the fore; two directions can be derived from attitudes to death. One is to give meaning to the life by projecting beyond death something otherworldly or eternal. But such an eternal cannot be more than a merely "abstract" idea or form, when compared with the concrete life that brings about this; this is so even if the life produces this under the guidance of an Idee which is acquired in the depth of mystic experiences. The other direction is to take the turn from this consciousness of death toward the life present and to concentrate on "strength" and the so-based-on self-consciousness" as

a result of experiencing Existenz, in whose Idea-guided self-dedication the empirical self is accordingly "relativized" or retrieved as "lost".

The self-dedication of Existenz may be carried on by "risking the self". The pathos, however, is not directed to abstract shapes, nor is it like that of emotional, accidental and unconscious "adventures". It generates in "the whole of a particular personality". To focus on the clarity of the self-consciousness at this level, the self fastens upon something entirely different from what is provable by "objective values". That is to say, instead of being satisfied with a halfway endeavour, imitation or overstrain for abstract shapes, it will not rest until it becomes clear of what is, in freedom, experienced as "something absolutely essential to the singular individual" and as "an eternal meaning for his present life". Such a whole is never known by contemplation but becomes an "appeal" oriented with the absolute, eternal and at the same time universal. In risking the self, the prime is not to will death, but to will life in order to expand the process of becoming. It may choose death as well, but only to retain the self according to its freedom.

Thus, self-dedication in Existenz stems from Existenz' sense of the absolute and therefore it risks life for unconditional love and all-embracing responsibility. In this view, to dedicate oneself to an abstract formula in behalf of a reward; to give oneself as completed at once; to choose self-preservation by entrusting oneself as mere life to dependence and to submission; to discipline one desire over against others and to discipline oneself in behalf of a value - though in close analysis only out of the self-preservation instinct controlling

other instincts; all these are exposed as lacking the strength to seek for the Ideas or for the Absolute. In this sense, the existential self-dedication may be characterized as becoming in knowing, with regard to the multiple shapes, "resignation" necessitated for the sake of retaining Existenz only. Jaspers says: "Only as far as self-risking and self-dedication penetrate, does the whole Existenz become a spiritual self". No objective shapes remain infinite to Existenz, but every finite shapes, whether relative or absolute - like that of a religious, politician and humanist - must remain open to constant questioning and overcoming in the process of the becoming.

The existential self-becoming goes within the actuality as the self-consciousness moves correspondingly. The decisive point here is not to fix the self to the rational, but to sustain the becoming of self-transparency which grows in the unending process of movement. Such transparency has the comprehensive character of becoming clear of self's relation to the Absolute. The most encompassing stage is illustrated by Kierkegaard's authorship. Jaspers deals with it as Offenbarwerden (Becoming-revealed). The self-becoming at this stage means actualizing the imperative which becomes in existential concreteness; it is coupled with reflection which requires the will to clarity; thus, the becoming is identical, in a sense, with acquiring consciousness of the self through radical self-reflection.

Its structure may be presented as follows. First, as movement it is "process" unendingly driving forward. Second, as a relation to the self itself, it takes on the actual self in the unending process; as it becomes, it concentrates on concrete self-consciousness at each

time. In both Angst and faith, it faces the self in solitude. Third, as a relation to another self, it proceeds in love and communication; it gives the self in unfolding the self with questioning and answering; truthfulness (Wahrhaftigkeit) must be sustained throughout the communication; its rational shapes as in process are neither absolutely open nor absolutely enclosed, but lie in the middle. Fourth, in relation to the origin of the Existenz, it is inwardness understanding eternity while spiritualizing temporality. Finally, classified in terms of the type of spirit, it is the phenomenon of demonic man, sustaining eternal strength in the absolutely dialectic personality of seriousness.

6.2.h The Conflicts of the Infinite

In the sphere of the becoming where finally the direction to Ideas and that of the shaping are essentially related to each other, the carrier of this structure, demonic man, is found occupied with the shaping—in accordance with the mood of Ideas. Jaspers confronts this aspect with the communicative becoming, calling this inclination "essential reality". The problematics of this whole are concentrated in the last analysis in conflicts among wills. In such conflicts, there we see crevices, so to speak, leading into infinitude. As hitherto, Jaspers by means of the trichotomy divides demonic man into three types: Realists, Romantics and Saints.

The Realist, if the liveliest, is mainly interested in bringing about spatio-temporal reality. Concerning the Daimonoion or Ideas, he feels he is ruling himself; he never agrees to fix such to a doctrine or to a prescription. In such a compass, he is characteristic for "handling" man as a means or as part. He acts in accordance with his

shaping the world as unendingly "changeable", but not as "indeterminable"; while the will to power supports his concrete, particular activities.

The Romantic's main concern is "lived-experience" (Erlebnis) regarded by him as authentic actuality. There is no completed objectivity; personal destiny is all; constant fluidification in overcoming movement is the centre. Thus, he develops an enhancement of unending reflection, which as his objectification at each instant and in the form of aphorism provides a psychology of "cometary character". What counts is to awaken each man to his own self. He acts not by shaping, dominating or by actualizing a concrete impulse, but as "attraction". Psychological insights and pedagogical endeavours are his accomplishments, whereas for the Realist a world image is his accomplishment. Thus, the will to self persists in response to infinitude.

Finally, the Saint is characteristic for accentuating the essentials both of the realist's world-shaping and of the romantic's self-experience, and for grasping the Absolute directly. He mainly labours to acquire assurance of the Absolute or to have the ultimately unconditional. The world and self in the unending development, however, are not annihilated, but are "Inessential"; whereas the Realist and Romantic maintain their hold on infinitude in process, the Saint has his hold on the Absolute itself as the infinite. What is crucial for him is not the real or earthly, but God's love as well as a holy feeling of life. In such a compass, the Saint comes into the soul of the other in order to be regarded as the way or as the hold for the other. He feels that he is justified and obliged. Thus, he acts to spirit through spirit. When he ventures to become a leader open in spirit, he carries

power. His result is a doctrine: he grasps man by means of such a doctrine, which inevitably contains imperatives to dominate man. In this sense, though contradictorily, he unconsciously contributes also to the world-shaping by sociological vehicles. We see here the will to community of love.

Jaspers combines all three types of demonic man in one, that is, in the question of the will. The Realist pursues the will to power; the Romantic stands out in the will to self; the Saint binds men with the will to community of love. Thus, the types of demonic man, when seen in the essential realities, appears now retaining the realm of shaping respectively the world (realist), self (romantic) and God (saint) in 'positive' wills; which variation reveals to us conflicts concerning the unity of Ideas and objective shaping. That is to say, with the will to power, the hold on infinitude carries a crevice which comes from that which is merely empirical in essence; with the romantic will to self, the hold carries a crevice owing to mere self without imperatives from the Absolute; while with the Saint's will to community of love, the crevice comes from its rest upon the unquestioning doctrine of God. Besides, as Jaspers points out, over against this positive pull to the will there stands the will to "impotency" (Ohnmacht). This force is a merely "negative" confrontation, for, Jasper holds, it is an expression of such as expediency, freedom unreflected, or inanimation, etc., which could be again analyzed into various subdivisional wills.¹³ In any case, this negative direction indicates a merely passive "means" or "mask" that deceives the positive wills mentioned above.

In short, when related back to the direction toward the "Offenbarwerden" of demonic man, the positive wills in conflicts for reality are not only confronted with the complexity of these negative wills, but, in their relation to infinitude, become problematic as confronted in the last resort with the open movement of the "Offenbarwerden". And if the "Offenbarwerden" is impossible without objectification around which the positive wills struggle, and if the Realist is impossible without the sense of infinitude essential to the "Offenbarwerden", a whole must be sought, in which this confrontation is cancelled and unified. Again, if all divisions, this last confrontation included, indicate in form diversifications due to the subject-object cleavage in the flow of the lived-experience, the impulse for fully clarified creation heightening the person to the communicative becoming must be found in its creative centre. And it is at this centre that the fundamental guidance for the whole becoming, the objectification included, may be ascertained as the root of the subject-object cleavage. Thus, we have now been led to the threshold of the mystic.

6.3 The Creative Origin: the Mystic

Concerning the all-encompassing locus of the mystic pole of spirit, we have discussed it, prior to moving into the sphere of demonic man. We discussed there the mystic in anticipation of the analyses of demonic man. We did so by tracing the antinomic structure toward the problematicity of the will. In this sense, the mystic indicated the limit which means that any rationally seekable absolute synthesis is replaced by the pathos for the either-or which is necessitated at the zenith of all rationality. In accordance with

the polar structure of the spirit, this turning leads at the same time toward the ultimate resolution choosing the most intensified (through the medium of reflection) movement of Existenz under the guidance of Ideas and therefore of faith.

Although Jaspers, as mentioned before, refers such an encompassing stage of resolution to a possible unity of the two major spirits of the West, Christianity and Greek philosophy, it must be noted once more that he developed The Psychology so as to let it become an appeal. His conception of appeal has been stressed as attuned to what may be heard by soaring to the communicative sphere. Such a self-reflection of The Psychology naturally indicates that Jaspers himself carries out his methodic constitution up to the point of his own existential present. He does this by intensifying his own attunement to the past manifestations of the spirit. It is on this ground that we have to interpret Jaspers' mystic as the zenith of his scientific performance of attuning to the past philosophies. We are therefore going to concentrate in the end our discussion in what is signified by this appeal, namely, how Jaspers appeals for "the present" of each Existenz; an appeal ultimately for salvation through Ideas over against revelation.

6.3.a Toward the Authentic Sphere of the Mystic

First, Jaspers starts out by locating the mystic in the context of paths for salvation. Paths for salvation are divided into two stages: the general and mysticism. To delineate the general stage, salvation is sought in correlation between praxis and doctrine. Practically, the life feeling is to be guided by a rationally established "encasement" resulting from absolutization of a particular

attitude, world image or value. Such praxis occurs in correlation with a form of doctrine as illustrated by self-shaping, mundane labour, cognition, gnosis, relativistic research or mysticism.

In regard to this turning to mysticism, the "doctrinal" prescription mentioned above is characteristically concerned with "Particulars" or "infinities". That is to say, salvation when considered in general goes without cancelling the subject-object cleavage. In the mysticism stage, however, all subject-object cleavages are cancelled in such a way that "infinity becomes present in fulness as well as in totality". This structure of mysticism is clarified when mysticism in its "lived-experience", not in its multiple shapes, is focused on so as to see it as the origin of objectification. In general, a lived experience reached in satisfaction supported by cancellation of the subject-object cleavage is mysticism in the narrow sense. That is, in the depths of a concrete lived experience, a sense of infinity is experienced; according to this concreteness, even the concept of infinity as well turns out to be a finite object. This occurs in the Instant, but it may be retained as an enduring, meaningful lived-experience, which will be sought repeatedly in new experiences and thus will occur as the forces that orient the life of the spirit. When such a lived experience works in terms of life in the most synthetic sense, it becomes a mystic experience. Jaspers analyzes it into three types before concentrating on the authentic type.

A mystic experience (Erlebnis) may in the first place coil itself up in the impulse for the mystic and becomes "technique" or "method", which Jaspers defines as mysticism in the narrow sense. The

second type is the case where the impulse against the mystic grows out of a mystic experience, taking the mystic as a fanaticism; the mystic is lost in the unending road of the objective world of thought, action and artistic creation; this leads to positivism and rationalism; thus it becomes "non-creative of necessity, and more or less mechanically thinks, judges and evaluates according to fixed criteria of rational formulas." ¹⁴ The third type is accounted for as a synthesis of these two inclinations.

That is, when the impulse parting from the mystic to objectivity is linked to the impulse returning again and again to a new mystic; the inclination to technique is not fixed, but fluidified in such a way that, in the ever revived cyclic movement, the spirit returns to the mystic by the medium of the mystic in objectivity. This direction leads to the authentic mysticism represented by Plotinus. Another direction opens out of the same synthesis: that is, when the objectifying activity takes the course of expanding it in cyclic movement spurred by the sense of infinitude, the mystic becomes ever new and ever more deepened, in accordance with thus expanding objectivity. Thus, the mystic endures by unending process of the spirit, which continues to experience the mystic in constant overcoming and therefore rests on a more and more enriched foundation. Now, along this cyclic expansion, that is, on the foundation of the ever-expanding objective world, an all-embracing and yet mystical and therefore unstable construction becomes possible, by which the whole objective may be explained in the context of the mystic. This unstable construction means separation of Ideas from the mystic experience, which Jaspers illustrates by Kant ("demonic man"). By contrasting these last two types, Jaspers' thinking

culminates in the possibility of encompassing "the meaning of the world" in the breadth represented by Idea-minded man. Let us next discuss the contrast.

6.3.b The Polarity of the Mystic

Jaspers contrasts the two types by comparing between the unio mystica experience and the Idea-experiences (die Erlebnisse der Ideen). First, to view it as a matter of Existenz, Plotinus' unio mystica concentrates on the peace of bliss in the bosom of the One, that is, on "peace-resting having", in which the Existenz "gets out of the world"; whereas in Kant the Idea-experiences keep a distance from the Absolute and go "within the world". Therefore, what is reached here is not peace, but restless "strengths" coming from a sense of infinitude which is charged with faith in the actualized Ideas or in the cycle of "going forward to intensify the strengths and returning to the self through fragmentary Idea-experiences." ¹⁵ The sense of "non-clarity" rising out of his mystic experiences is transformed into a sense of the impulse for objectivity. While, for Plotinus, rational consistency is absolutely required to reach the goal, i.e., the mystic experience; for Kant, such consistency is what to be produced according as the original strengths go forward within the objective world; any consistency other than this is a "fanaticism".

Second, to focus on viewing the mystic experience: for the former, the mystic experience is the goal achieved in ultimacy as the actual union beyond all; whereas for the latter it is not the achieved goal, but remains as "the Idea of Ideas", in the sense that the foundation of the whole objective constitution is viewed in terms of infinitude.

Third, restricting to the objective in the mystic context, for Plotinus the concrete particular things such as plants or human beings provide fore-stages for the absolute union; whereas for Kant the deepening of the mystic experience goes in the clear subject-object cleavage and therefore in tension with what is produced as objective content. While the former holds the objective world either as "subjective criteria for the mystic revelation" or as "nothing"; for the latter, the understanding of the objective world, though heterogeneous, gives the ground for articulating mystic experiences in consistent order. This much for the contrast between Plotinus and Kant.

Now, if the above contrast can be seen concisely as the polarity with which the world and therefore history either loses or acquires meaning, it is natural that such a polarity should be further intensively discussed so that creativity in the world may be ascertained in its widest breadth. Jaspers proceeds to this stage by contrasting mysticism and Ideas.

Mystics, if their hold on infinitude is focused on, "have" the Absolute "directly" without maintaining a tension with objectification, for the subject-object cleavage is cancelled at the mystical height. This raises the question of how communicativity is undermined by the mystics. Thus, Jaspers points out that mystics cannot be approached in terms of "ground, principle or task" and that "discussion is impossible with them". All finites and rationals used in affirmation and overcoming them for the soaring come to be abandoned together with the way itself. They cannot meaningfully understand any empirical basis. When they appeal to a divine community or to God's

will, such a thing is revealed to them in an ununderstandable manner. Turning to their escape from the world, there rule feelings of thoroughgoing irresponsibility. Temporal beings are left undistinguished; there is no such a thing as development, for every development is cancelled as the spirit here takes resort to the timeless; the life of the spirit has no continuity in terms of the world in the subject-object cleavage; the Existenz while lacking temporality and responsibility makes resolution timelessly, supersensually and eternally. There is no room for giving positive meaning to the world.¹⁶

Idea-minded men live infinitude "indirectly", and life is given only in the subject-object cleavage and in movement within the finite. It is mediated by action, experience, reflection, or by self-examination within the world; although it is itself irrational, it does not sink into the irrational, but remains live by unending movement overcoming through the rational. The world is the reality in which they live, so that the Ideas may move and be shaped therein. The Ideas take finites as their means; thus, finites acquire meaning and the sense of eternity, through the Ideas; in short, finites are unified in what is eternal. The Existenz in this case makes resolution in the temporal Instant for the eternal, "as if eternal depended on temporals". The Absolute lies in action, movement, operation, labour or task. Although they appeal to subjectives, they in this sense never deflect to mere subjectivity. In a word, while mystics love the Absolute, God, humanity or Nothing without objectivity, the Idea-minded men love individual human beings, concretes, particulars, a matter, a task or a work, for Ideas are never directly given but indirectly through their finite embodiments.

So far as Jaspers' methodic constitution is concerned, the polarity of the mystic and accordingly The Psychology end here. The ultimate synthesis of this polarity appearing in the creativity sphere is left to existential choice, for the work is intended to be an appeal. Existential choice indicates the Instant (opened up by communication) or the present of Existenz. This means that while appealing to the reader's Existenz, Jaspers himself intends to be appealed as an Existenz. One can describe this point as follows: In attuning to Kant, Jaspers looks now to the direction in which the becoming is revealed as identical with fulfilling time by the movement of Ideas. In other words, when he looks back his communication with the past, the whole of the attitudes, world images and spirits is surveyed as in the context of the "possible", that is, of the becoming of Idea.

Viewing this in its relation to the past, we may stress that Jaspers' thinking posture as such indicates that he has dealt with history in communication and thus shown us the highest and most encompassing sphere of creativity, that is, the existential present in which the subject-object cleavage originates. It is in this present that Jaspers has brought up his awareness of 'becoming historic' in attuning to the past. Jaspers' later overall philosophizing emerges as the actualization of this historic consciousness. To be historic concretely in this direction means fulfillment, not 'cognition', of time — time as a matter of salvation. His self-consciousness of this "being historic" finds its systematic expression in his conception of historicity.

EXISTENZ'S HISTORICITY AND ESCHATOLOGY

Our discussion hitherto has been concerned with Jaspers in his contact with the past. And from this point on, we shall discuss him in his own personal, historic present, which was present also in his cognitional thinking and acquired thereby its clarity reached by the culmination of The Psychology. It is now time for us to state specifically about the prospect or the ground for our concentration on his conception of Existenz' historicity. This may be done from three sides: first, generally; second, as a matter of Jaspers' present philosophizing; third, as a matter projected into communication for salvation.

To begin with, as we have seen in the structure of The Psychology, Jaspers' historic present is charged with a comprehensive as well as dynamic, historic consciousness which is identical with his awareness of himself as a man of faith. This speaks about in what depths Jaspers' approach to history is distinguished in contemporary situations of historical thinking in general. This can be reviewed if we sum up modes of existing historical thinking. First, we can classify them into: empirical history, methodology of historical science, philosophy of history as system, phenomenology of the Western mind, and finally ontology. With this secondly, we notice the fact that these modes of thinking have been indeed retrieved or mediated by Jaspers' inward movement, though predominantly cognitional as yet, of confirming Existenz as actuality in which all these modes are found as legitimate possibilities. Such comprehensively and dynamically upheld Existenz may be either confined to any of the above modes of thinking or kept opened up toward communicative actualization of thinking. This indicates that Jaspers' conception of historicity has its original meaning only in his praxis of philosophizing,

which he sets forth as consisting of an authentication of all thinking possibilities in the modern age. In a word, in Jaspers' historicity we deal with the question of the origin of all modes of historical approach; this is so insofar as we consider the relation between his historicity and historical thinking in general.

Next, the historicity may be located within his own philosophizing as follows. To speak by way of a formalic, his philosophizing may be identified as intended to fulfil existential time in the face of eternity by intensifying Existenz's actuality, i.e., the whole of the subject-object cleavage, through which it becomes phenomenon. Substantially, as shown by the thinking compass of The Psychology, his philosophizing in the existential present is an actualization of the man of faith, which is understood as the most original as well as fundamental source of strength without which no mode of Reason, whether Verstand or Vernunft, can sustain its buoyance from the man-emptying inclinations of abstract thinking. He confirms such potency of faith by examining the past as unifiable by the continuity of prophetic philosophy as the zenith of man's historic creativity, the origin of Reason and Intellect. He succeeds to such continuity by his historic decision to fulfil time in the present situations, which are unique and irreplaceable. The way of Idea-mindedness mentioned as the zenith of The Psychology is the historic possibility of his philosophizing. He expresses the mystic dimension by the term "Transcendence", which is for him the origin of all his thinking, and he characterizes this as "intended" to be "transcending". Employing the form of the subject-object cleavage, Jasper in his three volume Philosophy develops the way of Idea-mindedness in three major directions: "world orientation", that is, philosophizing in terms

of the objectivity side of the trichotomy; "Existenz-elucidation", that is, philosophizing in terms of becoming the self or in terms of the subjectivity side of the trichotomy; and "Metaphysics", that is, philosophizing in terms of the temporal manifestation of the Transcendence or in terms of the wholeness side of the trichotomy.

Jaspers' historicity, though present in every direction of his philosophizing, gains its systematicity especially in his Existenz illumination. It is set forth in the full equilibrium of his total philosophizing. He confirms his whole personality of "self-being" as impossible without fulfilling time. It is now presented as a philosophical structure of salvation, salvation in the sense that man's highest way to maintain genuine faith in the Transcendence is to have his temporality in the meaning of eternity. It is in this consciousness of historicity that Jaspers disciplines his philosophy not to overstep its limited human boundary to trespass upon the imagelessness of the Biblical God. It also is in this conception that Jaspers, being aware of the inexhaustible depths of divine revelation, Jesus Christ included, cannot but remain communicative appeal in the face of the Christian faith without looking for the possibility of invading the unfathomable depths of religious Existenz as confronted with philosophic Existenz. In this appeal, Jaspers with his historicity stands face to face with the Biblical eschatology as spoken by the Christ who with his eschatological message pronounces that man's temporality is not autonomous but is in his (Christ's) cosmic sovereignty.

Since Jaspers develops his conception of historicity also by mediating his thinking through interpreting the eschatology, we cannot

overlook what arises between his thinking and the Christian faith, especially so when his historicity eventually becomes an appeal for communication for faith.

From such a perspective, we shall continually consider it crucial to attune our position to the faith-rooted compass of his thinking. For this reason we shall in the first place try to represent his historicity as culminating in the "appeal" structure of philosophizing. We emphatically uphold this appeal-becoming as intended to enhance Christian response, insofar as his thinking culminates in his clarification of the confrontation between the historicity and the Biblical faith. Perhaps, such a dialogical understanding could be also a comprehensive way to maximize the significance of Jaspers' thinking as a whole, for this always consists in the correlation between his historic consciousness and philosophizing, cognitional stages included.

JASPERS' CONCEPTION OF HISTORICITY

We shall divide our treatment of Jaspers' historicity by applying the form of the subject-object cleavage. When the wholeness of his historicity is taken up, we shall discuss it under the category of "Phenomenon of Existenz". In regard to its objectivity, we shall discuss it so as to distinguish it from "Objective Formulas". And lastly, in regard to its subjectivity, we shall focus on Jaspers' view of the "Actualization" of 'Existenz' historicity.

7.1 Historicity as Existenz' Phenomenon

We shall begin by describing in what sense Jaspers uses the term "phenomenon", for he applies this term in a unique way. Jaspers draws a clear line between "phenomenon" defined in terms of mere objectification and that applicable to existential consciousness. The former use is concerned with what is conceived to lie objectively underneath what is known (as a phenomenon). That is to say, "phenomenon" in such a case is paired with something statically objectifiable, like the essence or laws of nature. When applied to existential consciousness, however, it pertains to a search for Being-in-itself, though in Jaspers' case "Being" cannot be sought after by ontology. Rather, it is dealt with as "Idea", i.e., as a universal by whose medium that which is ultimate is brought into communicative clarity.

In this sense, "phenomenon" according to Jaspers' usage may be best regarded in terms of the well known thesis that 'everything exists in consciousness'. Therefore, it indicates "Being" which enters into consciousness. So, Jaspers distinguishes "phenomemon" in this sense from that which becomes an object of investigation.

Jaspers largely divides phenomenon into two groups: one consists of existential manifestations of the Transcendence, and the other is Existenz illuminated or clarified to the consciousness itself, or in another way, "Existenz as phenomenon to itself". That is to say, in the existential sense, phenomenon means either phenomenon of the Transcendence or phenomenon of authentic self. Whereas phenomenon understood in terms of objectification is universally valid and therefore transmissible through the intellect, phenomenon in the existential sense is revealed in existential communication as the most structurally encompassing performance of thinking.

Jaspers describes historicity in terms of phenomenon in such an existential sense, meaning that Existenz is illuminated or clarified to itself by becoming Dasein or empirical existence. This indicates that his conception of historicity is intended not to be a mere doctrine of the self, but to be a dynamic self-awareness fulfillable only at the height of communication between Existenz and Existenz. Following such a framework, we shall analyze his view of phenomenality by the following procedures: (a) historicity in relation to the sense of history (not Geschichte), (b) historicity as Dasein, (c) historicity as an existential unity of Dasein breaking up into oppositions, and (d) historicity as it is fulfilled in communication between Existenz and Existenz.

7.1.a Historicity in Relation to a Sense of History

All modes of understanding history, whether objectivistic or existential, inevitably refer to history as Geisteswissenschaft. The objectivistic modes then, whether epistemological or metaphysical, may be characterized as resting on a certain universally conceived ground underneath the knowledge of history. With regard to the relation

between a "sense of history" and self-awareness, such a universal ground is often identified with Reason either as natural law or as subjective freedom. In any case, what rules here is the general consciousness so far as we focus the issue on the matter of self-awareness. In other words, the self in this direction remains one-dimensional if compared with the multi-dimensionality of consciousness as the self. Jaspers' Existenz-illumination is of course centred on the existential depths in whose dynamism the general consciousness gains meaning (Sinn). In this sense, we may begin by describing Jaspers' conception of the "actual" self distinguished from the objectively fixed or "possible" self.

As discussed before, for Jaspers, Existenz as the self "in itself" remains unknowable to the general consciousness. Existenz manifests itself into its Dasein pole, and this movement is the way it actualizes itself. In this actualization, Existenz manifests itself in fulfilling time by concentrating its Dasein through the strength of existential responsibility as well as through resolution. The widest range of such a Dasein-concentration is unfolded as the concentration expands, under the guide of the idea of the whole, towards an existential philosophy of history, which grows to an inward self-awareness which is extended beyond any possible whole of empirical history.

Thus, if seen from the actualization of Existenz as self-being, Existenz emerges in time by actualization, and Jaspers identifies the self at this stage as "historic being". When the self has such historic being in its consciousness, this consciousness is called "historic consciousness" which is distinguished from the self understood as a being of history, that is, on the level of "the sense of history."

It is therefore the active actualization process of Existenz that gives the whole ground for the authentic historic consciousness as well as for the sense of history in the general consciousness. This whole actualizing process of Existenz is called "historicity".

In the meantime, this whole existential concentration is "individual", and therefore does not absorb the general consciousness or the sense of history in a solipsistic individual abyss, but keeps expanding the task of actualization by positively maintaining contact with the historical general consciousness. Namely, an inward cyclic movement links the sense of history to the historicity of Existenz. This means that the historicity of Existenz is not apart from the communicative relationship of Existenz. Consciousness of the historicity of Existenz is never actualized unless communication with other Existenz is to be fulfilled in the same depths of the historicity of other Existenz. In this sense the relation between historicity and the sense of history means nothing without the communicative height of Existenz.

Communication, however, is for Jaspers not the final source of historicity. The whole dynamism of the existential actualization of the self owes its fundamental fountain to its relationship with the Transcendence, the relationship similar to Buber's centre of dialogue.¹ Jaspers thus holds that authentic historic consciousness acquires its actualizing strength from the sense of the Absolute. The sense of the Absolute is the philosophical, existential faith in the Transcendence. This sense of the Absolute is not something that can be posited to "contemplation" conceived as observing the existential inner actuality as if from without. It is out of this sense of the Absolute that Existenz in actualizing itself into Dasein never sinks into mere Dasein but keeps holding the Dasein pole within the cyclic movement mentioned

above, overcoming its bondage to time. Thus, the tension between the pull towards the eternal-now and the pull towards the Dasein is the fundamental structure of Jaspers' historicity. Herein lies the ground for Jaspers' describing historicity in terms of phenomenon, that is to say, so far as historicity is actualized in Dasein, the manifestation of the self's essential substance is never Existenz in itself but only its phenomenon in time. Jasper states:

"I find myself in a world of inexhaustible possibilities, and within those I bring forth a world of my own. In this temporal existence I am possible Existenz, a being which confronts my temporal existence if it merely exists, and which is identical with that Dasein if it becomes the phenomenon of my selfhood; but in any case I am an individual, not all by myself. It is only as self-being in Dasein facing its Transcendence whose absoluteness I cannot know except in the cipher of my own historicity -- that the unity of Existenz and Dasein prevails as a historic phenomenon. For me as temporal existence, historicity is the one mode of access I have to absolute being."²

7.1.b The Awareness of the Historicity in Dasein

As mentioned before, Jaspers' illumination of historicity, that is, his thought on historicity, takes place in the "appealing" movement of Existenz-illumination. And this appealing maintains its fulness by coming to communication; and in communication alone the illuminatory thinking fulfills its performances. In other words, in communication -- therefore through the medium of clarification -- it makes its concentration in existential "praxis". In this sense, Jaspers' discussion of the phenomenon of historicity takes a cyclic movement linking the path from Existenz to Dasein and the returning path from Dasein to the eternity-rooted dynamism of Existenz. The substance of this cyclic movement may be generalized as follows. Historicity means that Existenz retains its Dasein as its own

"phenomenon" essential to the will to be Existenz as a whole. The cyclic movement therefore indicates that Jaspers salvages the phenomenon from being absolutized, in order to relativize this.

First, to follow the path from Existenz towards Dasein, Dasein is the "temporal" pole of the dual structure of Existenz. With historic consciousness, the self turns to take on Dasein as the phenomenon of Existenz. In other words, Dasein is known now as the phenomenon of "possible Existenz". Owing to the existential concentration which retains the historic consciousness, this taking on the phenomenal Dasein brings forth an awareness of the "unity of Existenz and Dasein".

In this unity, the self as Dasein is no longer a mere Dasein which is to be left to the mercy of the general consciousness. Although Dasein in this case shows itself as knowable to the general consciousness, it, in the context of this unity, stands participating in the polar dynamism of Existenz, and it is a being which stands in the depths of Existenz. Being in the artery of Existenz in whole, "an existentially comprehended Dasein is infinitely important to the individual and mutually recognized in genuine communication; and yet at the same time it is to him as nothing before the Transcendence."

Thus, the phenomenon, comprehended in the existential concentration of the historic consciousness, is not only liberated from disposal by the general consciousness, but also enhanced. Thus, it stays as the only place where the self, through its constant self-relativization, heightens its freedom, which is bound in its faith in the Transcendence:

"Once it is aware of its historicity in the whole of Dasein, Existenz will answer the question what is [Dasein] by saying that its restless flux is the phenomenon of being -- and that while this flux does hide being from those who would make Dasein lasting and would see it purely as the world, it is manifested to a mind that dissolves this duration in limitless historicity. Moreover, in this metaphysical view we feel the urge to turn everything into freedom..... Historicity, that constantly self-destructive engendering, is the only phenomenon which assures me of myself and of the Transcendence. In this phenomenon alone do I touch being."⁴

The returning path towards Existenz in the face of the Transcendence is decided by whether Dasein as the phenomenon of Existenz is absolutized or relativized in the light of the historicity of Existenz.

The problematicity of absolutization is often argued in favor of historical relativism. Then, Husserl, the phenomenologist, attempted to overcome this relativism by proposing a phenomenological system of the spirit of Europe, intending to restore the constructive sense of the absolute.⁵ Either case is not parallel with Jaspers' application of both terms, "absolutization" and "relativization". From Jaspers' view of existential unity, both the relativism and the phenomenologism are to sink into absolutization, insofar as the self in these cases rests on the tangible thoughts which are themselves merely temporal existences.

Similarly to the way he leads his cognitional thinking, the idea of "process" (used here as a decisive springboard for the living dynamism of the selfhood in whole) is one of the major factors which determine Jaspers' all-embracing concentration on the existential movement. He accentuates the awareness of process not in terms of the progress of the merely objective set against the subjective. This awareness indicates Jaspers' historic consciousness which is authentically rooted in the existential dynamism in which alone Dasein as phenomenon retains its meaning. If Jaspers' form of the subject-object cleavage is

recalled, we note again that neither "pure" Existenz nor "pure" Dasein is identical with what is concretely lived in being Existenz, which remains true to the existential actuality only in the tension between Dasein and Existenz. That is to say, if Existenz's pure objectivity or Dasein is absolutized as if apart from the fundamental tension structure, Dasein is no longer known here as the phenomenon of Existenz; this leads to jettison historic consciousness, through which the self salvages itself from being in bondage to its Dasein. Thus, the absolutization of Dasein means forfeiting not only historic consciousness but also existential freedom coming from, and returning to, the Transcendence as Existenz's fundamental relationship.

"I am unexistentially tied to Dasein if it becomes absolute to me in the sense that I am no longer aware of it as phenomenal. This will happen in conditions without a clear sense of historicity, when all I need to lose myself is to be brought from the world of my particular (Dasein) into another; or when I cannot freely face an environment I had decisive experiences in, because I have chained myself to matters of senses and succumb to them as if they were nothing else to my life."⁶

On the contrary, in the sense of genuine historicity, if Dasein is taken into the existential, transcending movement, the spatio-temporal determinacy of Dasein is relativized in such a way that the realm of the Dasein of the Self remains open to existential freedom. Thus the self by mediating its phenomenon through the sense of historicity relativizes the phenomenon so as to retain the unity of Existenz and Dasein, without leaving itself to be objectified as a mere Dasein. The relativization of Dasein has its root in the sense of historicity by which the self retains its inner unity as Existenz. Elsewhere Jaspers states on this dynamic tie between the relativization and the existential sense of the Absolute:

"What might abide with us would be absolute being; what does abide with us is mere [Dasein]. The absolute lies for us in the vanishing reality of freedom; and the relativity, the temporal duration and objective validity. This reversal of what we would expect, as duration becomes insignificant and evanescence the phenomenon of being, is the historicity of [Dasein]." ⁷

Thus, the relativization of Dasein stems not from the mere intellect but from the sense of historicity of Existenz. Therefore, if Existenz, while jettisoning Dasein, claims its subjective such as the will to freedom understood as absolute and, accordingly without reference to the bonds of Dasein, then it follows that "Existenz would be stepping out of the world and plunging in the void". ⁸ Dasein as textured in the actualizing movement of Existenz in whole cannot be relativized in such a way that freedom is absolutized in reverse. The existential transcending, which points at one pole towards the face of the Transcendence, remains existentially actual only when it holds Dasein in historicity. Dasein understood in historicity is to be regarded as the self which as Existenz at the same time chooses to saturate its Dasein with praxis of "unconditional acts" ⁹ dedicated to the will to Being. To know Dasein as Existenz's phenomenon is thus something that transcendently encompasses Dasein known in terms of mere objectification. In other words, Dasein is meaningful only as permeated with historicity.

Since historicity in retrieving Dasein retains its life solely from the existential faith in the Transcendence, it turns out that "the betrayal of the Transcendence" and "the betrayal of a phenomenon of Dasein" are identical with each other. In short, historicity in which Dasein is relativized means in fact salvaging Dasein from sinking into mere objectivity as well as from flying into mere subjectivity. Next, this centripetal salvage of Dasein through the sense of historicity must be studied further as a matter of truth.

So far as Existenz becomes phenomenon, the self has no being without a phenomenal objectivity. Such objectivity, however, is relative while being in historic moments and in a certain determined situation. If we take this relativity as absolute, our Existenz is fixed as universally true, that is, as existing timelessly and unactually. On the other hand, if we take all objectivity lying in the phenomenon of Existenz as nothing but determined by mere Dasein, we have to lose Dasein's unconditionality together with all sources of being. The loss of Existenz then becomes inevitable. The former treatment of existential objectivity does not share in the depths of the each time historic phenomenon. The latter treatment, degrading the existential objectivity to a mere empirical existence, isolates such objectivity from the context of unconditional action, without which there is no such phenomenon. Either case waters down the objectivity as if without the fundamental existential concentration holding the very objectivity.

As truths were reoriented in his Psychology of World Views, along his all-embracing culmination in the heights of existential creativity best exemplified by the encompassingness of Kant's doctrine of Idea,¹⁰ his overall philosophizing and therefore his conception of historicity deal with the question of truth by concentrating on the truth of the dynamism of Existenz actualization. Since Existenz, by its experiences of the boundary situations of the self, mediates its thinking by a decisive awareness of the evanescence of holds on the finite, its struggles for truth are not founded upon any criterion that is merely a Dasein, but upon faith in the unconditionality of Existenz. In his Philosophy, Jaspers on the same ground refers to

three directions of unconditional action. They are: unconditional ideal action, unconditional existential action, and unconditional transcendent action. Seen in the encompassing relation to the realm of Dasein, these three directions may be taken as indicating the existential breadth of Jaspers' truth in accordance with the three aspects of the subject-object cleavage. Jaspers' truth, as we shall discuss in the following, may be described as extending to the sphere where these three directions are unified into one.

"The unconditional ideal action" is dedicated to actualizing a spiritual whole instead of the wholeness of Dasein in the objectivity called human order. "The unconditional existential action" is to will Existenz in the face of the Transcendence while the soul finds itself in the world. Finally, "the unconditional transcendent action" concerns itself with the Transcendence understood as transcending all empirical existences, and drawing both Ideas and the soul into the abysmal depths of its being. According to Jaspers' philosophizing, these three directions are to be unified into one; for so far as Dasein is regarded as important because of the sense of historicity, Existenz in the face of the Transcendence cannot but actualize itself through the strength of Ideas. Jaspers himself calls this unity a "trinity". At any rate, for Jaspers, truth matters most as the truth of the self's becoming, without minimizing the limited truth values of all other levels of consciousness. In this sense, for Jaspers there is no truth based on objectivity that is capable of the truth acquired through the phenomenon of the self's becoming.

He writes:

"To remain true, unconditionality must concentrate on the concrete historic present. The truth which Existenz acquires here in coming to itself is purely phenomenal, but the phenomenon as such, objectively conceived and held fast is not this truth; it was true only because there was the Transcendence in it at the same time. That, however, was a historic occurrence and not a general, objective phenomenon, no matter how and where it should recur."¹³

The question of truth cannot be discussed apart from the becoming of the self. That is to say, Jaspers has hitherto lifted up the becoming as occurring in the middle between generals and personals, and now upholds the sphere of encompassing truth as the meaning of all truths. It is upheld as "historic standpoints" in contrast with "cognitive standpoints". While the cognitive standpoints can be made learnable in entirety, the historic standpoints are steps of a freedom in which Existenz comes to be. All historic standpoints overwhelm any cognitive approaches and cannot be known theoretically or generally; they are truth assurable only in existential communication in the face of the Transcendence, for they occur not as an object of the intellect but as the becoming of the self which encompasses within it the intellect. Once more this view of truth recalls to us Jaspers' emphasizing that his philosophizing occurs as historic and communicative so essentially that any criticisms attempted at outside such a context are bound to miss the whole point.

7.1.c Freedom as Historic Consciousness

Jaspers' unfolding of historicity has led us to the point where the historic consciousness plays the role of the axis on which Dasein in cyclic movement concentrates in the dynamism of Existenz. Now, the historicity is illuminated as the unity of unconditional action and the conditionedness of Dasein. It is now the turn towards the region where this existential freedom in this context has to be

described as unifying its opposite, i.e., "necessity".

First, what is to be noted is the fact that in his Philosophy, characteristic for being Existenz-illumination, the concept of "necessity" is more than a matter of objective thinking at all levels. It is naturally textured as to how Existenz becomes in its full dynamism, in faith and communication. In the context of the historicity, the consciousness of necessity is thus grasped as it is called into the existentially inward movement which concentrates in existential freedom.

That is to say, the consciousness of necessity is in the first place taken on as indicating Dasein's sense of situation for fulfilling existential unity. It is based upon the consciousness that situations of Dasein are found contrasted with Existenz because they are determined by the necessity of what is given. However, it is not fixed as indicating an objective entity that shatters the inward movement for authenticity of the self. Rather, as a consciousness emerging in the self, it implies that the self here appears as inevitably determined, but so far as the whole of the self goes, such a sense of determinacy calls out at the same time the sustenance of the aspect of the self that decides himself in the face of the determinacy. Here, necessity is grasped as in conflict with freedom whose empirical appearance at this point is to unfold its existential depths. This is the way Jaspers deals with the sense of necessity in the afore-mentioned structure of Dasein's phenomenality. In brief, the issue here is how the freedom of existential resolution encompasses Dasein's determinacy so as to take on the determinacy as its own free choice in terms of the phenomenality. As to this crisis of contrasts, Jaspers states:

"When I look at given facts I am purely determined; when I look at freedom, even definitive decisions are definitive only as I see them now; although I cannot reverse them by new decisions, I can direct their significance by imbuing them with a meaning yet unknown; they still seem fraught with possibility."¹⁴

This crisis then can develop to a possibility of overcoming it through freedom. That is to say, either I in freedom decide to treat everything thoroughly with necessity, or I in the same freedom decide to treat everything in order to see the glow of possibility in them. Thus the determined is to be transformed into the movement of my freedom. To see this transformation in the context of its phenomenality, Existenz in becoming the phenomenon or Dasein requires "the resistance of matter" in the way, e.g., a bird cannot fly in a vacuum. Seen from freedom, and therefore from existential choice, "the determinacy is the historic form in which Existenz appears in time." Thus, necessities experienced at all levels are overcome by historic consciousness, regardless of whether they are understood as temporal, absolute or as transformed into freedom without resistance. That is to say, necessities are made to dwell in their ground through authentic self-actualization.

If we reascertain this unity of freedom and necessity as distinguished from the freedom which manifests itself by necessities, the encompassing freedom as historic consciousness appears as distinguishing itself from the freedom which is understood merely in terms of Dasein. First, Existenz considered as freedom consists in the antinomy of the following forms: on the one hand it pertains to its experiences in terms of the possibility of choice, and on the other, in its source of freedom, it does so only in being historic.

That is to say, the self even in its encompassing decision cannot be conceivable without being at the same time bound to sources of Dasein, and in this determinacy it is found to be historic. Yet, this historicity is not something that is ultimately determined but to be decided afresh in existential freedom. Such freedom however must not be confused with the Dasein-centred freedom which is founded upon the view that the objectively set world is what is 'ultimately' decided. Freedom in the latter sense is limited to the freedom consciousness of mere Dasein, that is, the self is free in this case only within himself without the possibility of upholding his freedom above the world. This relative freedom is devoid of the dynamism of the existential, absolute freedom in which the givenness of Dasein is encompassed as mentioned in the above. Jaspers thus distinguishes freedom considered as "encompassing historic consciousness".

The encompassing historic consciousness sees the unified whole of freedom, in the sense that there is no freedom without the givenness and there is no givenness without freedom. The reality of the given is illuminated and respected. This attitude to the given reality rejects "unhistoric" utopianisms, which in reverse transform freedom from the given into timelessly conceived reality possible only on the basis of "a supposed generally valid accuracy". The active approach to the reality, that is, the approach of the historic consciousness, takes on the necessities of the reality out of the ground of action, namely, out of freedom, and retains them that way.

7.1.d Historicity as the Life of Eternity

Jaspers deals with the question of time by retrieving it in the context of consciousness-creativity, along his most carefully thought-out awareness of the limitations of objectivity-fixed thinking. In this sense, he appears to take it up here as an aspect of clarifying the historicity. We, however, may reasonably imbue it with a significance decisive for retaining the correlation structure of Jaspers' conception of existential history—the correlation between the philosophizing held by him as "process" and the correspondent conception of the unity of time and eternity. We shall begin for this reason by drawing comprehensive attention to this overall significance of his concern with the question of time, though in a sense for Jaspers the awareness of eternity occupies the centre of this conception.

Firstly, we may describe such significance in terms of his philosophizing as a whole, which we have distinguished for its intention to be inward movement centred on communication. As has been stressed again and again, Jaspers' philosophizing as such communicative movement consciously locates itself by attuning it to the greatest spirits struggling for philosophy considered as a matter of salvation. He then not only sets forth his philosophizing as a "transformation of the Christian faith"¹⁵ but concentrates the praxis of the communication in his appeal, in the last resort, for communication between the philosophical faith and revelation.¹⁶ The thorough-goingness of this parallelism, however, must not be confused with appeals for the simple-minded rationalization of the faith in revelation. With all his radical examinations of the

Biblical revelation coming to him via objectivity, Jaspers, takes reserve by saying that he does not mean to call the revelation a lie. If this conflict, between his reverence for the revelation and his exhaustive fight for the philosophical faith is to be lifted out, its challenging posture may be taken as a titanic strife for the clarity of time. And it as such is comparable with the challenges brought about by the contemporary inter-Christian strifes for the clarity of the Biblical eschatology.¹⁷ In connection with this intellectual historic impact of Jaspers' philosophizing as a whole, his conception of the unity of time and eternity could be assessed as implying the significance of challenge for a possibility of unifying the two faiths from a new dimension of thinking.

Secondly, Jaspers' unity of time and eternity reminds us of the way he in his Psychology of World Views deals with Existenz. That is to say, in concentrating world views as the life of spirit eventually in Kant's doctrine of Idea, Jaspers contrasted the hold on finitude and the hold on infinitude; and there the discernment as well as the unification hinged upon his awareness of the existential Instant wherein time and eternity are perceived as the most general forms effective for grasping the dual structure of the life of the spirit. For Jaspers, the form of time structure was more than a mere general concept, that is, it was used as the most general form for bringing about appeal for self-awareness. This intensive dependence upon the existential time structure was obviously supported by his attunement to Kierkegaard's conception of the Instant.

Thirdly, to turn to his illumination of the historicity, his unification of the sense of history, historic consciousness and

historicity is structured according to his awareness of the unity of time and eternity, as illustrated by his Idea of phenomenon.¹⁸ In this sense the current part of his illumination of the historicity may be taken as dealing with the most general form of the very illumination. As mentioned before, Jaspers does not deal with time in term of an objective, natural time concept as if the time consciousness were to exist completely apart from the whole of the existential dynamism of consciousness.

For a living self, time is first and foremost "the present". And in the existential inward movement which takes its fundamental strength from the sense of the Absolute or in another way by faith in the Transcendence, such a present is no longer the flash of a merely objective moment, but is identical with the consciousness of the present which is to be fulfilled by actualizing Existenz. Thus, the duration of time is understood as continuity of a present. Natural time is experienced by Dasein, and it is by no means the pattern for understanding the existential present which sustains Dasein by resolution. This context of resolution, when chosen at the zenith of Existenz, is that of existential self-actualization in its ultimate sense. Since this self-actualization is in the last resort the actualization of the will to salvation, it may be said that Jaspers' time-structure is in its centre an appeal for his philosophical faith. Jaspers' historicity here reached the climax of its structure, and we shall next elaborate his existential Instant and its duration in time.

Insofar as this self-awareness consists in retrieving the pole of the self means being aware of "the present". I am the

present in this sense. As described before (in reference to the existential retrieval of the time consciousness), the existential self-concentration emerges as mastering the phenomenon in process or in the lapse of time. Seen from the temporality characterizing this phenomenality textures in the ever-to-be-present concentration of Existenz, such a present appears as timeless on the one hand and at the same time as unifying both the temporality and timelessness. Jaspers writes: "Existenz is neither timelessness nor temporality as such; it is one with the other, not one without the other."¹⁹

Thus, so far as the awareness of historicity remains alive, the question of time is no longer absorbed in the form of objectively fixed time but is centred solely upon "intensification of the moment". That is to say, the factual moment or the temporal present in this context is taken as carrying past and future within itself, and then it is intensified towards the transcendently heightened "Instant" of being Existenz. Here in this transcending structure lies Jaspers' conversion of time-consciousness.

Then, this conversion implies that neither future nor past is to be set up as the fulfilment of Existenz. Future may be tentatively set, fixed as a specific achievement or as the goal for which the present is a passage. Past likewise may be marked as achievements significant for the present. These however take place only within the encompassing dynamism of intensifying the present, and they never mean that Existenz is to replace present-intensifying movement with a specific future goal or with a supposed perfection of the past. To be Existenz means consummating life as a whole, and in this context these specifics can be regarded as serving for the learning and awakening which are

indispensable for the intensification of the present.

If we are to identify in form the phenomenon as "temporal process", and further if such temporal process is to be imbued with the life of the Trancendence-immersed historic consciousness, it may be formulated that the historic consciousness is the state of mind in which the phenomenon as temporal process is found as paired with the eternal, i.e., with being Existenz. The present moment to be lived as human time, emerging within the sense of historicity, is the fulfilment of time, in the sense that it holds the phenomenal evanescence upon the eternity consciousness. The extant, fulfilled, temporal particularity, instead of what is comprehensible in terms of universal validity, becomes immensely important as the phenomenon of eternal being or of Existenz.

"The moment as the identity of temporality and timelessness is the factual moment deepened to present eternity. A sense of historicity makes me aware of two things in one: of evanescence as a phenomenon and of eternal being by way of this phenomenon -- not in the sense of timeless validity that happens to be grasped now but would be just as capable of being grasped at some other time, not in the sense of temporality and timeless standing disparately side by side, but in the sense that, once fulfilled, the temporal particularity is comprehended as the appearance of eternal being, that the tie between this eternity and this moment is absolute."²⁰

This time-structure requires a little more development. The phenomenon emerges in each particular moment and thus constitutes a line of such moments according to the lapse of time; and this might sound as if the each heightened moment were to exist independently of other moments. First, the existential present is not to be confused with a moment objectively represented or with a moment experienced apart. The authentic Instant cannot be pinned down as if it could be set up outside the flow of the phenomena. Encompassed in the

inexhaustibility coming from the Transcendence as well as from the unending communication with other Existenz, Existenz cannot rest on any one moment and take it as completed. "Existenz does not appear immediately as a finished product; it is acquired step by step, through decisions taken in the course of time; its phenomenon is not the single moment but the historic succession of interrelated moments."

The difficulty in grasping this continuity structure of the existential Instant may be lightened by familiarizing ourselves with Jaspers' distinction between what becomes a reality and what is to be grasped in the Instant. In the process of becoming, the self might "anticipate" being Existenz and thus confuse what is made a reality only by intellectual constitution, with what is touched on by the medium of the "sense of ignorance" fulfilled in the heightened Instant. The self also may persist only in what becomes a reality and thus "miss out" a historic fulfilment, which never becomes a reality but emerges within the inward depths. Jaspers distinguishes the awareness in the Instant as "actualization", from "inactualization" characteristic of the pursuit of a reality. Now, this actualization, as considered in the above, is to become phenomenon, and therefore it is in essence temporal actualization. This temporal actualization, however, consists in a dual structure: empirical structure and existential structure. In the empirical structure, the actualization may be taken as limited to the plannable in terms of specific purposes or means. In the existential structure, without which the empirical structure is groundless, the actualization overwhelms such plannability.

At any rate, the existential Instant, due to this dual structure, is not to be absorbed in the phase of the historical successions, for such

successions, if apart from the existential, all-encompassing concentration, are nothing but a flow of time which lacks the historicity. The same dual structure prohibits degrading the vertical dynamism which carries the temporal successions as phenomenon, to horizontal continuity without telos, as exemplified by the modern progressionisms. While in the existential cycle the phenomenon is ultimately decided each time according to its contribution to the extant fulfilment of being Existenz faced by the Transcendence, the progressionisms reckon the historic in terms of the progress of values. While, therefore, the existentially historic may be forfeited by the progressionisms, the existential historic consciousness can never remain true to the self unless the whole of Dasein is carried as "irreplaceable" individuality. While the former singles out Dasein from the life of Existenz and consequently undermines historicity, the latter pertains to the self-awareness fulfilled each time at the height of the inward movement. While the former constitutes the continuity by degrading the historic into a flow of events and of time without any beginning and end, the latter, however, holds the continuity to be the collection of existential moments (in their dual structure). Jasper writes:

"Not the course of time and events that has no beginning and no end is historic, but the fulfilled time whose appearance rounds out and brings to the present what has intrinsic being by a relation to the Transcendence. If the moment is existential as a link in a continuity, this continuity must be the actualization of what exists irreplaceably at each moment of its temporally limited course: continuity may be conceived as the moment that has become encompassing -- as a time which, limited in itself, is not endless time but timelessness fulfilled in temporal extension, true duration between beginning and end as the phenomenon of being."²¹

We have hitherto discussed Jaspers' conversion of time-structure as the unity of time and eternity, which is reached through intensifying consciousness at large by concentrating on existential self-awareness. Time-structure is converted from the level of objective thinking to the encompassing structure of historicity, and only in this context alone, can objective thinking and accordingly the consciousness of natural time retain meaning, as they are phenomena of Existenz. Time structure in this sense is reached by grasping the "paradox" of Existenz's historic consciousness which carries the unity of Existenz and Dasein. At the Existenz pole, the idea of eternity cannot be set up as existing independently of temporal phenomenon, but it is the most general form of what substantiates existential resolution which is confronted with the Transcendence and at the same time challenged for communication.

On such a paradox, Jaspers writes:

"The paradox of the existential sense of historicity — that fleeting time includes eternal being - does not mean that there is an eternity somewhere else, aside from its temporal appearance. It does not mean that being is simply in [Dasein] but appears in [Dasein] as the outcome of decision, in such a way as to make the outcome eternal."²²

Existential resolution then emerges not as an actualization of "mere freedom" as claimed by Sartre.²³ It emerges as a fulfilment of philosophical faith and also as an awareness of existential unconditionality. Thus, Jaspers proceeds to reject Nietzsche's "eternal recurrence" which identifies Dasein with eternity, for no matter how deep the intensification of the Instant may go, Jaspers' Dasein never breaks its being the phenomenon of Existenz. "Eternity" in this sense is a "cipher" produced for the historic enhancement of

the self's existential substance. What we have to say in response to this stage of the illumination of historicity is that, with Jaspers' time-structure, time and eternity seem to have been retrieved from objective thinking (through the becoming of man) for the first time by an exhaustive concentration of all levels of human consciousness.

7.2 Historicity Contrasted with the Objectifying Formulas

We have traced Jaspers' historicity as it is to be shaped by the medium of general concepts culminating in the opposition of time and eternity. This means that the shaping proves to be an "objectification", though distinctively with the framework of the communicative illumination of Existenz. In his Philosophy, Jaspers proceeded to be more specific about such objectification. And we think that this procedure serves to disclose what is indispensable for distinguishing his historicity from the conventional approaches to history.

Jaspers takes three steps in order to show his historicity as encompassing three fundamental modes of historical thinking, which he takes as centred on man's self-awareness. The first step is to distinguish his historicity from two conventional concepts applied to the historic, i.e., from "irrationality" and "individuality". The second step is to show the freedom of the historicity by contrasting it with any closed whole which is intended to include man in it. The third step is to point out the genuineness of his historicity contrasted with metaphysical systems of history. Let us follow these steps.

7.2.a Historicity Distinct from Irrationality and Individuality

First, while shaping by means of objectification, the historic consciousness elevates itself above the inclination to undermine life with "universality". At this point, the living

historic consciousness may be identified as "irrational", but Jaspers would not agree to confining the historic consciousness to this mode of objectification.

In general, "irrationality" is illustrated by such as, matter opposed to general form, arbitrary action opposed to legal procedure, or chance opposed to necessity. In this sense, it is "purely negative" without being penetrable. It is a "remainder" and "limit" of what is general.²⁴

Over against such a negation of the universal, the existential historic consciousness or "absolute historicity" must be structurally distinguished as a source of ground of generals which are produced as expression and phenomenon of Existenz.

"Absolute historicity, on the other hand, is positive as the carrier of the sense of Existenz. It is a font, not a limit; an origin, not a remainder. It becomes a standard that is untransferably singular. It is the proper truth which downgrades every mere universal to accuracy, and every ideality to a penultimate stage. To fail in its cognition simply means the responsible process of self-elucidation in which a possible Existenz comes to itself. In Existenz both the universal and the nonuniversal will decline into instrumentalities of expression and appearance."²⁵

Irrationality is also mentioned as applicable to universals, when universal validity is sought in figures of art and poetry. A form of the historicity however is never meant to be universally valid, though it has, as its media, rationals as well as irrationals, which it shaped. In this sense "it is superrational, not irrational".

As in Hegel, irrationals are conceptualized. The authentic historic consciousness, however, cannot be treated in the same manner, for it is expressed not by objectifying a thing but "by appealing to a potential". In this sense Hegel's all-embracing conceptualization must be characterized as the case "when a historic Existenz seems

closest to historicity, it will in fact, all unaware, be far removed from it by the resultant delusion of having actual knowledge".

Irrationality is claimed as identifying individuality.

Individuality in this case is an objective category in the sense that the concept of individuality is sought for expressing the remainder of general cognition. It may be applicable to Dasein but never to Existenz (understood as the source of objectification). The idea of constituting historic individuality, however, does differ considerably from the case mentioned above. In describing objectively, it grasps "the logical structure of objectifying representations of history", for "it resolves that consciousness into a new universal, one that has been actualized once only, while obscuring the sense of Existenz."

Thus the historicity of Existenz is neither a non-general that is an irrational, nor a non-general that is an individuality. For in either case the live historicity is transferred to an objectivity that is devoid of the positive dynamism of historicity. All general expressions of historicity carry general form, while the historic consciousness in itself remains original only in its singularity or uniqueness, which is not to be subsumed in generality. The general form which the historic consciousness uses as a medium ought to retain meaning existentially in such uniqueness. What is decisive here is the direction in which the historic consciousness proceeds to penetrate objectivity in order to bring about its phenomena. As the source of such phenomena, the historic consciousness itself never becomes an object of any generalization. In short, so far as the abstraction into the general forms illustrated in the above remains in tension with the live substance of Existenz, any

general forms in this context never retain dynamism unless they are constantly reconcentrated in the historic consciousness. Jaspers distinguishes this reconcentration as conversion from thought to "the actuality of consciousness". At this point, the historic consciousness commands its general forms to flash in its live, existential, unique entirety, for else the task to reach and open up the self in historic consciousness is never fulfilled.

Compared with this concreteness of the historic consciousness, the universals must be interpreted this way: that is, they contact the concretes inevitably in negations, circle-relations, images, and in a structurally inadequate use of categories; and yet they serve in the end "as a form of conveyance (Mitteilung) and as a means of awakening."

7.2.b Historicity Contrasted with Closed Wholes

Existential self-illumination, in whose dynamism the historic consciousness owes its source, requires not only the universal but also the whole so as to retrieve Dasein in communication. The question is whether the historicity is conceived as subsumable in any mode of such whole. To recall the division between Existenz and Dasein, Dasein is bound to necessity while Existenz to freedom, and so far as the existential concentration goes, the necessity is to be retrieved in the freedom. Seen in this context, the question of the whole mentioned above refers to such necessity, namely, to the necessity applied to Dasein which lives in the "situation" and the thus related "taşk". This confined state of Dasein may tempt one to subsume the historic consciousness as well in a whole conceived only in terms of Dasein. The historic consciousness needs, however, to be illuminated as authentic as going along the whole²⁶ of Existenz rather than any specific whole

or an absolute whole shaped for the world as a whole. Jaspers sees the matter from the existential creativity in which any whole in this sense may be relocated.

To begin with, Jaspers gives due rights to the region of specific wholes. The specific whole is required for Dasein which is empirical and therefore belongs to the empirical world. It refers accordingly to universal validity and empirical life, and these regions advance, assuming possibilities of the whole. These possibilities are necessary for empirical life, which, though, remains inauthentic if not encompassed by the existential communication. Wholes in this context, however, are characteristic for being closed if contrasted with the soaring dynamism of the communicative context. Besides, constitutions of such wholes cannot be regarded as absolute, for there the order of a whole is set up only "relatively" in accordance with modes of empirical beings or of the world of objects. Because of this limitedness of specific wholes, the historicity, the live dynamism of being Existenz, must be distinguished as a possibility which is so overwhelming that it cannot be classified as well as confined in any of these closed wholes.

Next, Jaspers discusses the absolute whole. It is illustrated by a whole which is conceived to be "unconditional", a whole set up as the ultimate goal for all, or by a whole as the eternal world formulated above this world. As considered in the context of the world view psychology, such wholes are objectively impossible and must be interpreted in terms of cipher, but never of all-inclusive objective knowledge. They are incapable, by nature, of subsuming the historicity; they are in fact an overly sought expansion of the fashion of the specific whole. If a

whole in such a sense is applied to the historicity, it may mean that the historicity is identified with the whole of the world understood as history. We shall discuss this question later in a separate section.

Jaspers holds that the whole issue must be clarified by bringing it back to the creative unity of the whole applicable to Dasein, and thus to the live whole which is the Existenz-seated "depth of historicity". Whereas this depth of historicity never knows any end of the Being until it touches on the Transcendence, the Dasein grasped within the confine of a whole ends up merely in the region of phenomenon. The phenomenon, as discussed before, is not self-inclusively fixed, but remains fluid in movement, as the whole depth continues to actualize itself. This structural conversion from the sphere of phenomenon to the Existenz sphere implies viewing the unity by ascending to the sphere where the cyclic movement of Existenz' self-illumination continues to expand in communication. The depth of historicity is lost when historic consciousness is confined to fixed images or wholes. The alternative to such a loss is to view the wholes in conversion to the expansion of the self-illumination cycle. Jasper writes:

"A sense of historicity as a being that becomes reality is not a possible standpoint that might be classified alongside other standpoints. Historicity as an awareness of an origin unfathomable in itself cannot be adequately stated as a known phenomenon; not until it is actualized will it become itself. Instead of revolving in the circle of communicative self-elucidation and undefinably expanding it, historicity as the phenomenon of the (Dasein) would turn into a fixed objective structure and lose itself. There is no getting beyond the source. For as Existenz I cannot stand at my own back — something I can do quite well as consciousness at large — lest I lose the source and come to a point-like I at large, no longer I myself."²⁷

7.2.c Historicity and Speculative World-history

In the above, we have dealt with the historicity presumably pulled into the region of objectively set wholes, and this direction seems to remind us of the direction in which historic consciousness, now conversely, throws itself away, as it were, into objective wholes. That is to say, a sense of historicity turns itself toward a whole to read in it a supposedly more original historicity. In seeking such historicity, it climaxes in the whole of the world. Jaspers refers to this direction as "metaphysical expansion" of historicity, characterizing the turn as: "In seeking to fathom where I come from I ask metaphysically where the world comes from".²⁸

Thus, the world as the whole of all beings is historicized, and all beings are understood as having reached their present shapes through "decision". Nothing is eternal or timeless in an absolute world but all (laws of nature and all other universal validities included) are regarded as timeless aspects of something temporal and historic. In this relativization of the world, speculation starts, with consciousness at large, setting up an objective order of wholes, while being led by an awareness of the radical instabilities of the world. In viewing the world as historic, this same speculation lifts up decision as conceptually incomprehensible; that is to say, thought becomes "dizzying", and consequently is swept away by the all-embracing relativization: all the generals as well as all the wholes are eventually bound to fade out as relative.

When historicity is pursued in such a way, i.e., by making a turn to the objective world, it results that the realm of consciousness at large and the thus shaped generals and wholes are left astray, being

jettisoned from the self-retrieving, communicative cycle of existential concentration. Thus, the historicity becomes lost in the objective world, and instead of saving the realm of universal consciousness in the depth of original historicity, it sinks itself into the march for an irresponsibly set up objective whole of the world and into the march for the thus faded-out generals as well as wholes. It in the end delivers itself to the loss of faith. Now that we have considered Jaspers' historicity as he illuminates from its objectivized side, so to speak, we shall proceed to consider the way in which it is illuminated from the side of its actualization.

7.3 The Actualization of Historicity

By the foregoing two parts, we have dealt with Jaspers' historicity by employing the guidance of the triad structure of Jaspers' thinking. As the first part was concerned with historicity in terms of the wholeness side, and the second in terms of the objectivity side, so now the present part will concern itself with the subjectivity side. Such is the logical (philosophic) locus of the actualization of historicity. Although Jaspers divides this aspect into "actualizations" and "aberrations", we shall concentrate mainly on the question of the actualization.

The region of this actualization, considered in the general structure of the historicity, may be located as follows. The historicity is Existenz' historicity, communication-fulfilled Existenz. We have identified this dynamism as the cyclic structure of the unity of Dasein and Existenz, or another way, we have characterized it as a cyclic unity in which being and its phenomenon are unified. This unity consists, of course, in the tension lying between the two levels of

the self. And in this tension, the phenomenon, namely, Dasein's existential becoming, cannot be understood as soaring completely into the Existenz sphere, but only as that which actualizes "possible Existenz".

The movement of such actualization is determined by two levels of concern or of will: Dasein's concern for the world on the one hand, and the authentic will to Being on the other. In other words, the self (Ich) comes to acquire its authentic will in situation and also in observing such as beings and that which approaches it. Then, the actualization in question takes place as actualizing such will by means of action, and this is the way the possibilities are brought forth.

7.3.a Fidelity (Treue)

Historicity is lived in the actualization of the possible Existenz, as long as the whole movement goes in time. As the Existenz actualization continues only intermittently, so historicity endures in the flow of intermittent continuity. This intermittence implies that the historicity is actualizable when in its depth a fresh present is constantly repeated along the path of retrieving self's past decisive moments over and over again. In this sense, to actualize the historicity means "fidelity" to the self in unifying past into present without losing the centripetal concentration in the dominance of empirically-inclined concerns and satisfactions. Moreover, since death calls for a sense of the end of Dasein's possibility of becoming the phenomenon of Existenz, Dasein in this context is taken so seriously that one cannot think of any seclusion but restricts it within this unpassable boundary. Therefore, fidelity never implies

absolutizing the actualization, as if to become phenomenon were to exhaust the faith in the encompassing sphere of Existenz. In other words, the fidelity as emerging at such retrieval stage serves virtually to enhance a sense of the limitedness of the realm of phenomenon as a whole in such a way that the actualization of historicity purifies the authentic sense of the Absolute. In referring to death, Jaspers states:

"As Existenz, however, my sense of historicity assures me that my [Dasein] is phenomenal in time. It is a phenomenon, a phenomenon of the Existenz that may be inherent in it. This is how the experience of the end of all things refers to the phenomenal side of Existenz, which I ascertain in suffering under the end." ²⁹

Because of such a structure, the fidelity must be distinguished from various conventionally understood modes of fidelity. First, fidelity in itself must not be confused with its effects. That is to say, fidelity requires, e.g., the firm validity of a pledged word, moral dependability, and the form of habit. But, these do not stand for themselves; they are merely the "consequences" and the "premises" of the fidelity.³⁰ The fidelity itself, however, owes its life neither to its consequences nor to its premises; it rises or falls with the inward unity carried by the historicity, i.e., with the Transcendence-immersed dynamism of Existenz:

"But fidelity itself is the historicity which takes hold of the content of its own empirical existence (Dasein), and in that it binds itself to its ground, never forgets, and actively keeps its past in the present."³¹

In this centrality, fidelity sharply distinguishes itself from infidelity (Treulos) which, confusing love for generals with the centrality of the self, minimizes the concrete ground of Dasein. Jaspers offers an expansive discussion of the infidelity, by

concentrating on "Aberrations of historicity", which we cannot afford to deal with in detail in this thesis. In any case, the point is that the abscondence from the concrete self toward generals, which we have just discussed, does not keep within the boundary of the attitude to the immediate self but in fact expands as broad as the empirical understanding of man and points to its largest comprehensiveness.

Jaspers writes:

"In infidelity I can detach myself and go off endlessly, so to speak, into a bottomless void. I may scorn and corrupt my origin, fighting everything that has laid the ground for me as an inhibiting and marring bond; I may think I love generalities and idealities, and as a result may have no unconditional, exclusive love for anything concrete in my historicity; I may confine myself to occasional playful guesses at which I may perhaps love best of all, although there is nothing that inwardly, truly concerns me. For my progeny, for instance, I may seek a purely general education by expert instructors instead of a historic source in my tradition, however scant it be by objective standards. Historical particularities may come to be viewed as no other than self-willed eccentricities in the face of the general culture. Whether we call this culture human, European, German, whether we recognize one or several, the generalities remain. I can drag my own self down to the level of an arena and a mere tool, and then I no longer know existential fidelity; I know only what is falsely called fidelity: compulsive necessity and a purposive adherence that will serve, and can be relied upon, to preserve that general culture." 33

This basic distinction between fidelity and infidelity may be confirmed when elaborated further in terms of the triad of the world, Dasein and Existenz. The substance of fidelity is determined by understanding the world as its surrounding. In this sense, it may appear to be fidelity to such as tasks or men of great and general importance. But, seen from the radical structure of the historicity, such fidelity, if isolated from the existential artery, means no more than being in bondage to general Ideas and objective validities or in bondage to "roles and effects", instead of encompassing these in existential

freedom. Therefore, fidelity ought to be textured into the "simple fidelity of the origin", that is, to the existential fidelity. The authentic fidelity therefore is characterized here in this connection as referring to the central faith of the self, for Jaspers says,

"Fidelity collects its treasure on the smallest scale; I am all by myself if I am faithful; I want nothing else and looking for visibility; it is in the stillness that I am sure of myself." ³⁴

Turning to Dasein, i.e., to the empirical selfhood, fidelity as the matter of the existential inward concentration may be distinguished from generalities and timeless validities, since it essentially pertains to what has lived in existential concreteness. Such concreteness is representable, at least, by two phases common to every thinking man: love for parents and actualizations lived during childhood and youth. Parents, considered both in empirical as well as existential relationship, remain as origins resisting oblivion at any decisive moment in the self. One may think that the self in this relationship is to be transformed into ordinary "filial piety", which no longer maintains the structure identical with that of the call to the unconditioned love that decides this relationship. This thinking cannot understand in depth the constant sustenance of the fidelity to "my" parents in each existential present. Enhanced to the original structure, fidelity to my parents is lived as "an element of my self-awareness", to the extent that "I cannot love myself without loving my parents". ³⁵

Childhood and youth are filled with flashes of radical questionings, ground-touching awarenesses and consuming desire for radical levels of love. In this sense, they, in each of one's existential present, stand as unfolding steps in my growth in actualization; ³⁶

they are of actuality; the authentic fidelity claims to take hold of such experiences to take them seriously. To disregard them as juvenile illusions is possible only for "the helplessness of an empty Existenz." Since empty Existenz may hinge on what is supposed to be fidelity to generalities, the question arises at this point whether there is fidelity to generalities at all.

Loyalty to institutionalized duties is often claimed as the pattern for self's highest fidelity. They are founded upon belief in rationally calculated effects. No doubt, such duties have place in the context of Dasein (the phenomenon of Existenz) as generalities have place in the objectification considered in various contexts. In this sense, such effects can be regarded as a kind of fidelity's phenomenon, but not fidelity itself. The existentially confirmable fidelity cannot be fixed and made an institutionalized duty, for the substance of the dynamism endures as its "creativity" but never as a fixed "form". Jaspers, on this ground, sees in such a "mechanical bond" a degradation of fidelity, saying, "Only in moments when it {fidelity} flags, when it seems all but lost, can it in passing assume the form of duty."³⁸ That is to say, it must be stressed that fidelity as "historic" and therefore as "in process" goes on and remains the life of all the changes that occur in the Dasein of an Existenz. For, "I keep," Jaspers says, "fidelity not to anything dead and extant but rather to Being, which through phenomenon becomes something utterly unoverseeable."³⁹ This means that fidelity cannot be founded upon a consciousness of generality, but only upon "the decision of a sense of the Absolute"; this phase of fidelity needs to be discussed next in terms of Existenz.

In terms of the World, fidelity was contrasted as "simple fidelity of origin" with the adherence to objective validities and to expediencies. Then, it was an actualization of what is existentially "concrete", when contrasted, in terms of Dasein, with institutionalized duties as general forms. Finally, in terms of Existenz, Jaspers deals with fidelity as identical with "Angst" contrasted with Dasein's rest upon arbitrary, self-constituted justice.

If seen from the tension of Existenz, fidelity may be sought in the inclination of mere Dasein: thus, fidelity seems to exist as something apart from the question of Being. The self (Ich) in loss of its Existenz seeks to set aside men or a reality as if these no longer provoked it with the question of Being. Such an adherence never takes root in Existenz, and therefore its peace is "false" and accordingly fidelity remains inauthentic, for the self in such a state never tackles the task to be.

However, as long as the existential will is present, Dasein can, in no case, ever forsake "doubt" which virtually leads to the question of Being. The authentic fidelity, however, does not rest upon empirical, false faith but upon the existential faith in the Transcendence.⁴⁰ Fidelity may begin to "become" by risking a conflict and a break with an infidelity, but if such a break remains satisfied with itself it is no longer the fidelity in its authentic sense; in order to be fidelity itself, it must remain one break that is retrieved in another break, i.e., in another actualization in the sphere of Existenz.

Furthermore, when fidelity is confined in mere Dasein as it has been described in the above, it results that the self turns out

to be incapable of carrying out his present responsibility both to himself as well as to any other self. That is to say, since the self in such a case is not involved in the responsibility structure of existential actualization, he, deprived of the potency of becoming, deals with communication as well as the crisis of Being under the categories of past, chance, humanity in general, or of oblivion.

Finally, moving into the Existenz structure, the historic character of fidelity becomes clear when Jaspers links two stages of fidelity together: the central and peripheral fidelities. In a particular existential present, fidelity becomes central because it goes as if identical with the self in such a way that without fidelity there is no self. It is central because an experience of it "brings me in whole to the Being". There are around this centre fidelities which do not directly concern the task to be; they are "peripheral" in this sense.

When this sequence of such present experiences is taken into the process of life, fidelity is found to be divided into two; it sometimes converges in the actuality of the single self and sometimes is made "essential". Fidelities transformed into essential or theoretical forms, as it were, are fixed or preserved in piety. They may be grasped in a hierarchy. Thus, we have been led to see fidelity in the contrast between that lived in the concrete present and that preserved in such a hierarchy. The former is called "the absolute fidelity" while the latter, "the relative fidelity".

In retrospection, historicity has been discussed as an inward actuality of the self-being, and this inward actuality is the way the self becomes historic, which way itself grows as such according to the

process of time that the self lives. Thus, Jaspers' fidelity must be best delineated in the end by the unity of two poles, the ascending and descending.

In the ascent, it is the growth of the existential present, concentrating the self's past in the ever new present. This concentration consists in the intersection of two patterns: the central fidelity in each present, and the absolute fidelity in linking the past to the new present appearing in the process of time. The direction of such absolute consciousness reminds us of the structure of Existenz in communication set in response to the Transcendence. So, in the descent, it in such a unifying concentration is the way in which the Transcendence — in which the self is the identity of the unity of Existenz and Dasein — becomes phenomenon on the Dasein plane. We have thus far discussed the actualization of the historicity by focusing on the region of self-retrieval; since in fact the compass of a Dasein exists in expansion and contraction, the actualization must be further clarified in terms of this expansion which culminates usually in an Idea of history as the whole of the world.

7.3.b Expanding the World as Existenz' Phenomenon

To become historic, the self cannot but venture inrush into the Dasein region; thus, the Dasein region opens up, hinging upon making his own the "situation", "tasks" and traditions. Practically, this is the way the existentially formed world expands with historic consciousness. In reality, however, this practical expansion of the world-understanding proceeds in intersection with the "theoretical" expansion, which grows from a knowledge of empirical history to a philosophy of history.⁴¹ As considered before, a philosophy of

history, occurring within the dynamism as a whole cannot be projected to be fixed, but remains open again in intersection with the order of the overall becoming of the self in the present. On the whole, it turns out that, in becoming a philosophy of history, the historic consciousness grows to be an interpretation of the future as possibility for the Existenz to become; that is, it is an act of widening the Existenz's possibility, which, to be sure, is presented only in the field of Communication.

To begin with, in the sphere of historicity, empirical historical knowledge rooted in the consciousness of history is to be retrieved in historic consciousness and thus it is transformed into present self-awareness. Philosophy of history, Jaspers holds, is an expression of such textured historic consciousness, instead of claiming to be either an encyclopedia of historical knowledge or a complete knowledge of the ideal of total history. While historic knowledge can be pursued as a possibility of detached observation, such a philosophy of history employs objective historic knowledge in order to "illuminate" our sense of the historic substance, which is made the self's own. It relates all time to the live, free existential present, and therefore it emerges as historic without becoming an attempt to foreshow the whole history (Geschichte) that is in the whole Existenz.

Due to this concentration in the present of the Existenz, the truth of the philosophy of history must not be identified with timeless truth; rather, it can only be current, and only currently true.⁴² Both the past and future are constituted in the form called "image". This, however, does not mean that the past and future are constituted as homogenic images. Despite the commonness of using images,

there is in content disparity between the two. The image applied to the past is for laying a tentative ground, which can never become complete, for what is past is never fixed but remains open to the ever anew becoming present. The image of the future then is for showing a possibility, which never becomes an inevitable necessity. The future image as a possibility is never intended to set forth the self as fixed, for in the face of the Transcendence the existential consciousness of the present keeps itself open as an "authentic question". The philosophy of history, being an objective shape is certainly combined with objective knowledge, but in reality the objectivity, moving in the dynamic depths of absolute historicity, remains instable and serves for a kind of speculation called "myth". In becoming a myth in Jaspers' sense, the philosophy of history becomes a praxis of hearing the language of the Transcendence by the communication of the historicity.

7.4 Jaspers' Thinking as Communication of Historicity

Jaspers' philosophizing is distinguished as a "transcending", whose intrinsic realization becomes the third volume of his Philosophy and is reconfirmed by the fact that his last lecture at Basel is entitled "Chiffren der Transzendenz". The dynamic character of this transcending seems to be most comprehensively shown by his intention to lift the Transcendent relationship above all possible objectivities, his own philosophy included.

"In transcending I have no objective knowledge of Being, as in world orientation, nor do I come to be aware of it as of myself in the illumination of Existenz. I know about it, rather, in an inner action which lets me stay with this intrinsic Being even as I fail. Without finding it as an objective support, Existenz can look to this Being for the strength to uplift itself in [Dasein], to rise to itself and to the Transcendence in One." 43

As for the actual process of transcending, Jaspers starts out by identifying past metaphysical thinkings as "symbolic thinking". Then he focuses this sphere on the language of the Transcendence which he experiences through synthesizing the symbolic thinking in his conception of "cipher"; which he carries out in an exhaustive manner to the point of making his philosophy a cipher language. Underneath this process lies the life of his consciousness of the absolute historicity of Existenz. That is, in guiding his thinking with his "present" sense of Being, Jaspers begins by assuring the realm where the Transcendence is conceivable only as manifesting in time, or more precisely as "actuality in historic shapes", and therefore his approach converges from the beginning in "the historicity of metaphysics". The centre of such convergence is the historicity of the present Existenz, which actualizes its phenomenality in transforming past actualities.

"In the Transcendence as an actuality in historic form, the sense of Being is always self-sufficient, not to be repeated and not to be copied. If the phenomenon of Existenz is historic rather than general, and if it is only becoming, not yet Being - not like the passive becoming of (Dasein), however, but by freely actualizing itself in the extant medium - the Transcendence that appears to it must also become historic. It is assurance, not knowledge, that is derived from the historic phenomenon. That the Transcendence will change its phenomenon along with Existenz is no argument against its truth and actuality; indeed its phenomenon must necessarily have the aspect of change if it is a language heard by Existenz in temporal existence."⁴⁴

Jaspers comprehends this relation between historicity and historicity as a unique "community" which is established by "the historic phenomenon of the Transcendence in the objectively made symbol." Here transcending is performed both in communication of historicity as well as in expansion of the present historicity. Although struggles among historicities colliding with one another

are inevitable because they share the same situations, this communication of historicity is carried out not for struggle or for victory but for the "foundering" - the foundering, in which state Jaspers however never loses hope, for: this historicity of the transcending consciousness is known and adopted by men as their past. We shall next describe the becoming of this foundering, which Jaspers eventually calls for as the cipher that marks the zenith of the transcending.

First, Jaspers' conception of symbolic thinking must be delineated in structure. In order that the characteristic dynamism of this conception may be stressed, we have to in the first place compress it into two questions: what the symbol signifies, and which sphere of Being can interpret it properly. The first question is concerned with the formal aspect while the second with the actual life or substance of the conception, though of course the two are in alternation.

To view it from objectification in general, symbolic thinking is encompassing in that it is clear about the call for the "impermanence" of objectivity - the impermanence which looms beyond objectification. Seen as a matter of Being, such objectivity becomes a phenomenon of the Transcendence and accordingly belongs to the sphere of the Being of freedom. In other words, it belongs to Existenz, to which the same objectivity signifies the Transcendent "as language" hearable only at the point of the "evanescence of consciousness", which accompanies empirical objectivity. In other words, objectivity is "not the object itself", when considered in the context of symbolic thinking. To focus on its intellectual clarity, such objectivity gains clarity

ultimately by reaching the awareness of its "logical collapse", that is, at the risk of becoming a circle, tautology or self-contradiction. Finally, if considered in terms of actuality, objects here are not juxtaposable with any empirical actuality but are "absolute actuality" grasped by a free Existenz in its finite, empirical actuality.

Due to this existential structure, the symbol means an objectivity in which an image is set up not to represent a thing itself but to remain an image for something not accessible in any other ways ; it is "the objectification of something nonobjective in itself", in the sense that:

"To understand a symbol does therefore not mean to know its meaning rationally, to be able to translate the symbol; what it means is that an Existenz experiences in the symbolic intention this incomparable reference to something transcendent, and that it has this experience at the boundary where the object disappears."⁴⁷

Now, at this point the second question, that is, what sphere of Being is entitled to read the symbol in its authenticity, seems to have been brought into our focus. Considered in its entirety, the symbol exists for possible Existenz which encompasses consciousness at large. Possible Existenz alive in the present remains in communication in order to be faithful to the task of being. And, in such a full dynamism of possible Existenz, the language of the Transcendence cannot be fixed to a "doctrine" of the Transcendence, but must be existentially "interpreted" as a cipher, for the Transcendence unfolds itself only in the sphere of possible Existenz which is conscious of the reason why this language is not the Transcendence itself. Therefore, this language is "not a language to be understood or even heard in consciousness at large". This means that Jaspers is concerned with

the communicative function of this language, and he turns to analyze it into three stages, which culminates in existential philosophizing in the present.

The first language of the Transcendence manifests as "the direct language of the Transcendence" in the absolute consciousness of Existenz. It is as such concentrated in the individual's singular historic moment. The second language emerges when the first language takes the course of conveyance by a certain generalization which is illustrated by the image mentioned above. It thus becomes "common" so as to be "replenished" in its existential fulness by relating back to the source by virtue of the tradition of this second language. The third language is the stage where metaphysical speculation carries out its penetration into the same source by "philosophical conveyance", by means of "thinking" without degrading the whole of the language to a mere cognition. This philosophical conveyance is itself a becoming of another cipher of the same depth.

"When a thinker interprets the cipher language for himself, he obviously cannot know the Transcendence as the Other. Nor can he, in [Dasein], expand world orientation as the knowledge of [Dasein]. However, obeying his own formal law, he thinks necessarily in objectivities. He reads the original cipher script by writing a new one: he conceives the Transcendence in analogy to his palpably and logically present mundane existence. His thought itself is a mere symbol, a language that has now become communicable. It can be spoken in many different ways."⁴⁸

Jaspers' conception of "cipher", which is the culmination of the last volume of his Philosophie, is formulated as his philosophic communication, and his will to uphold the turn to the voice of the Transcendence becomes identical with the zenith of his thinking. This means that the above considered three stages of the cipher-reading must be taken as a form for a concrete cipher-becoming of Jaspers' own philosophizing. This cipher-becoming

first constitutes a hierarchy of ciphers by viewing his own philosophy as a cipher performance, i.e., by retrieving or rather by "cancelling" the three stages of his own philosophy, "World Orientation", "Existenz-illumination", and "Metaphysics".⁴⁹ And the thorough-going manner of this cancellation continues to the point of ascertaining the total foundering in which both Dasein and Existenz are found to vanish as ciphers of the Transcendence.

This all-embracing cipher-concentration soars this way in order to purify the faith that the Transcendence is for nothing but Existenz. The purification expands to the point of drawing a sharp line between two directions of speaking of the Transcendence. The first direction is to start out from an "imaginary point of a transcendence known as Being, as if there could be a cognition of Being " and this direction, guided by the idea of "ontological knowledge",⁵⁰ leads to the way in which the knowledge of "empirical beings" is derived and thus identified as "history", though history in this case is understood in two ways: history as the phenomenon of Being, and history as leading to the end of empirical beings. The other direction is to face the Transcendence through deepening the sphere of communicative Existenz; which endures as all empirical beings become ciphers to Existenz. Jaspers writes:

"But that [Dasein] is a cipher is a matter of course to an Existenz for which there is the Transcendence. All things must be able to be ciphers; if there were no cipher, there would not be the Transcendence either..... from our [Dasein] we can rise to the cipher, but we cannot descend to the cipher from the Being of the Transcendence. The fact that there are ciphers at all is to us identical with the fact that there is the Transcendence at all, as long as we exist as [Dasein], we do not grasp the Transcendence otherwise than in [Dasein]. For us, the question

why there is (Dasein) is replaced by the question why there are ciphers, and the answer is that for an existential consciousness the cipher is the only form in which the Transcendence appears to such a consciousness. It is the sign that from the sight of Existenz the Transcendence is indeed hidden, but has not vanished..... The cipher is the (Dasein) I must recognize as that in which I find myself and can in truth become only what I am."⁵¹

The second direction is further intensified in the name of cipher-reading in existential philosophy, which fulfils the becoming of the cipher by retaining all ciphers in the cipher of the "authentic foundering", wherein "the will to eternalization," or the will to soar to touch on the Transcendence in experienceing, by virtue of freedom, the foundering of the most lucid and forthright self-being. This means the foundering of the Existenz in the awareness of "the impossibility of being absolutely on my own" -- the awareness flashing in alternation with the readiness to hold on the Other, the Transcendence.

"My freedom makes me guilty in any case; I cannot become entire. Truth proper, which I comprehend because I am and live it, cannot possibly be knowable as generally valid; general validities are timeless and could not endure in ever-changing (Dasein), but intrinsic truth is the very one to go down. Self-being proper cannot maintain itself alone. It may default, and it cannot compel its coming. The more decided its success, the clearer the limit that will make it fail. Failure in search for self-sufficiency prepares for its otherness, for the Transcendence."⁵²

This foundering may sound as if everything were to be abandoned in order to plunge into the abyss of the Transcendence, as if Jaspers pointed to a mere foundering to make this the goal of all. However, Jaspers in fact regards it as "perversion" to lead a thinking in such a direction. Nor does he mean minimizing Dasein; instead, he sees the turn to the eternalization of possible Existenz. That is to say, the heightened sense of Being at this point stands as such only

because the realm of its phenomenon is taken seriously. In other words, it flashes as the Existenz is equally sure of the entering of eternity into the phenomenon of time. In becoming cipher, the sense of Being no doubt struggles with such things as "objectivity" and "duration", in order not to confuse the sense of Being. But at this point, remembering their contributions to the whole soaring, the very Existenz (as a possible Existenz) acquires its true energy and accepts these things as "phenomena" so as to fulfil its actualization through Dasein. It is in such Dasein that the possible Existenz can turn to claim this world as the space for experiencing what is authentic and therefore for conditioning itself with communication.

"One must have potentially left the world and come back to it, to have it positively as world -- in its splendor and in its dubiety and in its character as the sole place for the phenomenon of Existenz, the place where it can understand itself and other Existenz."⁵³

To conclude:

In moving in Jaspers' philosophizing stage, we have discussed his conception of Existenz's historicity. We have done this by interpreting it as distinguished for its systemizing Existenz' present in the unity of eternity and temporality. However, our prime intention has been to present this as his inward movement which finds its overall intrinsic expression in the Philosophy. From such a viewpoint we have extended our discussion to the cipher-becoming of his own philosophizing in order to show his historicity as in correlation with his thinking as a whole.

The cipher-becoming appears to us as substantiating the time structure of his historicity. It can be taken as Jaspers' own praxis of fidelity, an actualization of the very historicity. That is

to say, the fidelity, in becoming a philosophy that identifies itself as a cipher, proves to lead his thinking to the space where the voice of the Transcendence may be heard, both in communication and in encompassing the very praxis as a foundering. This foundering then is not comparable to any empirically understood failure; it is the sole height in which Existenz's temporal life is to gain the most purified strength of Being that eternalizes its phenomenon in time.

This philosophy as well as its time conception, in calling for tension-minded rest upon such eternalization, has clarified itself as communication for salvation without revelation. Perhaps, it is not overstating the case to say that all thinking patterns ascribable to Western civilization -- to say the least -- have been called on for such communication. Dialogue with this communication may depend on the hearer. One possibility of such dialogue seems to be to take this communication as a significant challenge to the faith in revelation, which we shall discuss next.

JASPERS' HISTORICITY AND THE BIBLICAL ESCHATOLOGY

To restrict it as a matter of rationality, Jaspers' historicity is not properly treated unless it is brought in a communicative attunement that is opened up by his thinking. In its complex dynamism, it comes to us as Communication for the "language of the Transcendent"; the language, with which his will to salvation stands or falls. Declaring himself a "liberal" Christian, Jaspers practices communication for the Transcendence with Christianity in numerous forms; the most comprehensive one is Der Philosophische Glaube angesichts der Offenbarung. If one agrees that Christianity is centred on the event of Jesus Christ, it also may be said that Jaspers by his philosophy of history, The Origin and Goal of History, challenges the very heart of Christianity on another comprehensive scale, for in this book history is conceived as having no such centre as the revelation in Jesus Christ but "axial periods" in which Christ is regarded as one Existenz among many original ones.¹ At this point Jaspers' historicity appeals for the clarity of eschatology.

Two directions may be conceivable with regard to relating the two ultimate "languages" of history. One is to pursue the possibility that Christianity may be seen anew by going through historicity from within; from within, unless we are not yet ready to replace the thorough-going subject-object cleavage of all thinking. The eschatology seems to be the appropriate question for this pursuit because it is the primitive thought on the part of Christianity, with regard to any time consciousness. The other direction can be drawn from the eschatology tradition from within, in the limited sense here that all theological interpretations of the biblical eschatology are bound up with use of rationality and

that such rationality combinations may be clarified when put in Jaspers' "historic fluidification". Finally, beyond these directions there seems to be room for hearing the Biblical eschatology as revealing an entirely new creative origin of thinking and therefore an entirely new direction of understanding time. We shall begin by considering Jaspers' interpretation of eschatology.

8.1 From Historicity toward Eschatology

8.1.a Philosophy as Immanent Actualization

In his unity of eternity and temporality, Jaspers concentrated on historicity to keep the transcending phenomenality in immanent structure. This immanence maintains its dynamic breadth in Jaspers' unending reflection, and may be regarded as distinguishing philosophy especially from religion. From this point of view, we shall discuss Jaspers' interpretation of eschatology both general and biblical, as characterizable by this structure in the first place. In his "World Orientation" (Philosophy, Vol. I), Jaspers articulates the question of the relation between philosophy and religion. And the discussion there, as it is sustained by his stress on the becoming of Existenz taken up in the sphere of faith, is coupled with his appreciation of the necessity of communicative struggle between two faiths: philosophical faith and faith in revelation.

Jaspers writes:

"In faith I collide as truth, as the truth I am as myself, with the faith in other truth. It takes this collision for my faith to come into Being, and for me to come to myself Only the man who becomes aware of the faith that is inherent in his Existenz, who can distinguish it from cogent and objective knowledge (which he seeks and has, but is not) as well as from the other faith -- only such a man is originally unconditional and true peril. He alone comes to respect

Existenz in the other, distinguishing it from mere [Dasein] and from himself. It takes faith to understand faith. And to understand it does not here mean to take my own, or to understand just the contents; it means that at the bounds of intelligibility the unintelligible is experienced as akin to myself but alien to me in the originality of the other faith."²

(1) Philosophy in relation to religion:

Now, turning to religion, Jaspers, in describing the constructive meaning of inevitable conflicts between the two, characterizes this inevitability as based on the fact that "this conflict lies in faith as such, for religion and philosophy both are faith."³ In this sense, he basically sees religion by going up the sphere where religion is no longer to be understood by observing from without, for "what they are in themselves is not an object of possible knowledge and comprehension."⁴ The ground of religion is something that is "present only to the person who stands on it", in the same way as the philosophical ground is in a singular individual self. So, the matter brings one to the depths of philosophical Existenz as well as of religious Existenz; empirical contacts with religion do not provide the capacity for understanding the real meaning lying underneath the conflicting relations between the two.

"No such empirical findings or divergent points and validity can answer our questions about the origin of the philosophical religious split, or about the meaning of the struggle. To these questions there is no adequate objective answer. All that we can try to do from the philosophical side is to go as deeply and as far as possible to illuminate the inevitability of the struggle."⁵

As suggested by the depth of Jaspers' cipher, his major concern here is not to isolate philosophy from this relationship with religion, genuine only in honest struggle, but to purify the relationship by

concentrating on the question of whether religious objectivities as phenomena of the Transcendence are, as a matter of Existenz, ciphers or universally valid objective knowledge. Jaspers in the first place describes the originality of religion, concentrating on prayer and worship, revelation, church, and obedience.

Prayer and worship, Jaspers emphasizes, are original acts of communicating with the deity. Although their empirical realities are "relative" and can be "overcome", the transcendental actualities, when genuine, are "unique":

"What men enact as well as experience in them is a real, not just emotional, relation with the deity; they are performances and receptions of real world of transcendent relevance. They make man at home in another world in which the remote is near and the occult is present."⁶

Revelation is the original font of religious objectivity. It is not a relative phenomenon of the Transcendence but "the one, historically singular, exclusive revelation." A dogma is what originally crystallizes this for our knowledge, and theology thinks on it systematically.

These, that is, prayer, worship and revelation, come to constitute that community called church. In such a community, men can have substantial certainty without engaging in the Communication between singular individuals. This means that the church with its universal claim on all mankind constitutes for every believer in it the authoritative visibility and certainty of the one and the only true Transcendence; the authority of such church is supersensory for its believers.

Finally, obedience follows. The believer, without doubting, obeys in praxis orders of the church. Nothing but the deity revealing itself in its own objectivity can remain solemn here. All sovereignty,

all validity and all true objects must be ascribed to this one deity. In a word, religion exists only where prayer, worship, and revelation establish community and become the font of authority, theology, and of obedience; while philosophy, however, neither actualizes nor authentically understands this. It is in this sense that religion is "the other" if seen from the philosophy side. Philosophy, aware of the existential depths of faith, cannot penetrate religion in terms of coercive cognition but only "clarifies its external character" insofar as it appears to philosophy. From this point, philosophy returns to itself to find itself as in the face of the other Existenz dedicated to faith in the Transcendence and yet having a historicity structurally different from its own.

As long as the inexhaustible originality of religious Existenz is present in its full appeal, a philosophizing Existenz never becomes before it the only, exclusive possibility of philosophizing for future being, but "looks up to the religious subsistence as another possibility to the faith that is present to him."⁷ In looking up to religion, philosophy is aware of its lacking that originality, for it has its origin only in time while religion as such stands as beyond any comprehensible range of time; it is beset with questioning the receding actuality of religion.

Concerning the religious form of authority, Jaspers understands it in two directions. First, it cannot but be admitted as in the context of resting in the Transcendence in believing the objective guarantee. Second, it can be understood in reference to the intellectual "uncompromisingness" which grows as world orientation as well as self-consciousness becomes clearer, in which an interpretation of authority

takes place according to the freedom and therefore to the historicity. To hold such freedom, however, does not mean shaking off authority in an a-historical manner, but leaving it with utmost respect. That is, the philosophizing man "can accept it in reminiscent philosophy, affirming what he has left as his inalienable way, and as truth of others."⁸ In negating religion, a philosopher in this sense can be called "negatively religious", but since he in fact negates because he authentically wants an affirmation, he is a "religious man" in this affirming, holds Jaspers.

Philosophizing consists in viewing objectivity in dual structure; that is to say, objectivity as empirical knowledge is universally valid objectivity, and objectivity appearing in the historicity of possible Existenz is what is fluidified in communication. When revelation is considered by the standard of this dynamic structure, it on the one is "fixed" as "God's word", while in philosophy one hears it as a possible language of the Transcendence by interpretatively "adopting" it.

Finally, concerning the obedience, Jaspers likewise cannot but doubt the one finite historic fact believed to be a condition for all men's salvation, but understands at the same time that it is valid to him as an "unceasing demand".⁹ When the Sermon On the Mount, for instance, is claimed by the religious to be practiced to the point of martyrdom, philosophy notices that this is in conflict with man's empirical existence and turns to pay respect to the other's action while hearing the Sermon as a demand. Such a martyrdom occurs in the eschaton (end) of the world, which philosophy, bound essentially to the historicity, cannot directly share.

As a way of transcending actualization, philosophy is always

immanent actualization. Prayer and worship are in this context not meaningful immanently. The unconditionality of Existenz endures as meaning in actual Dasein in the world. So, philosophy keeps soaring in order not to encase the Transcendence in any "specific, distinct objectivity". To mention love, there is no love for God apart from loving individual human beings. So, philosophy fulfils itself as an authentic making of this world; it cannot plunge into the other world for fulfilling itself. The deity does not speak any direct word in view of the faith in the philosophically touched-on Transcendence. Rather, man is thrust, so to speak, back to his immanent freedom in the face of the Transcendence.

"The more painfully we have felt what philosophy lacks in comparison with religion, the brighter the realm of freedom looks. The Godhead says nothing directly, but through this change of freedom it appears to speak, to demand that its - for us - unfathomable will be done, that man use the independence it gave him, that he make his own decisions on his own responsibility and derive his human dignity from so doing."¹⁰

In such immanence, philosophy maintains its genuine, existential relation with religion, which is the meaning of its conflicting with religion, "loving struggle" for the Transcendence. Jaspers thinks of this relation as three-fold. When religious objectification is found inclined to materialization of the Transcendence, which will lead man to decline, philosophy struggles with this particular untruth "to make room for the individual's freedom to choose at his own peril, and to keep the deity from being dragged into dust."¹¹ Next, philosophy has to keep its sincere will, as well as full scale search, for finding in religion the core which is respected as possible truth. Finally, it is required of philosophy to do its utmost to clarify conflicts between religion

and philosophy; in order that both philosophical Existenz and religious Existenz can be deepened by recognizing authentic difficulties of their tasks. This clarification is therefore to appeal for authentic originalities of the two, without invading the other's originality.

Thus, this conflicting relation must not be confused with making both fixed to spheres which are investigated by specific sciences, such as history of religion, history of philosophy, or anthropology. The diverse spheres, when seen from the historicity of Existenz, are either religious or philosophical, and this means that such spheres exist only as being animated by either or by both. The phenomenal world is rooted in the dynamism of the actualization of faith; the objectivities of both are in the unity of Being and phenomenon, and both are nothing but themselves in the sense that the realm of faith appears to be divided into the two originalities. Hence:

"Religion and philosophy deteriorate when they regard themselves as specific mental spheres with a solidified objectivity. For if their self-differentiation is truthful, neither one can turn into a sphere: since neither comprehends the other as a knowable existence, since each originally encompasses everything, they split within themselves. Fission of all origins into philosophical and religious faith and again into a diversity of faiths on both sides -- this is our situation in existence. If the deity remains invisible, the ultimate is still not man at large, knowable in a universal anthropology; the ultimate is the concord and discord of the actualized origins of faith."¹²

In a word, for Jaspers religion and philosophy are to be mutually identified in the depths of Existenz's historicity, stretching in the full unity of Being and phenomenality. Revelation is looked up to only in such mutual identification, and any revelation claimed by objectifying an original -- existential -- revelation that is lived by a singular individual, is accordingly considered to be secondary, so

far as the original revelation is to be adopted by philosophizing. It is in this sense that Jaspers uplifts his idea of Biblical religion over against Christianity as a catholic church.¹³ The religion of the man Jesus is another existential event in line with Biblical religion as a whole, and the religion mediated by later understanding or by theology is a transformation of the original. The latter is secondary insofar as the originality lived by Jesus is to be adopted as a matter of historicity. In agreement with the Form Criticism¹⁴ founded by Martin Dibelius, Jaspers in such a framework draws a sharp line between Jesus as a historic man and Jesus as the Christ which dogmas he ascribes to the emergence to the kerygma (the proclamation of the Gospel).

"The understanding of original revelation is what we call theology. Its premise is the actuality of the revelation. Where do we find that? One may think it lies in the actuality of Jesus, discoverable in the synoptic Gospels by means of historical criticism. But the actual Jesus was human, the historic one, the last of the Hebrew prophets, a preacher, a spokesman of God's will, a predictor of doom and judgement, a caller for penance. He was neither a self-appointed Messiah nor a self-made sacrament -- by instituting the Last Supper -- nor the founder of a church. Revelation is also believed to lie in the kerygma, the first preaching of the apostles, beginning with the conception of Jesus as the Christ, of his messianic significance based on the belief in his resurrection. There we distinguish revelation from its understanding We are certain that the thought of revelation rests upon the revelation itself. The revelation itself is the word, in the sense of the original logos. Without thinking what is revealed to him, the thinker could neither be aware of the content of his faith nor communicate it; the thought is not additional; he has received it together with the revelation."¹⁵

8.1.b Jaspers on Jesus Christ

This attunement to Biblical religion as encompassing Christianity (determined with Christ-centricity) looks in the surface similar to the conventional, contemplative and intellectualistic relativization of the kerygma stage. But in its actuality, Jaspers'

relativization of the kerygma stems from concern for faith without which, as he consistently emphasizes, the whole structure of the transcending is bound to collapse; he is opposed to the conception of the Christ as God-man because he on the whole thinks that otherwise he cannot but lose the historicity; which means again losing the Transcendence lying beyond all objectifiabilities and thus the ground for possible Existenz as well.

That is to say, Jaspers on the one hand wants to keep open space for the eternal Transcendence which lies beyond all communication between Existenz and Existenz, and on the other, space for possible Existenz as the meaning of time, without which man cannot live in nobility. In this context, he thinks that to fix God religiously or to determine God by identifying Jesus as Son of God defies on the one hand the depth of faith as lying beyond any mental spheres, and that this determination leads virtually to comprehend man within the idea of the second Adam, the herald of new man, and brings the existential unconditionality (rooted in the Transcendence) down to the level of general validity. Thus in the sphere of the second Adam the relation between possible Existenz and possible Existenz has to be extinguished. That is, if, Jaspers thinks, Jesus were to be the only Existenz, all others would turn out to be no longer possible Existenz. Jesus' revelation is of course "transcendent" in itself, but it is so only in its whole singularity and therefore in its calling on other men as wholes in the sense of the same singularity. So, in the long run the faith in the Christ is found standing in the face of a philosophical "appeal", which he typically illustrates by the following passage:

"The thinking of religious fixation has come into an unacceptable alternative when it lets Jesus demand that we

leave father and mother, wife and child—that we cut all bonds of nation and occupation and follow him, because he is the truth and the life.

If there is such a choice to be made between Jesus and the deepest human relations, it must be because Jesus is no longer human after all, because he is human and divine at once - not singular as Existenz in the sense of the singularity of each possible Existenz, but as the only true Existenz, that of God's Son, compared with which a human being as such cannot even be possible Existenz."¹⁶

Jaspers links this dogma-overcoming return to Jesus' Existenz to the recurrence of Protestantism in the sense of movement for the originality of faith. He finds himself having been born into the tradition of this faith, and in his won historicity he has no choice but to fight the church-oriented fixed objectivity so as to inwardly share the actual dynamism of the faith in which Jesus' faith is one manifestation of Biblical religion. The faith of the church in the dogmatic fixation of this manifestation indeed appears to him (through his historicity) alien to his own, but there is, he holds, no substantial historicization on his part without starting with this very fixation. Thus, Jaspers' fight against the church is structurally heterogeneous with those based on a-historic relativization, and also with those emerging within the church by transforming faith into ideals (objectivity), whatever reflection on man may be presupposed in such inclination.

"I know that religious objectivity as an actuality of [Dasein] is the only tradition that safeguards the transcendent relationship of man. Wherever this tradition was abandoned, philosophy would no longer endure. Since the religious ground on which I stand even when I philosophize comes from having been born into it, from having awakened to consciousness filled with its self-evident substance, I cannot rationally deny that substance without losing my own footing. I do not aim at nothingness when I philosophize, although I may perhaps dare - in the terminology of olden times - to be heretic in the church or, differently put, a Protestant in essence."¹⁷

At any rate, to return to Jaspers' Jesus, Jaspers "adopts" Jesus as one of four "prototypes" of philosophy and focuses on the transcendent dynamism of Jesus' message about the kingdom of God. The message is spoken to each individual man in such a way that the kingdom of God in itself is understood only by faith sharable in "indirect" communication; his references to it in objectivity are no more than "signs" which are intended to elevate unfaith toward faith. All his message is directed to the inward wake of each individual Existenz as faced with the kingdom of God present in Jesus own faith; the presence and therefore the faith appear in intensity when they are radically contrasted with the impending catastrophe.

"His purpose is not to improve the world, not to reform men and their institutions, but to show all those who hear and see him that the kingdom of God is at hand.

Jesus predicts what will happen. But he is not merely purveying news to an idle crowd. His message is addressed to man, who in this situation is confronted by a decision. The message is: 'The time is fulfilled, and the kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe the gospel.' 'Repent, do penance,' therein lies the answer to the question: What shall we do, what can have meaning, if the world is about to end? The kingdom does not mean beatitude for all. Each individual is faced with the question of what will become of him in the catastrophe." 18

Concerning the faith in God, Jaspers notes its historical uniqueness as "one of the great creations of Jewish Biblical religion". In the awareness of the imagelessness and formlessness of God, Jesus believes God as active person, the absolutely Other, the absolute Transcendence, the Creator, the Will, the Judge, and the Father. But all these forms were accepted only as he (Jesus) "subordinated to the present will of God." Jaspers sees infinite openness stretching behind this faith.

"At every moment he is close to God, and nothing has meaning for him but God and God's will. The idea of God is subject to condition, but the norms it imposes subject everything else to their condition. It gives knowledge of the simple ground of all things.

The essence of this faith is freedom. For in this faith that speaks of God, the soul expands in the Encompassing. As it experiences gladness and woe in this world, it awakens to itself. Nothing that merely finite, that is only world, can hold it captive. From devotion, from the trust that transcends understanding, it derives an infinite strength: for in the sorrow of the vulnerable heart, in rending emotion, it can gain awareness that it is given to itself by God. By believing, man can be truly free." 19

It is in such a dynamic structure that the cosmic descriptions of doom can be understood in its living context, holds Jaspers. Jesus, Jaspers goes on to say, expresses his faith in God in this expectation, and the listeners are here reminded of man's boundary situation in which decision on faith and therefore on freedom have to be chosen over against resting in the empirical spheres of Being.

"The radical certainty of his faith in God derived an unprecedented intensity from his expectation of the impending catastrophe. From the standpoint of cosmic knowledge, this expectation was error. But even if the world did not end, the fundamental idea retains its meaning. Whether immediately or far in the future, the end casts light and shade, puts its question to each and every man, summons him to decision. His mistaken belief in the physical end of the world brought the truth to light by compelling him to live in the presence of the catastrophe. For though men close their eyes to the ultimate, they are faced with it none the less. The world is not the first and last; man is doomed to die, mankind itself will not endure forever. In this situation the alternative is: with God or against God; good or evil. Jesus reminds men of this boundary situation." 20

We have expanded our discussion on the immanent character of Jaspers' thinking, toward his Jesus, in order that its self-identification in the face of religion may be understood in the depths of its struggle for faith to the point of challenging the unity of Biblical revelation and the eschatology. We shall next discuss specifically his interpretation of eschatology.

8.1.c Jaspers' Adoption of Eschatology

(1) Eschatology to philosophic transcending:

Objectively speaking, eschatology may be identified as linked to claiming total knowledge of the world and of history as the whole of world process. And when such a knowledge is looked at as impossible, eschatology is dealt with as a "myth"; interpretations of the myth as such vary. If we attune to Jaspers' encompassing historicity, the question may be reduced to: whether it is read in terms of the symbolic thinking or of coercive cognition. Jaspers in his Metaphysics discusses it in the context of the transcending through cipher thinking; to be more specific, it is read as a symbol of Existenz's relation to the Transcendence; this relation finds itself in the middle of two extreme opposites about the Transcendence: ascension (Aufstieg) and descension (Abfall).

Neither of these two states can actually take place, however, without a possible Existenz philosophizing; for a merely ascending means mere Existenz without Dasein, while a merely descending means mere Dasein without Existenz. In its sense of the Absolute, possible Existenz ascends toward the Transcendence, while in its unconditional action it descends at the same time toward the realm of Dasein. So, the ascension when considered in actuality may be said to be bound to the descension possible or actual; and vice versa. It is in such a middle tension that Jaspers adopts ancient myths as concerned with man's fall and rise in relation to the Transcendence. Let us next make clearer this tensive zone, in which the myths are given their symbolic meaning by Jaspers.

The overall situation in which possible Existenz experiences the extreme poles is vividly described by Jaspers as follows:

"In absolute consciousness I am sure of Being, but not of a calmly perfect Being that might last in time. Rather, I always find myself in the possibility of coming to myself or losing myself -- either scattered in diversity or concentrated in the essence, either distracted in fears and sorrows and self-oblivious in pleasure, or else in the presence of myself. I know the desolate Nonbeing of my authentic self, and I know the ascent from this Dasein of Nonbeing."²¹

To focus on the fall in this context, it on the whole is characterized as "existential decline" (existentielle Abgleitung); Jaspers uplifts the zone of the existential peril of tension as lying between opposites, which may be formulated according to the phases of the origin of possible Existenz.

First, when the origin alive in absolute consciousness is termed "active movement in self-becoming", the descension may go into the fixed or merely objective, whether in timeless permanence or in regularized, passive movement. That is to say, instead of fulfilled content, empty form, formalization or mechanization is pursued; instead of Existenz' historic continuity, it leads to what is rootlessly arbitrary and purposively fabricated. Thus, in descension objectives are mistaken for "Being" or for Existenz' functions as truth.

Second, when the origin is termed "decisiveness holding the hierarchy of the content", the descension in decline is the perversion in which the unconditional takes the place of the conditioned and the conditioned takes that of the unconditional.

Third, when the origin means the genuineness that is maintained in the identity of essence and phenomenon and also in the praxis of fidelity, the descension goes into ingenueness such as mere subjectivity

-- like lived experiences or gesture -- or mere objectivity isolated from the living origin.

Fourth, when the origin is termed "infinite" present to be fulfilled at each time, the descension leads to endlessness (Endlosigkeit), that is, to the meaningless repetition of pursuing objectivity without retrieving the productivity in fidelity.

Now, possible Existenz finds itself exposed to these possibilities or actualities in the process of its becoming, and this perilous situation is always bound up with the question of "entirety": the entirety of the self first and the entirety of the world next. When the rise and fall are understood in terms of the entirety of the self, the self finds itself in the Idea of "immortality" at the zenith of the rise to the Transcendence, and likewise in the Idea of death at the bottom of the fall. The myths of immortality and death have their place in the self-consciousness of possible Existenz.²²

Concerning the entirety of the world, approaches to such an entirety are classified into two: the entirety considered in terms of world orientation, and that conceived in the direction from Existenz toward Dasein. According to world orientation, images of the entirety of world process are to be characterized as ending up in the "endless beginning" and the "endless end", for no knowledge is capable of making the beginning and the end tangible. There are myths concerning the origin of the world; the present world is ascribed to creation, failure of creation, or to eternal recurrence of the eternal now. None of these can be claimed in terms of world orientation, which conditions itself by the rule of coercive cognition. Nevertheless, when these myths are read in terms of symbolic thinking, one cannot but see in them searches, in the

middle of the rise and fall, for meaning in each existential present,

When the entirety of such process is sought after as the entirety of history, philosophy of history - which is again a form of myth - takes the role of expanding the surrounding of Dasein. No philosophy of history, bound up with limited knowledge of empirical history, can claim to be the total knowledge of world process, as long as no present can be the end of such process. The truth is that by philosophizing about history one finds himself thrust back to his present; the rises and falls formulated by speculations are as much meaningful as the thinker concentrates in his own present, a present which is unique and never repeatable due to the decisive quality of historicity. What then can any eschatology or a doctrine of "the last things, of the perfection or definitive destruction of Dasein" be? It is in this context that Jaspers adopts eschatology.

First, in order that the transcending structure of eschatology may be seen as it is uplifted, non-mythical cases are to be considered. One may ask about the end of the future. A valid answer to this is that whatever had a beginning, or all things in time will perish. Thus, there lie before the end all possibilities: progress, ultimate goal or purposeless unending self-motion is conceived as the major ideal that unifies such possibilities. What characterizes this line of thinking is that the end is referred to as something that is experienced by future generations or as a certain reality occurring within the world. That is, here the end is spoken of in terms of observer's contemplation. Existenz does not deal with time in its full concentration.

Furthermore, turning to the modern states of man, one can think of the end of history by referring to the current tendency

that human beings have been transformed into "a merely repetitive state, similar to animal life, but regulated, in lieu of instinct by man's total functionalization in his omnivorous technical machinery." The end of mankind has become a real possibility as modern man is now capable of destroying all. This type of prediction, no matter how certain in terms of empirical reality, is not a whole man's thinking but mere contemplation, as long as it is pessimistic without calling man back to himself.

To turn to eschatology, Jaspers considers that it is in structure a way of searching for the end by transcending, in the sense that as a myth it combines "temporal reality with supersensory fantasies."²³ The point lies not in the impossibility of the sensory-temporal side of the idea, as all such myths have ended with disappointments. The end mentioned in such a myth cannot be brought in time as if it were for empirical knowledge, but must be grasped in terms of the transcending, in which the rise and fall is experienced momentarily by moving in the middle zone.

When we focus on the individual self thrust back to himself in searching for the end, we can see the coexistence of two split awarenesses: the awareness of the rise and the awareness of the fall. The central concern is "the intention to authentic Being". With the rise, the reference to the perfection at the end becomes one cipher indicating this authentic Being, while the reference to the perishment at the end becomes another cipher produced along the fall at the same time. The question arises here: why the end is described as coming in the future. The future in this case must not be taken as mere time without existential temporality, which is chosen as Dasein in the sense of phenomenon of Being. In this temporality, the perfection

touched on at the zenith of the soaring cannot remain stable but flashes only in the instant of the absolute consciousness; and as long as possible Existenz, the becoming in the perilous tension, sustains its phenomenality, the end confirmed in the momentary eternity is grasped in turn as future time, though in actuality the same end lies as the perfection in that eternity. Thus, eschatology at large is adopted by Jaspers not as knowledge but as a cipher awakening Existenz in transcending.²⁴

(2) Eschatology in the actuality of Jesus' faith - Jaspers' appeal for communication for faith:

Concerning the Christian eschatology specifically, Jaspers holds the same position and emphasizes that his contemporary adoption of it must respect the wholeness of Jesus' faith as the actuality of the eschatology. The whole images must be read as ciphers created by Jesus' faith. When this unity is dissolved in terms of objective knowledge, ranging from dogmatization to Bultmann's demythologization, the faith carrying the whole myths is bound to be lost.

"The cosmic process is conceived as one with the processes of salvation and human history. Christ is the turning-point of the world. The road goes from the Creation to Adam's Fall, to the deliverance by Christ, and on to the world's end on the Day of Judgement. Aligned with this image is the import of the sacrifice, of the resurrection, of the unworldly absolute ethos that ignores the world -- which will soon end anyway -- to anticipate eternal life by love alone, with all the consequences that are self-destructive in the world and irresponsible in the eyes of the world. One cannot pick out and separately stress one element such as the cosmic, the redemptive or the ethical, without destroying the whole of this faith."²⁵

The image of the end of time must be valued for its contemporary significance, as he goes on to say:

"The sense of facing the end awakens Existenz. The threat of an end in our time is based on reality and puts man into a boundary situation: he will find the answer in his Existenz, or else he will perish. But we can be evasive. We can conceal the end. Instead of being awakened, then, we fall prey to the course of things."²⁶

This much for Jaspers adoption of eschatology both at large and in particular. Our previous discussion has shown to us the fact that, soaring toward its highest or deepest sphere, Jaspers' philosophizing is one of the most dynamic as well as encompassing struggles for faith or for salvation. And perhaps no part of his thinking, culminating in his cipher thinking, continues apart from the transcending structure of his historicity. As to the question of faith, Jaspers is one of the rare thinkers who have in full seriousness regarded the Biblical faith as inseparable in its inmost depth from its eschatology. In this sense it is justifiable for us to say that without such an adoption of the eschatology his historicity might have been left unbalanced. This is so, provided that the eschatology is the ultimate word -- on the side of the religion that Jaspers calls "the other" faith -- with regard to man's concern for time, including this historicity, as Jaspers himself admits by remaining an appeal.

Further, if we move forward in this direction, it also may be said that the historic significance of Jaspers' thinking as a whole, as long as it is presented as communication for faith, has to be assessed in two directions. One is its encompassing relativization of all current modes of historical thinking; this is so as long as these modes have not yet been mediated by the existential dynamism as the origin of all rationalities. The other is that faith whose rationalities, dependent on philosophy, is now challenged by whether they are authentically mediated by the eschatology.

Jaspers' "appeal", the culmination of his communicative thinking, is for sending the listener back to himself, and in this sense also for the listener's reply. And this dialogical structure sustains his treatment of faith in revelation. As to the character of this "reply", it seems that an encompassing reply attuned to the historicity must be a rational language stemming from the Biblical faith which sustains its eschatology. This requires a thinking at least compatible with the comprehensive journeys of Jaspers' thinking. In any case, an attempt to review in brief current Christian thoughts on the Biblical eschatology may be a way of such a response.

8.2 The Actuality of the Biblical Eschatology

The Biblical eschatology may be discussed in various ways according to the fields in which it is placed. We are going to restrict our following discussion to its most universal aspect that is thinkable in response to Jaspers' historicity.

We think that such an aspect may be contrasted with Jaspers' interpretation of eschatology, as follows. In Jaspers, we have seen that he interprets the Biblical eschatology within the context of his transcending "adoption" and "appeal". And accordingly, the eschatology is left to those who preserve it as an inseparable part of their faith. In this sense, Jaspers' treatment of the eschatology is characterized as dealing with the eschatology in a possible "immanent" structure.

By making a sharp contrast with this position, we think that there is a region in which the eschatology has been dealt with in a possible "transcendent", or more accurately, "immanent-transcendent", structure. In order to see the issue in such a contrasting way, we shall

take up the following two thinkers as representative of dealing with the eschatology by actively immersing the rationality aspect in philosophical questioning of history. Rudolf Bultmann will be treated as doing this by appealing to a "hermeneutic method", and Paul Tillich, to an "ontology".

8.2.a Bultmann

As a New Testament scholar, Bultmann developed the method called "form criticism". He classifies the traditions of the Synoptic Gospels and examines each material by historical criticism to find out laws of their successions and thus pursues the becoming process of the Synoptic Gospels. From this, Bultmann concludes that the Synoptic Gospels were written neither out of historical interest nor as biographies of Jesus, but according to primitive Christianity's "kerygma", which means the proclamation of the Gospel. Bultmann holds that Jesus Christ, the object of this proclamation, is not the historical Jesus but the Christ for faith and worship; and that the unitary stories of Jesus must be identified as providing a myth needed for unifying the Kerygma.

From this method, Bultmann further developed later his method of "demythologization" by combining this idea with an existentialist interpretation. This way, Bultmann separates Jesus' life and personality from the message and discards interest in the former to concentrate on the message. His purpose in this respect is to bring the Bible into the sphere of "Geschichte" which, he thinks, is to be understood in terms of "encounter" as contrasted with objective observation. Like many Protestant thinkers, he as he confesses is indebted to Heidegger's existentia explicated in Being and Time. He picked out the concept of decision and regarded the encounter as centred on this. Apart from the

further developments in his History and Eschatology, wherein he systematically presents his thought on the Biblical eschatology by transforming it into a matter of "existential relation" (Existenzverhaeltnis). We shall discuss how Bultmann views the eschatology in terms of the idea of "development".

Early in 1931, Bultmann explicitly began to comprehend Jesus' eschatological teaching in the framework of his concept of existential decision:

"We must probably conclude that in the eschatological as in the ethical teaching of Jesus the fundamental view of God and of man is presupposed. The eschatological expectation arose out of the conviction that God is the final Reality, before whom everything earthly fades away, and before whom man in his unworthiness and worthlessness sinks to nothing. Only the future, which is God's, can bring salvation to man; and this future still faces man, in the present, and requires of him the decision for the world or for God. This is exactly the sense that Jesus' moral demands held He taught men that the present instant is the moment of decision, in which it is possible to yield up every claim of one's own and submit obediently to the will of God."²⁸

In his History and Eschatology, he expands the meaning of "encounter" by relating it to the concept of historicity as this is applied by Erich Frank.

"As Erich Frank says: 'The situation, in which the individual finds himself, is the result of that which he himself, and others before him, have been, and done, and thought, of historical decisions that cannot be revoked. It is only by taking account of this past that man can think and act and be. In this the historicity of his existence consists.' Man cannot choose the place from which he starts. But is it possible for him to set a certain goal at which he wishes to arrive and to choose the way on which he wishes to walk? Men have at all times been aware that this is possible only to a limited extent. They have comprehended that they are dependent on circumstances, and that the achievement of a plan of life involves a struggle with opposing powers, which are often stronger than man's own virtue. They know that history takes shape not only through the actions of men but by fate or destiny."²⁹

Intending to witness to the Gospel in existential contemporaneity, Bultmann applies this concept of historicity in a universal manner and views that the eschatology has developed from its cosmological inclination toward being "historicized". And he maintains that the current sense of historicity must succeed to the historicizing eschatological structure so that existential decision before the Gospel may be acquired in accepting man's destiny as a sinner.

The historicization of the Biblical eschatology, if confined to the New Testament, is traced from Jesus' preaching to the eschatological belief of the primitive church and further to those of Paul and John. Jesus' preaching, Bultmann holds, consists in an appeal for the reign of God as "the eschatological reign" -- eschatological, in the sense of eschatology in terms of the historicity mentioned above. Even when Jesus refers to the last judgement, the centre of the context lies in his existential sense of his time. Bultmann writes:

"It is not disputed that Jesus understood his time as the time of decision, and that he thought that men's attitude to himself and his message was decisive for them. The time has now arrived in which the old promises and hopes will be fulfilled."³⁰

To turn to the primitive church, its eschatology consists of both Jesus' eschatological preaching as well as Jewish apocalyptic themes developed by Later Judaism prior to Christ's appearance. While believing the coming end of the world, which was shared also by Paul, the church expanded eschatology to such an extent that "history is swallowed up in eschatology".³¹ That is, they regarded their community as the goal and consummation of the history of salvation on the one hand, and also as a super-historical community created by God's cutting into history on the other.

In Paul, Bultmann goes on, along with his apocalyptic eschatology, a transformation of eschatology took place. That is, both Israel and mankind as a whole are reviewed eschatologically: both are unified in one as sin, and "the end of history cannot be the natural result of historical development, but only its breaking off, accomplished by God". Especially in treating the question of "fulfilment of promises", "Paul has decisively modified the current eschatology as well as the apocalyptic view of history." He turns to identify the real bliss as "righteousness and with its freedom". "The reign of God, he says, is righteousness and peace and joy in the Holy Spirit." The new Aeon is already reality, for 'When the fulness of time was come, God sent forth his son'. For Paul, man is either a "life confirmed by God" or a "life condemned by God"; he in this direction calls man to choose in Christ the most decisive and important for being man. The eschatological thinking at this stage comes to reveal man's historicity, as he writes:

"But although the history of the nation and the world had lost interest for Paul, he brings to light another phenomenon, the historicity of man, the true historical life of the human being, the history which every one experiences for himself and by which he gains his real essence."³²

This direction of understanding the end as what is occurring in the present is pursued by John in a more thorough-going manner. That is, John completely abandons future cosmic events, and the eschatological event is regarded as happening in the present, for he says that the resurrection of the dead and the last judgement are present already in the coming of Jesus. Thus, Bultmann in constituting the "historicization" of eschatology proceeds to relate the emergence of sacraments to the later fading-away of interest in the cosmic eschatology. The disappointments caused by the delay of the parousia is coupled with the development

of sacraments. Individual's salvation, blessed immortality of the current soul and the presence of "the power of the beyond which will make an end of this world", all these are now pursued in sacraments. The church is regarded as a result of the cosmic victory of the risen Christ. Bultmann writes, characterizing this tendency:

"The relation of the present eschatological existence to its future is conceived not as a dialectical one, but as a real one, namely, as an anticipation of the future."³³

Bultmann has dissolved the myth of eschatology by subjecting it to his hermeneutic method. We are reminded that for Jaspers Jesus' eschatology must be left beyond his adoption because of the inexhaustible originality of revelation, insofar as the capacity of rationality is so limited. Bultmann, however, treats the myth as if it were rooted in existential decision rather than in the transcendent Instant in which the myth is called in to be inseparable part of the whole language of the Transcendence, as it were.³⁴

8.2.b Tillich

In Tillich, the Biblical eschatology undergoes a transformation in accordance with the dialectical structure of his thinking which unifies ontology and the Biblical faith. For Tillich, ontology is identical with philosophy as such, as we shall see later on. His thinking as a whole is claimed to remain on the boundary between philosophy and theology, though this in no way means that he intends to rest on any ready made philosophy or theology. Methodologically, he started by asking "How can theology be a science in the sense of Wissenschaft?" By his work Das System der Wissenschaften nach Gegenstaenden und Methoden (1923) he came to find

the place of a theology that may unify autonomous thinking and theonomous thinking on the basis of concern for meaning sought in the face of the Absolute. Tillich recollects:

"I answered by classifying all of the methodological disciplines as sciences of thinking, being, and culture; by maintaining that the foundation of the whole system of sciences is the philosophy of meaning (Sinnphilosophie); by defining metaphysics as the attempt to express the Unconditioned in terms of rational symbols, and by defining theology as theonomous metaphysics."³⁵

The "metaphysics" was replaced with the "ontology" when he found himself deeply influenced by Heidegger's lectures at Marburg. As his thinking grew to his Systematic Theology, he arrived at the view that ontology is centred on 'nature' of being. We think that, when compared with Jaspers' view that philosophy is "appeal", this fact is worth noting as a matter of characterizing his thinking. Tillich defines ontology:

"Philosophy is always in what the Greeks called aporia (without a way), that is, in a state of perplexity about the nature of being. For this inquiry I like to use the word "ontology", derived from logos (the word) and on (being); that is the word of being, the word which grasps being, makes its nature manifest, drives it out of its hiddenness into the light of knowledge."³⁶

To show more precisely this cognitive lead of his thinking:

"And more specifically, let us speak of ontological analysis in order to show that one has to look at things as they are given if one wants to discover the principles, the structures in the different realms of being, in nature and in man, in history and in value, in knowledge and in religion. But in each case it is not the subject matter as such with which philosophy deals but the constitutive principles of being, that which is always present if a thing participates in the power to be and to resist nonbeing."³⁷

Now, the question is how this ontology side is combined with the Biblical faith. Tillich brings in the concept of existence, and analyzes religious existence into two: ethical existence and social

existence. Ethical existence is what is concerned with God's righteousness and love, while the social existence with participation in the kingdom of God. And the heart of Christian existence is faith; faith is called "the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern." By this Tillich ascribes faith to that which is beyond human autonomy, as he goes on to say:

"And, since only that which is the ground of our being and meaning should concern us ultimately, we can also say: faith is the concern about our existence in its ultimate "whence" and "whither". It is a concern of the whole person; it is the most personal concern and that which determines all others. It is not something that can be forced upon us; it is not something which we can produce by the will to believe, but that by which we are grasped. It is, in Biblical terminology, the divine Spirit working in our spirit which creates faith."³⁸

From this sphere upward, so to speak, Tillich's thinking opens up the most creative origin of human existence: "man's encounter with the holy". This is the experience in which "divine revelation" is met by "human reception" at the zenith of the "I-thou relationship". As an encounter, it is "personal" in the sense of going into Rudolph Otto's "mystery" or "numinose", which means the Absolute, the ground of all absolutes appearing in "the relativity of man as subject" and in "the relativity of reality as object in terms of our cognitive and moral encounters."³⁹ God is personified, but not on the ground "that we first know what person is and then apply the concept of God to this", but that "in the encounter with God, we first experience what person should mean and how it is distinguished from, and must be protected from, everything a-personal."⁴⁰ It is "the source of the full meaning of person." We above pointed out the ontological, cognitive lead in Tillich's thinking, but now at the root of the Biblical faith we may see the sphere that lies beyond the division of the subject and object.

That is, the encounter of the holy indicates, Tillich says, that it soars above, or receives a foundation for these: the structure of the mind, the logical and semantic structure of the mind, the categories and polarities that make understanding of reality possible, the unconditional character of the moral imperative, and finally even agape or love -- agape, in the sense that it is experienced as a way to God, or as it "contains and transcends justice and unites the absolute and the relative by adapting itself to every concrete situation."⁴¹

In this all-embracing birth of human personality, the Biblical faith, Tillich goes on, is not only free from the intellectualistic and voluntaristic misconception of faith but rather positively open for all human functions, though in the first place in its transcending the functions.

"Faith, in the Biblical view, is an act of the whole personality. Will, knowledge, and emotion participate in it. It is an act of self-surrender, of obedience, of assent. Each of these elements must be present. Emotional surrender without assent and obedience would by-pass the personal centre. It would be a compulsion and not a decision. Intellectual assent without emotional participation distorts religious existence into a nonpersonal, cognitive act. Obedience of the will without assent and emotion leads into a depersonalizing slavery. Faith unites and transcends the special functions of human mind."⁴²

Yet, Biblical religion also knows that each function remains inclined to pervert ultimate concern to sin, whose essence is "disbelief, the state of estrangement from God, the flight from him, the rebellion against him, the elevation of preliminary concerns to the rank of ultimate concern." In other words, faith is not a result of intellectual or moral endeavours, but the reverse is true. Both in its personal and in its communal participation, it precedes all actions and all thinkings. In this sense

no ontology can be attempted without faith.

"only he who in the state of faith participates in the good and the true can act according to the norms of truth. Participation precedes action and thought, for participation gives a new being in which sin, or estrangement, is conquered. And participation in that which is of ultimate concern is faith. This means that the faith which conquers sin, by receiving reconciliation and a new being, must precede the search for ultimate reality, for the truth itself. Only in the new state of things can being itself be reached."⁴³

This dual structure of faith reminds us of another very important point: that it is associated with "symbols". The ultimate reality is expressed by religious symbols, and without these there is no way to participate in faith in its ultimate sense. No such symbols are identical with the ultimate reality. In other words, faith is to participate in the Unconditioned by the medium of the conditioned. The concrete contents of faith or the objective symbols of faith have not direct certainty.⁴⁴ Tillich thinks that expressions of the ultimate concern are symbols in the sense that they indirectly indicate the Unconditioned while participating in it. Thus, "the language of faith is the language of symbols, " holds Tillich. God is "the fundamental symbol of our ultimate concern," though the notion of God consists of two elements: "the element of ultimacy, which is a matter of immediate experience and not symbolic in itself, and the element of concreteness, which is taken from our ordinary experience and symbolically applied to God. Thus, for Tillich whatever is attributed to God is symbol, to the extent that "Jesus Christ" too is a symbol in this sense."⁴⁵

At any rate, what follows from the symbol-mediation is that faith requires "courage" in approaching the Unconditioned by means of the uncertain symbols. In this sense faith is "risk"; in this risk,

faith is coupled with "doubt." Such doubt is however not identical with methodic doubt nor with scepticism, in the sense that it is in tension with faith, in such a structure that ultimate concern reflects itself on its concrete content. Calling it "existential doubt", Tillich emphasizes:

"There is no faith without an intrinsic 'in spite of' and the courageous affirmation of oneself in the state of ultimate concern. This intrinsic element of doubt breaks into the open under special individual and social conditions. If doubt appears, it should not be considered as the negation of faith, but as an element which was always and will always be present in the act of faith. Existential doubt and faith are poles of the same reality, the state of ultimate concern."⁴⁶

Finally, if faith is to take into itself such a "No" of doubt and the "anxiety" of the insecurity, it means that faith embraces, whether consciously or not, the question of discerning ultimate reality from preliminary realities, in order not to fall into idolatry. This way, Tillich thinks that a place for ontology is found in faith as well.

"Faith embraces itself and the doubt about itself. Therefore it comprises itself and the ontological question, whose precondition is the radical doubt. Such a faith does not need to be afraid of the free search for ultimate reality. It does not need to keep ontology in ecclesiastical seclusion. It is Protestant by nature, whether it appears in Protestantism or in Biblical religion."⁴⁷

Concerning how far Tillich's ontological thinking structure permeates his understanding of Biblical revelation, one have to survey the whole of his Systematic Theology. But this is not our purpose, though at least two points must be ascertained here in connection with our previous discussion. One is the fact that for Tillich there is no ontology nor philosophy apart from his religious existence immersed in the personality creation which he ascribes to the holy.⁴⁸ It may be said that he ontologizes the Christian faith in order to become fully

certain about power of being as this is purified by his uplifting the Absolute beyond the polarizations of the absolutes and the relatives. The other is the fact that Tillich, so far as his original faith is concerned, dissolves Biblical words, including the logos and its subsequent dogmas and doctrines, by means of an expansive application of the category of being, which Jaspers, for the sake of the purity of the deity as well as of Existenz's freedom, limits as attributable only to consciousness at large. That is, Tillich's ontologico-theology seems to be beset with this doubt: that is, if it is so structured as to destroy the road to the unbreakable unity of revelation in which all human language is called in.⁴⁹

The discord appearing between these two points has much to do with his interpretation of the Biblical eschatology or with his philosophy of history, which is one of the major factors of his thinking ever since his early article Kairos (1922-three years after Karl Barth's Epistle to the Romans). And it is very symbolical of the implication of his philosophy of history that he concludes his Systematic Theology by the chapter "The End of History."

First, although the eschatology in the New Testament was expressed solely as an inseparable part of Jesus Christ, Tillich begins by jettisoning it to make it part of a metaphysics of history, that is, he put it as if linked to the straight line of salvation -- the line from God' creation toward the Second Coming of Christ, and Christ is regarded as the centre of history. This must be noted first because it in a sense the landmark from which he turns to the ontological transformation.

"History is the history of salvation in Biblical religion. From the prehistorical fall of Adam to the posthistorical reunion of everything in God there is one straight line, starting with Noah and Abraham and ending with the second coming of Christ. History is neither the expression of man's natural potentialities nor the tragic circle of man's growth and decay; history creates the new. In Christ a new Being has appeared within the world process; history has received a meaning and a centre."⁵⁰

He then sets up his kairos point on this straight line to put eschatology in a vertical structure conceivable to the existential present. This vertical structure consists in a unity of "the eternal" and "temporality". For convenience' sake, let us describe this unity in an ontological schema. The eternal is not endless temporality nor timelessness, but embraces time in the dynamism of history. Tillich states:

"Eternity transcends and contains temporality, but a temporality which is not subject to the law of finite transitoriness, a temporality in which past and future are united, though not negated in the eternal presence. History then runs toward its end in the eternal, and the eternal participates in the moments of time, judging and elevating them to the eternal."⁵¹

Now, concerning the straight line of the history of salvation, Tillich holds that it is impossible to identify such a history "because of the ambiguities of life in all dimensions,"⁵² just as world history cannot be identified. To claim such a line means to conceive salvation as created by history; salvation must be seen in the structure of the saving power's breaking into history; that is to say, how the kingdom of God in its creative dynamism manifests in history, that is, not the horizontal line but the vertical structure, constitutes the right approach.

When one takes a turn to this verticality, he is faced with the message that Jesus Christ is the final manifestation of salvation. Thus, Tillich replaces continuity of time, or time as quantitative,

with this central manifestation, in which time is settled anew in terms of quality. Past must not be sunk into oblivion, nor is future entrusted to relativistic autonomy; so far as faith goes, time has now come to the point of "fulfilment", from which Tillich derives his conception of kairos, to be sure. The question arises: what is the participation of the future, in which the present generation finds itself as faced with crises of existence? What does it mean to concern for meaning in history? What does it mean to the present faith as well as to all present ultimate concerns religious and philosophical? Mediating by such questions, Tillich analyzes the centre into "preparation", that is, the past, and "reception" that is the present; then he applies this formula to all possible moments of such reception, by which each future is determined.

"The term 'centre of history' has nothing to do with quantitative measurements, which would understand it as the middle between an indefinite past and an indefinite future, nor does the term describe a historical moment in which the cultural process came to a point where the lines of the past were united and determined the future. There is no such point of history. And what is true of the relation of the centre of history to culture is true of its relation to religion. The metaphor 'centre' expresses a moment in history for which everything before and after is both preparation and reception. As such it is both criterion and source of the saving power in history."⁵³

Moving in the area of the generations that follow this centre, Tillich applies the same pattern and derives a universal form from this central manifestation. That is to say, for Tillich eternity, to say ontologically, is the "power of being, and whenever it is present it appears by embracing each time past and present in the same time structure, though in less significance than owned by the central manifestation. That is to say, the kingdom of God manifests itself again and again in the process of history whenever the "prophetic Spirit" arises in reception of the same profundity. Therefore, each group of past around such a

reception gains meaning as the preparation for the reception, and each group of future as well becomes room for a further manifestation and a corresponding reception. Tillich formulates this succession as "movement from immaturity to maturity." Every generation can encounter "the transtemporal presence of the Christ", for this is "the potential presence of the centre in all periods of history." It is in such a transcendent structure that Tillich distinguishes between "the great Kairos" and the "relative Kairoi"; the relative is subject to be demonically distorted (Nazism) or to be erroneous. In any case, no kairos, no fulfilment of time, is conceivable apart from the criterion of the original, unique kairos.

"The fact that kairos-experiences belong to the history of the churches and that the 'great kairos,' the appearance of the centre of history, is again and again re-experienced through relative 'kairoi,' in which the kingdom of God manifests itself in a particular breakthrough, is decisive for our consideration. The relation of the one kairos to the kairoi is the relation of the criterion to that which stands under the criterion and the relation of the source of power to that which is nourished by the source of power."⁵⁴

Tillich's ontological universalism also interweaves other religion into this kairos order, which point may be referred to in this connection. But we shall keep ourselves restricted to tracing his transformation of the Biblicaleschatology. We have hitherto considered how Tillich encases the concrete message of the kingdom of God in an ontological time structure; next, we have to make clearer its eschatological implication by his concepts of beginning and end.

In retrospect, time consciousness is aroused from the quantity level to the quality level, that is, to the eternity sphere where the fulfilment of time is considered to be fully realized once and for all by the manifestation of eternity in Jesus Christ. This indicates that Tillich

goes along with Jaspers and Bultmann in giving up to understand the message in terms of the beginning and end of the historical process as such. Beginning and end must be understood in relation to the fulfilment of time, in which time consciousness gains vertical structure.

When concentrated in such a vertical structure, beginning is not to be understood in terms of clock time or horizontal time, so far as the issue has now become a matter of whole personality in which the intellect retains its function. If the successions of the kairos relation have become the frame for understanding modes of time (present, past and future), history first of all is the history of salvation. And in this context, salvation must be said to "begin the moment man becomes aware of the ultimate questions of his estranged predicament and of his destiny to overcome this predicament." Accordingly, as to the end, as long as the true time is the culmination in the fulfilment of time, and also so long as God remains the power of being, it is no longer a matter of the final catastrophe which is possible, nor is it an act of God; the end is the moment when mankind, for whatever cause, has lost hope for succeeding to the kairos. Tillich asserts:

"The end of history, in the same sense in which we spoke of its beginning, comes at the moment in which mankind ceases to ask the question of its predicament. This can happen by an external extinction of historical mankind through destruction caused cosmically or humanly, or it can happen by biological or psychological transformations which annihilate the dimension of spirit or by an inner deterioration under the dimension of the spirit which deprives man of his freedom and consequently of the possibility of having a history."⁵⁵

With this transformation of beginning and end, Tillich's kairos, that is, the inward present upheld by his time structure seems to acquire full urgency, so far as the psychological tension bound up with the ontological clarity is concerned. To relate Tillich to Jaspers,

apart from the structural difference between Jaspers' culmination in appealing and Tillich's rest on ontological universality, a similar stage of interpreting the Biblical eschatology to its divine originality, Tillich brings it down to the encounter level, where the revelatory language is made to belong to a universal structure of being. At least it is isolated from its living unity with the kingdom of God, so far as one hears the eschatological teaching as it is intended by Jesus himself; that is, Tillich too is characteristic for dealing with it not as a teaching of the truth of revelation in Jesus Christ but as a teaching of human destiny, if not of the structure of the kairos, an ontological derivation from the encounter. Thus, insofar as the unity of faith and eschatology matters as it is stressed by Jaspers' faith-minded communication, Tillich, representing the Christian faith, may be said to fail in purifying the unity as it occurs within the faith lived by Jesus' Existenz. That is to say, at this point of Tillich's interpretation of the Biblical eschatology, the issue of "actuality" so essential to Jaspers' communication seems to recede into the realm of "theory" proper. We see here a question arise: how the "actuality" of the Biblical eschatology (as an ultimate language of history) can be referred to by our replying to Jaspers' interpretation of it?

8.3 Conclusion

We shall conclude this thesis by way of clarifying the above mentioned question. It seems to be a way for us to bring in here Karl Barth, who is known for radically distinguishing "theologizing" from philosophy as well as from theological modes founded on "anthropological" premises. We cannot get into Barth's theology in this thesis, though there seems to have been a certain latent, polemic exchange

between Jaspers and Barth.⁵⁶ However, a few words with regard to Barth's locus must be mentioned for orientation's sake.

With Barth, thinking structure comes to shift from human transcending to thinking as a response to the presence of God's saving creation through Jesus Christ. He rather energetically worked on setting forth this dimension of thinking, for instance:

"He (God) cannot be known by the power of human knowledge, but is apprehensible and apprehended solely because of His own Freedom, decision and action. What man knows by his own power according to the measure of his natural powers, his understanding, his feeling, will be at most something like a supreme being, an absolute nature, the idea of an utterly free power, of a being towering over everything. This absolute and supreme being, the ultimate and most profound, this 'thing in itself', has nothing to do with God God is thought and known when in His own freedom God makes himself apprehensible.... Knowledge of God takes place where there is actual experience that God speaks, that He so represents Himself to man that he cannot fail to see and hear Him, where, in a situation which he has not brought about, sees himself faced with the fact that he lives with God and God with him, because so it has pleased God. Knowledge of God takes place where divine revelation takes place, illumination of man by God, transmission of human knowledge, instruction of man by this incomparable Teacher."⁵⁷

By the term "knowledge", Barth means "practical knowledge, embracing the entire existence of man."⁵⁸ At any rate, in such an all-embracing dynamic structure of thinking, Barth constitutes a most radical Christ-centric system, and the Biblical eschatology accordingly is taken as speaking about the Christ understood in the unity of "what he was, what he is and what he will be". This is the way eschatology is referred to by the Apostle's Creed. To say from man's side, it is a confession of the trinity of God.⁵⁹

This is how Barth deals with eschatology throughout his work of Church Dogmatics. When eschatology is concerned with Christians' future, Barth takes it as referring to man's hope, which is promised

by Christ. In connection with time structure, Barth identifies this realm of the Christ as "eternity", in the sense of "the fulfilment of time", in which not only the first witnesses but all later generations as well, even in recollection, are seized with the overwhelming divine presence - "presence" ever actual in the sense that "what happened still happen, and as such will happen."⁶⁰ Here we see that without understanding Christ in his eschatological presence throughout all possible and actual time point, thinking finds itself impossible as expressing faith. Barth characterizes this level of thinking as "thanking", which idea was developed by Heidegger in terms of ontology, too.⁶¹

In responding to Jaspers' appeal for salvation-concerned communication, we have tried to draw a path to the most encompassing sphere of the Biblical eschatology, where for a Christian Existenz the eschatology is lived as a language that primarily speaks about the cosmic sovereignty of the Christ. For this purpose, we have referred to three representative theologians, though knowing well that such a positive reference to theology is significant only when the horizon of thinking is so widely opened up as by Jaspers.

These theologians differ from Jaspers, insofar as the Biblical eschatology is concerned, in that they practice or live the relationship with Jesus as the creative source of man' all actual and possible relationships, communication included, and in that their respective commitment to this singular relationship is essentially bound up with an understanding of the Biblical eschatology - understanding in close contact with contemporary historic consciousness. Our points may be recapitulated as follows.

Bultmann's interpretation takes the position that a hermeneutic

method (a rational) fixed to a doctrine of "existenc" rules in such a way that the eschatology is reduced to a mode of myth that is subject to development in the direction which leads toward concentration on man's decision on God in the existential present. Seen in comparison with Jaspers' insight into the existential depths of Jesus' Existenz, Bultmann's position may be characterized as setting up the existential present as human decision which is not yet structured in the dynamic depths of what Jesus speaks about himself by the eschatological teaching. For Jaspers, such "demythologization" minimizes the faith lived by Jesus' own Existenz - about which Jaspers expects of Christian Existenz a clarification more authentic than those interwoven with inauthentic applications of universal validities.

Tillich's interpretation is ontology-minded, and an ontological universalization culminating in the idea of the power of being, transforms the concreteness of Jesus' revelation into kairos which he takes as the criterion for all later generations' kairoi. Since for Tillich the climax of each kairos is to see temporality resting on eternity, it is indicated that there is in such eternity no place for the Christ as the master of time - which is pronounced by the eschatology. Tillich thus jettisons the eschatology from the kingdom of God, believing that the two are entirely different regions. Although Tillich remains very careful not to mix the inevitable risk of concrete faith with the thus supported ontological clarification, his conception of the power of being orients his thinking in such a way that it cannot penetrate what Jesus' faith reveals by the unity of the kingdom of God and the eschatology. And it much less makes it possible to hear the eschatology as referring to the Christ himself rather than man's

destiny. Whereas for Jaspers the category of "being" can grow to a "cipher" which is bound to founder like all other ciphers, for Tillich it, though certainly not as mere objective cognition, grows to a "wisdom" regarded as a given power to be within the absolute. Thus the eschatology in its actuality is lost, while an existential ontology claims here a right to retain eternal meaning. Compared with Jaspers' conception of Idea, Tillich's kairos and accordingly his historicity know no foundering.

Interpreting these positions as reducing "God's Word" to anthropological premises, Barth stands out in upholding the eschatology as speaking foremost about Jesus Christ Himself. He emphasizes the unity of the eschatology and the Christ as crucial and inseparable. He does this as a praxis of faith by distinguishing "theologizing" from philosophy. In drawing a sharp line between "the Word of God" and human words, Barth's thinking undergoes a structure encompassing all philosophy-oriented theological thinkings. For Jaspers, "the word of God" may be a cipher at best, but this line of reflection is not capable of cutting through the concrete new creation taking place within the eschatological heights of Jesus' communion with those thus created. Jaspers himself is well aware of this difficulty, and that is why he urges "communication for faith" by his whole philosophizing. We seem to have moved, in saying these, in the sphere where, instead of the equivocality of the term "myth", the creative force present in the communion which calls in man's all possibilities so that man as pneuma may be created anew. Perhaps thinking, at this level, may turn to clarify the world of Dwelling (as homogeneous with communion) instead of the world of Being.⁶²

Under such circumstances, we shall close this thesis by

briefly confirming the significance of Jaspers' historicity as a matter of faith. First, if the Christian faith stands or falls with the eschatology, we may say that Jaspers' historicity can be received as a most encompassing and substantial philosophic appeal that serves for drawing attention to the creative meaning of the eschatology. Perhaps we do not have other examples which uplift the eschatology as a matter of Jesus' own faith inexhaustible to any modes of Reason. Next, in connection with historical thinking at large (we have such thinkers in mind: Collingwood, Toynbee, Husserl, Heidegger, etc.), the significance of presenting one's ultimate thinking as an appeal supported by such an encompassing reflection through retrieving all possibilities of being man cannot be lightly treated, as if man's mind were to be fixed to a single faculty without reference to the obvious struggles among spheres both past and present. In other word, to set historicity above all possible modes of historical thinking (e.g., Geisteswissenschaften, philosophy of history - both methodology and metaphysics, phenomenology, ontology, and finally the foundering of the very historicity), may not be disposed of as an "existentialism", as if one's own method or systematic had not been questioned from the bottom of its subject-object cleavage.

Finally, if we agree that thinking in its genuine sense is impossible without faith, the significance of Jaspers' appeal for communication, which is virtually concentrated in his appeal for communication between philosophic faith and revelation, must be assessed as unfolding the urgency as well as difficulty of the task on the level of appealing -- appealing, in the sense that here man is aware of, or experiences, his own ignorance before the other Existenz, whether

Christian or philosophic. Such would be enough to indicate the locus where a thinking is invited to Jaspers' philosophy, and a thinking may be spurred to arise in order to succeed to the task of faith enduring since the dawn of history.

CHAPTER I

N.B. Some quotations from the English translations of Jaspers' works were given slight alterations by this author. The asterisks denote his paragraphings and the square brackets denote his translations or notes.

¹Karl Jaspers, "Reply to My Critics", The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. Paul A. Schilpp, (New York, Tudor Publishing Co., 1957), pp. 750F.

²Karl Jaspers, Philosophie (3 vols., 3rd ed.: Berlin-Goettingen-Heidelberg, Springer Verlag, 1956), Vol. I, p. XXIII.

³Schilpp, ed., op. cit., p. 844.

⁴See Walter Kaufmann, Critique of Religion and Philosophy (Anchor Books, Garden City, Doubleday & Co., 1961), pp. 26ff.

⁵See Ernst Breisach, Introduction to Modern Existentialism (New York, Grove Press, 1962), p. 128.

⁶See Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 126ff; also idem., Perspectives on 19th & 20th Century Protestant Theology (New York, Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 234ff.

⁷See H. J. Blackham, Six Existentialist Thinkers (Harper Torchbooks, New York, Harper & Row, 1959), p. 152.

⁸See James Collins, The Existentialists (5th Gateway ed., Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1964), pp. 2f., 17, 212; F. H. Heinemann, Existentialism and the Modern Predicament (New York, Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 1-3.

⁹See John Wild, The Challenge of Existentialism (Bloomington & London, Indiana Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 30, 54.

¹⁰See Wilhelm Windelband and Heinz Heimsoeth, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie (15th ed., rev., Tuebingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1957), pp. 612ff.

¹¹See Michele F. Sciacca, Philosophical Trends in the Contemporary World, trans. Attilio Salerno (Notre Dame, Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1958), pp. 203-18.

¹²See Max Mueller, Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart (3rd ed., rev., Heidelberg, F. H. Kerle Verlag, 1964), pp. 52ff.

¹³Tillich, Perspectives, p. 244.

¹⁴Maurice Friedman, The Worlds of Existentialism (New York, Random House, 1964), p. 4.

¹⁷ Richard Dietrich, "Karl Jaspers als Geschichtsdenker", Historische Theorie und Geschichtsforschung der Gegenwart (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1964), pp. 77ff, 91, 96.

¹⁸ See John Hennig, "Karl Jaspers' Attitude to History", Schilpp, op. cit., pp. 566-91.

¹⁹ For Jaspers' definition of the 'Axial Period': "An axis of world history, if such a thing exists, would have to be discovered empirically, as a fact capable of being accepted as such by all men, Christian included. This axis would be situated at the point in history which give birth to everything which, since then, man has been able to be, the point most overwhelmingly fruitful in fashioning humanity It would seem that this axis of history is to be found in the period around 500 B.C., in the spiritual process that occurred between 800 and 200 B.C." -- Jaspers, The Origin, p. 1.

²⁰ Norbert Rigali, Die Selbstkonstitution der Geschichte im Denken von Karl Jaspers (Meisenheim am Glan, Verlag Anton Hain, 1968), p. 116.

²¹ See Bernhard Welte, "Der philosophische Glaube bei Karl Jaspers und die Moeglichkeit seiner Deutung durch die Thomistische Philosophie", Symposion, II(1949). pp. 9-190.

²² See Rudolf Gerber, "Jaspers and Kantian Reason", New Scholasticism, XLIII, No. 3 (1969), pp. 400-24.

²³ See Charles F. Wallraff, Karl Jaspers (Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1970).

²⁴ Schilpp, op. cit., p. 841.

CHAPTER II

¹ Philosophy, II., p. 349.

² For the significance of Jaspers' youth, see this thesis, III.

³ Concerning the encompassing nature of Jaspers' conception of "historic becoming", we are dealing with it as associated with an understanding of "meaning" (Sinn). Dilthey seems to have heralded the direction leading from the empirical sphere of meaning toward the speculative, encompassing one. We may outline his locus as such by the following consideration.

An approach to history in its entirety was identified by Oswald Spengler as rooted in man's search for "meaning". -- See Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West, trans. Charles F. Atkinson, Abridged by Arthur Help (Modern Library, New York, Modern Library, 1965), pp. 6, 31, 35. Such a search for meaning, however, is often confused with pursuing the total, objective knowledge of history. William Dray, for instance, takes it as identical with such a pursuit and characterizes all speculative approaches to history as those seeking "explanation" of history in order to know "what purpose or value or justification can be found for a process having the pattern and mechanism history is alleged to have." -- William Dray, Philosophy of History (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 65. Thus, Dray's position mistakes "meaning" for objectively shaped purpose or value, without lifting up the inner dynamism which was pointed out as essential to such a search for meaning.

In a sense, Jaspers Approach to history as well can be linked to search for meaning. Considered in this line of thinking, "meaning" must not be confined to the sphere of intellectualistic approaches to the world, for it is in fact rooted in the individual person's awareness of self, "self" in the sense of a "whole man" of whom the intellect is part. In this compass, "meaning" is identifiable with the wholeness of such a whole-concerned man. The wholeness is better called an "Idee of Life", and as such it is not what is knowable by the intellect, which is only one specific function of the whole man.

Dilthey's thinking concentrated on this matter. He asserted that, related to such a wholeness (or "meaning"), anything that occurs as its part is grasped as "meaningful" (bedeutsam). From this perspective, Dilthey attempted to lay the foundation for "meaning" on this level by describing the flow of "lived-experience" (Erlebnis). "Lived-experience" unfolds therefore that which never ceases to grow or to develop so long as the whole remains a life that has concern for itself, that is, for "meaning".

Thus, in this context, "search for meaning" is identical with the "becoming" of this very self which develops with understanding (verstehen) the life expressed. And finally, the whole of such expressed Life is history (Geschichte), according to Dilthey. In any case, the passion for "meaning" stems from self-awareness. When this inward movement expands along its range of understanding, the search for meaning approaches history in order to continue the inward becoming in which alone the partial functions becomes "meaningful". In brief, history, when considered as a matter of search for meaning, is identical with man's individual inward becoming, and therefore it is not comprehended in any framework of knowable entirety. Dilthey writes: "It (the whole) is a relation that is never totally accomplished. One should await the end of his life so that he in the hour of death could command a view over a whole out of which the parts' relation might become exhausted. Again one should await above all the end of history, were he to acquire the entire material for determining "meaning" in this sense. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the whole is given nowhere but to us, provided that it is understood through its parts." -- Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften (12 vols., 2nd ed. Stuttgart, B.G. Teubner, 1958), VII, p. 233; cf. Erich Kahler, The Meaning of History (Cleveland, The World Publishing Co., 1964), pp. 15-24.

⁴Dilthey, G.S., VII, p. 131.

⁵Dilthey, G.S., V, p. 27.

⁶See R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Galaxy Books, New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1956), pp. 1-7, 10, 205-209; also idem., "The nature and Aims of Philosophy of History", Essays in the Philosophy of History, ed. William Debbins (New York, McGraw-Hill Co., 1966), pp. 41-45.

⁷See Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. and ed. Quentin Lauer (Harper Torchbooks, New York, Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 122-47, 159-92; also idem., Husserliana, ed. Walter Biemel (Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), IX, pp. 223-34. Ludwig Landgrebe concentrates on the significance of Husserl's phenomenology considered in relation to the question of historicity; see Ludwig Landgrebe, Phaenomenologie und Geschichte (Gerd Mohn, Guettersloher Verlaghaus, 1967), pp. 11-33.

⁸See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 425-88; also idem., An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim (Doubleday & Co., 1961), pp. 35ff. Further, cf., Calvin O. Schrag, "Phenomenology, Ontology, and History in the Philosophy of Heidegger", Phenomenology, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Anchor Books, New York, Doubleday & Co., 1967), pp. 277-312.

⁹Philosophy, I, p. 16.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 2; underlines are mine.

¹¹Ibid., p. 1.

¹²Ibid., pp. 286f.

¹³We note that Jaspers, in his psychopathological studies, locates the Verstehung as lying between Existenz and factuality (phenomenological) and considers it as a possibility which leads toward Existenz illumination; see Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology (4th ed., entirely rev.), trans. J. Hoenig and Marian Hamilton (Chicago, The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 310ff.

¹⁴Already in his Psychologie der Welt Anschauungen Jaspers gives a comprehensive consideration to such a dynamism; see Karl Jaspers, Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (5th ed., Berlin-Goettingen-Heidelberg, Springer Verlag, 1960), pp. 185ff. See also Karl Jaspers, Existenzphilosophie (3rd ed., Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1964), pp. 55-85.

¹⁵Philosophy, I, p. 172.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 208.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 208f.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 209.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 214

²⁰Ibid., p. 209.

²¹Ibid., p. 216.

²²Ibid., p. 172

²³See Psychopathology, pp. 302ff.

²⁴See ibid., p. 27.

²⁵Psychologie, pp. 17f.

²⁶See this thesis, 3-2-c, 3-3-b, 4-2-a, 6-3.

²⁷See this thesis, 6-1-c, 6-3, 7-4.

²⁸See Jaspers, op. cit., p. 460.

²⁹Ibid., p.VII.

³⁰Ibid., p. XI.

³¹Psychopathology, p. xii.

³²Ibid., p. 859.

³³Jaspers' philosophic logic is developed in his work Von der Wahrheit, whose simplified version is his Vernunft und Existenz. What distinguishes Jaspers' idea of philosophic logic is that he by this conceives of the universal form of his own philosophizing, and constitutes this form by his conception of "the encompassing". The encompassing is then applied to the three divisions of Being, that is, to "World", "Existenz" and "the Transcendence". The term "encompassing", applied to these, indicates that none of these is comprehended in any exhaustive objectification, so long as objectification is limited to being rooted in the subject-object cleavage. Accordingly, in the sphere of authentic philosophy, no mode of scientific method nor formal logic can claim to be the measure of truth. Philosophic logic indicates the universal form of existential inward movement, that is, it concerns itself with the universal form of "transcending" in unending, communicative becoming of Existenz.

³⁴See Psychologie, pp. 769f. pp. 769f.

³⁵ See Karl Jaspers, "Philosophical Autobiography", The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers, ed. P.A. Schilpp, pp. 12ff.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 17.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 19.

³⁸ Jaspers, Psychopathology, p. 766.

CHAPTER III

¹ Schilpp, op. cit., p. 84.

² Jaspers, Schicksal und Wille, ed. Hans Saner (Munich, R. Piper & Co., 1967), p. 16. See also Hans Saner, Karl Jaspers, ed. ro ro ro, (Reinek bei Hamburg, Rowahlt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1970), pp. 7ff.

³ Schilpp, op. cit., p. 6.

⁴ Jaspers, loc. cit.

⁵ Schilpp, op. cit., p. 76.

⁶ See ibid., pp. 76f.

⁷ Ibid., p. 77.

⁸ See Jaspers, op. cit., pp. 104-108.

⁹ Schilpp, op. cit., p. 6. See also Jaspers, op. cit., p. 76.

¹⁰ See Gordon W. Allport, Becoming (New Haven & London, Yale Univ. Press, 1955), pp. 47-54.

¹¹ See this thesis, 7-3-a.

¹² See ibid., 7-1-b, 7-3-a.

¹³ Philosophy, II, p. 119.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Jaspers, Philosophy and the World, trans. E.B. Ashton (Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1963), pp. 24f.

¹⁶ In his Schicksal und Wille, Jaspers presents his article "Krankheitsgeschichte"; see op. cit., pp. 109-42.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 61

¹⁸See ibid., pp. 58f.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 68.

²⁰See this thesis, 7-3-a, 8-1-a.

²¹See Jaspers-Rudolf Bultmann, Myth and Christianity trans. Noonday Press (New York, Noonday Press, 1958), pp. 108-16. See also Jaspers, Schicksal, p. 164.

²²Ibid., p. 90.

²³Jaspers, Geistige Situation der Zeit (Berlin, Sammlung Geschen, 1931), p. 114.

²⁴Schicksal, p. 23.

²⁵See Schilpp, op. cit., pp. 7f.

²⁶Jaspers, "On my Philosophy", trans. Walter Kaufmann, in Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufmann (Meridian Books, Cleveland, The World Publishing Co., 1956), p. 132.

²⁷Ibid. See also Schilpp, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁸Kaufmann, loc. cit.

²⁹Schilpp, op. cit., p. 8.

³⁰Viz., Jaspers-Kurt Rossmann, Die Idee der Universitaet, 1st ed. (1923) and the entirely revised ed. (1946), which is followed by such works of Jaspers as: "Erneuerung der Universitaet" (1945), "Volk und Universitaet" (1947), "Wissenschaft im Hitlerstaat" (1957), "Von Heidelberg nach Basel" (1967).

³¹Jaspers, Schicksal, p. 22.

³²Ibid., p. 31.

³³For Ernst Meyer's life, see Schilpp, op. cit., pp. 40-45.

³⁴Philosophy, I, p. 3.

³⁵Schilpp, op. cit., p. 45. For the ways Mayer helped Jaspers, see ibid., p. 43.

³⁶See ibid., p. 42. For the original significance of Jaspers' philosophical faith, see Philosophy, I, pp. 376-82.

³⁷Schilpp, loc. cit.

³⁸Ibid., p. 43.

³⁹Jaspers, Einfuehrung in die Philosophie (4th ed., Zuerich, Artemis Verlag, 1963), p. 26.

⁴⁰Schilpp, op. cit., p. 84.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 11.

⁴²Ibid., p. 12.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Schicksal, p. 32.

⁴⁵See ibid., pp. 164-183.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 164.

⁴⁷For Jaspers' view of conjugal love, see his Geistige Situation, pp. 189f.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 188.

⁴⁹Jaspers, "Max Weber: Eine Gedenkrede", in idem., Rechenschaft und Ausblick (Munich, R. Piper & Co., 1958), p. 29.

⁵⁰See Schilpp, op. cit., pp. 369-91.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 32.

⁵²E.g., Weber's last work in this lecture: "We shall set to work and meet the 'demands of the day', in human relations as well as in our vocation. This, however, is plain and simple, if each finds and obeys the demon who holds the fibers of his very life." -- Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation", in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, trans. and ed. H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills (New York, Oxford Univ. Press), p. 156. See also this thesis, 5-2.

⁵³It is identical with "Max Weber: Eine Gedenkrede".

⁵⁴Rechenschaft, p. 28.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 20.

⁵⁶Cf. Marianne Weber, Max Weber: Ein Lebensbild (Heidelberg, Lambert Schneider, 1926), pp. 326-430.

⁵⁷Jaspers, loc. cit., p. 19.

⁵⁸Jaspers, Philosophie, I (German text), p. 145. Further see Schicksal, p. 34.

⁵⁹See Max Weber, op. cit., pp. 152f.

⁶⁰See Ernst Troeltsch, Historismus und seine Probleme (New ed., Scientia Aalen, Verlag J.C.B. Mohr, 1961), pp. 694-772.

⁶¹Schilpp, op. cit., p. 7.

⁶²See Max Weber, op. cit., pp. 151f.

⁶³Jaspers, "Max Weber: As Politician, Scientist, Philosopher", in idem., Three Essays, trans. and ed. Ralph Manheim (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964), p. 249.

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 261f.

⁶⁵Rechenschaft, p. 14.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 20.

⁶⁷See Three Essays, pp. 273f.

⁶⁸See this thesis, 6-4.

⁶⁹Rechenschaft, p. 28.

⁷⁰Psychologie, pp. 355f.

⁷¹See Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Science, trans. and ed. Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch (New York, The Free Press, 1949), pp. 90-112.

⁷²Three Essays, p. 238.

⁷³See this thesis, 3-3, 4-2-c, 7-1-c.

⁷⁴See Ernst Bernheim, Einleitung in die Geschichtswissenschaft (Berlin-Leipzig, Sammlung Goeschen, 1920), pp. 33-36.

⁷⁵See this thesis, 5-2, 7-4.

⁷⁶Schilpp, op. cit., p. 28.

⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 20f.

⁷⁸Psychologie, p. XI.

⁷⁹Schilpp, op. cit., p. 24.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 17.

⁸¹Ibid.

⁸²Psychopathology, p. 1.

⁸³Ibid., p. 6.

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 42.

⁸⁵Ibid.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 9.

⁸⁷Ibid., pp. 776f.

⁸⁸Philosophy and the World, p. 168.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 163.

⁹⁰Ibid.

⁹¹Ibid., p. 164.

⁹²See ibid., pp. 165ff.

⁹³Psychopathology, p. 812.

⁹⁴See Ibid., p. 776.

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 813f.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 766.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 820.

⁹⁸Schilpp, op. cit., p. 21.

⁹⁹Philosophy and the World, p. 179.

¹⁰⁰For a historical overview of this emphasis on cognition, see his "Vom europaeischen Geist" (1946). Further, his "Philosophie und Wissenschaft" (1948) will be helpful in providing for us with an essential description of his emphasis on cognition, "cognition" lifted up by him as "world orientation". See also this thesis, 6-3.

¹⁰¹Philosophy, I, p. 252.

¹⁰²Psychologie, p. IX.

¹⁰³Psychopathology, p. 311.

¹⁰⁴Being a medical student, Jaspers attended Emil Rusk's seminar in Kant's philosophy, during the 1913-14 session.

¹⁰⁵Psychologie, p. 12.

¹⁰⁶For Jaspers' urge for contemporization in this sense, see ibid., p. 466.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 488.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., pp. 466f.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 481.

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 478.

¹¹²Ibid., p. 483.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 484.

¹¹⁴Jaspers, The Great Philosophers, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1957), I, p. 284.

¹¹⁵Ibid., p. 380; underlines mine.

¹¹⁶Ibid., p. 3. See also ibid., p. viii. As to Jaspers' principal reflection on the importance of great human figures, see his Philosophy, II, pp. 351-59.

¹¹⁷Jaspers, Die grossen Philosophen (Munich, R. Piper & Co., 1957), I, p. 615f.

¹¹⁸For Jaspers' positive way of relating his own present philosophizing to Kierkegaard, see, e.g., "Kierkegaard" (1951), "Kierkegaard: Zu seinem 100. Todestag" (1955), and "Kierkegaard heute" (1964).

¹¹⁹For Jaspers' positive way of relating his own present pholosphizing to Nietzsche, see, viz., Nietzsche (1935), Nietzsche und Christentum (1947), and Vernunft und Existenz (1935), Chap. II.

¹²⁰Psychologie, p. 13.

¹²¹Ibid., p. 2.

¹²²Ibid., p. 377.

¹²³Ibid., p. 405.

¹²⁴See Great Philosophers, I, p. viii.

¹²⁵Psychologie, p. 8.

¹²⁶For Jaspers' maintaining the subject-object cleavage as fundamental phenomenon, see ibid., pp. 21f., Philosophy, I, pp. 49-51. Philosophy, II, pp. 297-302, and Karl Jaspers, -Von der Wahrheit (Munich, R. Piper & Co., 1947), pp. 321-50.

¹²⁷Psychologie, p. 30.

¹²⁸Ibid., pp. 34f.

¹²⁹Ibid., pp. 67f.

CHAPTER IV

¹Jaspers is opposed to identifying a philosophy with a system or with its doctrines. This, however, does not mean that he thinks of any existential interpretation without studying the philosophy's doctrines. On the contrary, he is second to none in emphasizing the need for employing all possible methodic procedures. Nevertheless, what he ultimately focuses on is not such doctrines but the thinker himself as Existenz. He maintains this posture even toward an existentialist thinker like Sartre, for example: "Ich halte den Existentialismus als Namen einer vermeintlichen Bewegung, unter die man dann eine Menge von Namen subsumiert, fuer oberflaechlich und nichtsagend. Es gibt keinen Existentialismus. Es gibt Sartre." -- Jaspers, Provokationen (Munich, R. Piper & Co., 1969), p. 40.

²Psychologie, p. 215.

³It is noteworthy that the essentials of Existenz discussed in his Psychologie are all seen in his Philosophie, II, to which he assigns the task of "Existenz illumination". This may be regarded as indicating that, regardless of the sharp line he draws between psychology and philosophy, he deals with Existenz here in his Psychologie by touching on all its depths.

⁴See Psychologie, pp. 220f.

⁵This existential value collision is an indication of "freedom", and Jaspers, in his Philosophie, puts this nature in such a dynamic way as: one becomes the way in which he evaluates. That is, "Nothing simply exists for me in the process of my rise and fall; everything is subject to possible evaluation. I evaluate my actions, my inner posture, the existence (Dasein) from which the other comes to meet me in communication, and whatever else occurs to me. I am -- and I become -- the way I evaluate." -- Philosophy, III, p. 75.

⁶Psychologie, p. 221.

⁷Ibid., p. 227.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid., p. 228.

¹⁰Jaspers' conception of "unconditional action" is also developed in his Philosophie and defined as follows: "Unconditional action in the world is therefore possible only if I have left the world, so to speak, and am now reentering it. Action in the world, along with all existence, has then acquired a symbolic character that does not make the world unreal but allows it to be irradiated from its depths. It becomes possible, then, for reality to be relative and yet a matter of total present commitment, for relativization not to make it indifferent but rather to preserve its weight. The tension in existence -- that I act as if existing reality were absolute, and am aware at the same time that as mere reality everything is nothing -- this tension is the truth of unconditional action in the world." -- Philosophy, II, p. 257.

¹¹Psychologie, p. 228f.

¹²Ibid., p. 280.

¹³Ibid., p. 229. Further see Philosophy, II, pp. 177-222.

¹⁴Psychologie, p. 233.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 236. See this thesis, 3-3-b, 6-3-b.

¹⁶Jaspers uses here in The Psychologie the term "Leben", because for his present cognitional approach Existenz becomes the object of Verstehung, while Existenz as overwhelming any objectification is more than such an object and becomes a matter of "illumination" (Erhellung); illumination, in the sense that Existenz becomes opened up in transcending communication supported by clarity, which is not subsumed in any mode of objectification. The illumination is then mediated by a sense of ignorance.

¹⁷Psychologie, p. 241.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 254.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 255.

²⁰As to "appealing" as such a culmination of thinking, the "Apell" gained perhaps the most intensified expression when Jaspers in his Geistige Situation der Zeit concluded the discussion on present decision by choosing beyond all philosophic possibilities "erweckende Prognose" against "betrachtende Prognose". See ibid. pp. 201ff.

²¹Psychologie, p. 136. Further see Philosophy, II, pp. 212ff. and Jaspers, Philosophy Is for Everyman, trans. R.F.C. Hull and Grete Wells (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965), pp. 97-105.

²²See Philosophy, II, pp. 193-201, and Philosophy Is for Everyman, pp. 106-115.

²³See Philosophy, I, pp. 255-62.

²⁴See Philosophy, II, pp. 190f.

²⁵See ibid., pp. 215ff.

²⁶Psychologie, p. 275.

²⁷Ibid., p. 277. See Reason and Existenz, trans. William Earle (New York, Noonday Press, 1955), pp. 24f., 45ff.; also Geistige Situation, pp. 10-16.

CHAPTER V

¹The translator E.B. Ashton applies the term "anti-historicity" to the German term "Geschichtslosigkeit", whereas we prefer the term "a-historicity". For its appearance in Jaspers' Existenz illumination, see Philosophie (German text), II, pp. 401ff.

²Psychologie, p. 286.

³Ibid., p. 71.

⁴See ibid., p. 289.

⁵Ibid., pp. 290-304.

⁶Ibid., pp. 293f. See also Jaspers: Nietzsche (3rd. ed., Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1937), pp. 245-253; Philosophy, II, pp. 150ff.; The Origin, pp. 214f.

⁷For Jaspers' treatments of Sophists in the modern times, see his Geistige Situation, pp. 168-71, and also Philosophy, II, pp. 98ff.

⁸See Philosophy, I, p. 260; II, pp. 97ff.

⁹See ibid., pp. 151ff.

¹⁰Psychologie, pp. 305f.

¹¹Ibid., p. 307.

¹²Ibid., p. 308.

¹³We note here that Jaspers' conception of "the Encompassing", which he began to develop positively in Existenzphilosophie (1937), had already formed its basic structure in his cognitional thinking; later on Jaspers employs the term "das Umgreifende", however.

¹⁴For the retionalism exemplified by modern technology, which of course can be dealt with either in authenticity or in inauthenticity, see Jaspers: The Origin, pp. 82-125; Philosophy, I, pp. 316-26.

¹⁵Psychologie, p. 311.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 313.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 319f.

¹⁹Jaspers values Authority as indispensable for philosophizing. See Philosophy, I. pp. 307-10 and Von der Wahrheit, pp. 766-834.

²⁰See The Origin, pp. 153-57.

²¹Psychologie, p. 322.

²²Ibid. For "arbitrariness", see Philosophy, II, pp. 155ff.

²³Psychologie, p. 324.

CHAPTER VI

¹Psychologie, pp. 329.

²Ibid., p. 336.

³Ibid., p. 337.

⁴Ibid., p. 341; underlines are mine.

⁵Ibid., p. 344.

⁶For the "transcendent" meaning of the "demon", see Philosophy, III, pp. 80f.

⁷For Jaspers' understanding of Jesus' faith, see this thesis, 7-1.

⁸Psychologie, p. 359.

⁹Ibid., p. 377.

¹⁰For the way Jaspers relates indirect communication in this sense to his own philosophizing, see Philosophy, I, pp. 296-316; II, pp. 93-103. See also this thesis 7-4, especially.

¹¹Psychologie, p. 357.

¹²For the location of this topic, see ibid., pp. 413-432.

¹³When freedom and inanimation means fear of being self, the will to non-power turns out to be, e.g., the will to enterprise, the will to labor, the will to industriousness, the will to isolation, the will to alienation from society, the will to lose activity, etc. These are merely for the expediency of the mundane self, and therefore they are passive but not active.

¹⁴Loc. cit., p. 448.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 451.

¹⁶See ibid., p. 459.

CHAPTER VII

¹Buber bases genuine dialogue (not in the sophistic sense of the work) on unconditional "trust" and attributes the fulfilment of such dialogue to God, whose trust alone, being absolute, is capable of giving foundation for trust on man's part. See Martin Buber, I and Thou, 2nd ed., trans. Ronald G. Smith (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 123-37. and his article "Dialogue" (1929), idem., Between Man and Man, trans. Ronald G. Smith (The Fontana Library, London-Glasgow, Collins, 1961), pp. 17-59.

²Philosophy, II, p. 107.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., pp. 221f.

⁵See Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the crisis, pp. 122-47, 187-92.

⁶Philosophy, II, p. 108.

⁷Ibid., p. 221.

⁸Ibid. p. 109.

⁹Unconditional acts are acts of faith, so writes Jaspers: "An active faith is the certainty of being in which unconditional action originates; it is historicity. In action -- provided I am not acting accidentally, for some purpose of the moment, but on grounds of a profoundly, purposeless binding guidance -- to have faith means to be ready to bear whatever may come. It means I can act purposively and at the same time be sure of acting truly even if everything fails. The unfathomable deity grants me the calm and the impulse to do what I can as long as there is a chance." -- Philosophy, II, p. 245.

¹⁰For Kant's doctrine of Ideas, see this thesis, 3-3-b, 6-3-b.

¹¹See Philosophy, I., P. 260.

¹²See ibid., p. 338.

¹³Ibid., p. 109.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 109f.

¹⁵For Jaspers' position of transforming the Christian faith, see Jaspers-Rudolf Bultmann, Myth and Christianity, trans. Noonday Press (New York, Noonday Press, 1958), pp. 32f. Jaspers further writes: "I see hope in the liberal faith, i.e., in Protestantism proper, which as such is capable of transforming the Biblical faith in all its manifestations. In this respect, as in others, no one can plan ahead. But freedom, moved by the pneuma of faith in God, projection of the Transcendence in the world, opens horizons, dissolves every evils, looks actuality squarely in the eye, and arrives at decision with the natural certainty of reason." -- op. cit., p. 115. See also Schilpp, op. cit., pp. 760-69.

¹⁶For Jaspers' communicative treatment of revelation, see his essay "Der philosophische Glaube angesichts der christlichen Offenbarung", Philosophie und christliche Existenz, ed. Gerhard Huber (Basel-Stuttgart, Verlag Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1960), pp. 1-92; also his Philosophical Faith and Revelation, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York, Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 15-60., and this thesis, 8-1-b.

¹⁷For the theological strifes for the clarity of the biblical eschatology, see Oscar Cullman, Salvation in History, trans. SCM (New York & Evanston, Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 28-64. For a historical overview of the same question, we refer to James D. Smart, The Divided Mind of Modern Theology (Philadelphia, The Westminster Press, 1967). Also see Ernst B. Koenker, Great Dialecticians in Modern Christian Thought, Minneapolis, Minnesota, Augsburg Publishing Co., 1971), pp. 101ff. Further, see this thesis, 8-2.

¹⁸Jaspers writes, e.g.: "In my Philosophie (Vol. II, I called "historicity" not the historically particular, not any given individual or knowledge. Rather, I meant by historicity the existential possibility of achieving and experiencing the actual unity of time and eternity in the moment. The possibility is grasped out of existential freedom. Only in this historicity can the merely historical acquire an existential meaning." -- Jaspers-Bultmann, op. cit., p. 99.

¹⁹Philosophy, II, p. 110.

²⁰Ibid., p. 111.

²¹Ibid., p. 113.

²²Ibid.

²³For such an actualization, see Jaspers, "Was ist Existentialismus", Aneignung und Polemik (Munich, R. Piper & Co., 1968), pp. 497-501.

²⁴This reminds us of Dilthey's attempts to grasp Leben in its structure, namely, the subjectivity characteristic for its becoming, while on the other hand emphasizing Leben as an inexhaustible "riddle" filled with all sorts of contradiction. See his G.S., V., pp. 80f.

²⁵Philosophy, II, pp. 114f.

²⁶Jaspers' position is distinguished for conceiving the whole of Existenz as an "Idee" inexhaustible by general consciousness or by the intellect, on the ground that in the Existenz state, man bound to faith in eternity never rests on objectivity. See Philosophy, II, pp. 8f. Cf., This thesis, 2-3-B.

²⁷Loc. cit., p. 117.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid., p. 193.

³⁰See ibid., p. 119.

³¹Philosophie, II (German text), p. 135.

³²Philosophy, II, pp. 124-129.

³³Ibid., p. 119.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶See Einfuerung, pp. 11f.

³⁷For Jaspers' attitude to such duties, see Philosophy, I, pp. 313ff; III, pp. 75ff. See also his Geistige Situation, pp. 32-64, 106ff, 179-88.

³⁸Philosophy, II, p. 120.

³⁹Philosophie, II (German text), p. 137.

⁴⁰See Philosophie, II, p. 120.

⁴¹The intrinsic combination of empirical history as a universal and philosophy of history as a historic is treated in, e.g., ibid., pp. 342-51.

⁴²See ibid., p. 121.

⁴³Philosophy, III. 5.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 18.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 24.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 25.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 16.

⁴⁸Ibid., p. 117.

⁴⁹See ibid., pp. 149, 191f.

⁵⁰For a general picture of Jaspers' view of ontology, see Philosophy, III, pp. 137-44. See also this thesis, 8-2-a.

⁵¹Philosophy, III, p. 180.

⁵²Ibid., p. 194.

⁵³Ibid., p. 198.

CHAPTER VIII

¹It is rather noteworthy that Jaspers treats Jesus' personality as "Existenz" by his so distinctively multi-dimensional structure of thinking. See further The Origin, pp. 1-21, 68ff, 269f.

²Philosophy, II, pp. 376f.

³Philosophy, I, p. 313.

⁴Ibid., p. 296.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Ibid., p. 297.

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid., p. 298.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 302f.

¹¹Ibid., p. 300.

¹²Ibid., pp. 314f.

¹³See Great Philosophers, I, pp. 92f.; Jaspers-Bultmann, op. cit., pp. 108-12.

¹⁴For "Form Criticism", see this thesis, 8-2-a.

¹⁵Great Philosophers, I, pp. 21f.

¹⁶Philosophy, II, p. 315.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 310f.

¹⁸Great Philosophers, I, pp. 75f.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 88.

²⁰Ibid., p. 90.

²¹Philosophy, III, p. 73.

²²See ibid., pp. 81f.

²³Ibid., p. 115.

²⁴See ibid., pp. 98f.

²⁵Philosophical Faith, p. 193.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷See Rudolf Bultmann, Theologie des neuen Testaments (4th ed. Tuebingen, Verlag J.C.B. Mohr, 1961), pp. 1-39; idem., Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 11-21; and idem., "The Study of the Synoptic Gospels", in Bultmann-Karl Kundsinn, Form Criticism, trans. and ed. Frederick C. Grant (Harper Torchbooks, New York, Harper & Row, 1962) pp. 7-74.

²⁸Bultmann-Kundsin, op. cit., pp. 73f.

²⁹Rudolf Bultmann, History and Eschatology (Gifford Lectures, New York, Harper & Row, 1957) pp. 1f.

³⁰Ibid., p. 32.

³¹Ibid., p. 37.

³²Ibid., p. 43.

³³Ibid., p. 52.

³⁴See Jaspers-Bultmann, op. cit., pp. 22-32.

³⁵Paul Tillich, On the Boundaries (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), p. 55.

³⁶Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (Chicago, The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 6.

³⁷Ibid., p. 8.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 51f.

³⁹Tillich, My Search for Absolutes (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1967), pp. 129f.

⁴⁰Tillich, Biblical Religion, p. 27.

⁴¹Tillich, My Search, pp. 124f.

⁴²Tillich, Biblical Religion, p. 53.

⁴³Ibid., p. 56.

⁴⁴See Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 41-54.

⁴⁵See ibid., p. 46; and also Tillich, Systematic Theology, (Chicago, The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951-63), I, pp. 241ff; II, pp. 108-13.

⁴⁶Tillich, Dynamcis, pp. 21f.

⁴⁷Tillich, Biblical Religion, p. 61.

⁴⁸See Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (eds.), The Theology of Paul Tillich (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1964), p. 6.

⁴⁹We shall raise this question once more by way of concluding this thesis.

⁵⁰Tillich, loc. cit., p. 41.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 78.

⁵²Tillich, Systematic Theology, III, p. 362.

⁵³Ibid., p. 364.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 370.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 367.

⁵⁶See Philosophical Faith, pp. 325-29.

⁵⁷Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, trans. G.T. Thomson (Harper Torchbooks, New York, & London, Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 23f.

⁵⁸Ibid. p. 25. For Barth's theological understanding of praxis (faith in the Biblical revelation) distinguished from that philosophically conceived of, see his Anselm, trans. Ian W. Robertson (Meridian Books, Cleveland & New York, The World Publishing Co., 1962), pp. 15-72. For an outline of his position in this respect, see his essay "Philosophie und Theologie", Philosophie und christliche Existenz, pp. 93-106. For an overall systematic presentation of it, see his work Die kirchliche Dogmatik (6th ed. Zollikon-Zuerich, Evangelischer Verlag, 1952), Vol. I/1, pp. 1-43.

⁵⁹An example of this manner of Barth's can be seen in his work Credo (1935), which followed the order of Apostle's Creed.

⁶⁰Barth, Dogmatics, p. 131.

⁶¹See Martin Heidegger, What is called Thinking?, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York, Evanston, and London, Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 148-71, especially.

⁶²If we look back upon the whole road we have ascended up to the present sphere, it is as though we had climbed up to the eternal (existentially assurable) present wherein man's thinking receives its authentic creativity. In other word, thinking seems to have assured the fact that it exists because the fundamental relationships -- both communicativity assured with the increased clarity of the historicity, and the communion assured with the communication-mediated clarity of the Biblical eschatology -- abide in an unfathomable grace, so to speak, as long as Existenz' struggle for time-fulfilment continues. This point reminds us of the "abidance" which Martin Buber refers to the I and Thou relationship. Buber says:

"And to anticipate by taking an illustration from the realm of unconditional relation: how powerful, even to being overpowering, and how legitimate, even to being self-evident, is the saying of I by Jesus. Thou Father in such a way that he himself is simply Son, and nothing else but Son. Whenever he says I he can only mean the I of the holy primary word that has been raised for him into unconditional being. If separation ever touches him, his solidarity of relation is the greater: he speaks to others only out of this solidarity. It is useless to seek to limit this I to a power in itself or this Thou to something dwelling in ourselves, and once again to empty the real, the present relation, of reality, I and Thou abide: every man can say Thou and is then I, every man can say Father and is then Son: reality abides. (Martin Buber, I and Thou, 2nd ed., trans. Ronald G. Smith (New York, Charles & Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 66f).

If we begin to think because the fundamental relationship so abides, it seems that we think profoundly in terms of our "dwelling" (or living in being aware of love) rather than "being". (For the fundamental structure of dwelling in this sense, see, e.g., Deutonomy, 33:27; John 15:1-11) For, in terms of "being", thinking emerges as "contemplation", while of "dwelling", it emerges to respond, in thanking, to the eternal expansion of the "calling-back" of human word in all realms, i.e., to the communion. Or more rationally, faith in dwelling, whether it is philosophic as Jaspers clarified it, or it is what is revealed through the Mediator. In a word, a fluidification of "being" may be done, by taking its root in the power of the eschatological calling. When thinking has passed through the communication between the historicity and the eschatological creation of new man, it finds itself abiding, in response to the initial "abidance", within the life of the I and Thou relationship. Without such abidance, no thinking becomes possible, for at this stage all thinking emerges as nothing but a living stretch of the "primary word" "I and Thou". Much more so if thinking, as seen in Jaspers' conception of "unending reflection", takes the road of reflection. Thus the category of "being" turns out to be heterogeneous with the origin of thinking, if it is claimed to be the ultimate category. The concern about "being" may be localized within the creative expansion of the I and Thous relationship, whose authentic actuality is experienced at the zenith of understanding the eschatology in communication with the historicity, so far as a Christian Existenz is concerned.

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